In the calculus of domestic politics, Tehran claims victory, relying on the premise that the regime did not fall, despite the opacity surrounding its hierarchy and decision-making process. It is as though it has adopted the same logic as the armed groups it created in neighboring countries, through which it has waged its wars of influence. These groups still cling to the same formula: survival is victory, regardless of the immense losses in lives and livelihoods and the widespread destruction inflicted on states.
This is what has occurred in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria in the past and continues today in Iran. The war against it has destroyed a large portion of the state’s military, economic, and civilian assets, yet the regime, in a state of coma and facing an uncertain fate, continues to claim victory.
In military terms, first, Tehran carried out deliberate aggression against neighboring Arab states. Second, the war against it has achieved a significant portion of its objectives and destroyed most of its arsenal, while its response to Israel had limited strategic effect. Its strikes on US military assets were also extremely limited. The damage affected neighboring countries rather than the bases themselves, with the exception of the Strait of Hormuz, which is becoming a central dilemma of war and peace and may reach a point where the cost of closing it exceeds the cost of keeping it open. If Tehran persists in manipulating it, it could shift from being a military advantage to a global strategic liability.
In the context of the truce and negotiations, both parties are, so far, heading to the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, despite Washington’s disregard for all the conditions put forward by Tehran. At the same time, Tehran continues to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, and Lebanon remains outside the truce.
From a Lebanese perspective, the country does not appear to be part of the day after, whether following the war or the truce. Islamabad seems to have fulfilled its negotiating role with Tehran, which claims it requested that Lebanon be included in the truce. Nevertheless, it appears prepared to proceed with negotiations despite Israel’s hostile position, which rejects a unified truce and insists on continuing its offensive, alongside a degree of American acquiescence expressed by the US president and vice president.
On the bloody Wednesday when Beirut came under intense attacks, Israel sent a direct message to both domestic and international audiences: the day after the war will be determined by Tel Aviv, not by any external negotiation track. It is intent on separating the tracks, both politically and militarily, even if Pakistan’s mediation succeeds in establishing a truce.
Domestically, the Lebanese state welcomed the truce and the Islamabad negotiations between Washington and Tehran, but rejected the idea that the two parties would negotiate on Lebanon’s behalf, especially given that previous experiences had been unfavorable to Lebanon. Tel Aviv, which according to reports could have pursued de-escalation, will not accept, politically or militarily, a negotiating track with the Lebanese state that would strip it of the military advantage it secured from Lebanese negotiators, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and former Prime Minister Najib Mikati, during the first support war. That arrangement allowed it to continue its operations in Lebanon, and it seeks to maintain it, in addition to retaining what it has seized on the ground or through firepower during this phase.
Those who are resentful, indeed genuinely shocked by Iran’s actions that drew Lebanon into war without ensuring its exit, ignored the clear statements made by the enemy in the first hours after the truce announcement, namely that Lebanon was not included and that the offensive would continue until its objectives were achieved. Overwhelmed by political and psychological shock, they directed their anger toward the state, which rejected acting through proxies rather than rejecting the truce or negotiations, and which refuses to allow any internal or external actor to speak on its behalf. As a result, they launched a systematic campaign accusing the government and its prime minister of treason.
At a moment of extreme sensitivity and responsibility, it would have been more appropriate for these elites to act rationally, recognize the scale of the national crisis Lebanon faces as both a state and a society, and call for dialogue instead of promoting rumors that could ignite internal strife and destroy what little remains after the war has already left widespread devastation.
What is clear is that on the second day after the truce, Tel Aviv shaped Lebanon’s trajectory through force. On the following day, after designating the government headquarters as a potential target, it will leave Lebanon’s path to the Lebanese themselves, who have chosen division as a way to avoid confronting the reality imposed by Tehran’s support war.
In reality, Tehran could choose not to enter negotiations in support of its proxies. However, this would not be the first time it has prioritized its national interests above all others. Those who deny this reality have many precedents before them, instances in which it drew others in and then abandoned them, only for them to return to their homelands and families after a bitter experience.
