I have the impression that most of the discourse around efforts to defuse tensions in our region is underpinned by wishful thinking and deliberate ambiguity, not tangible realities and serious commitments.
Personally, I do not doubt that only a small minority of regional players reject peace. I am convinced that the extremist biblical–Talmudic right currently ruling in Israel leads this minority, along with their backers abroad. However, there are no shared political grounds that could underpin practical and sincere approaches to break out of the impasse, and a great deal of mistrust has accumulated.
Meanwhile, human suffering continues. In Palestine, Lebanon, and other regions threatened by the unchecked momentum of the “Greater Israel” project, the specter of death and displacement remains. The “Black Wednesday” massacre in Lebanon, after the atrocities in Gaza, may well have been one of the most painful chapters of this regional deadlock.
This brutality may have helped accelerate a serious turn toward negotiation. Success could spare further bloodshed and could help this or that party “climb down from the tree” and “save face.”
Nonetheless, it is clear that the rival parties do not have equal need for negotiations amid the imbalance of firepower and alliances, to say nothing of differing degrees of commitment to peace and justice.
Accordingly, regardless of the intentions to reach a real agreement, no clear outlines have yet emerged. Many statements suggest a strong inclination among those who feel powerful toward “military resolution” and seizing the moment to realize an old dream of dominance.
The current Israeli leadership stands at the forefront, seeking to exploit this moment by raising prohibitive demands, hindering mediation, and ultimately overturning any outcomes these processes may produce.
Bezalel Smotrich steps forward before his extremist biblical audience, promising further expansion of the occupation, while Itamar Ben Gvir boasts of his fascistic record, the latest chapter of which was approving the execution of Palestinian prisoners.
On the other hand, some hardliners in Iran believe they have nothing left to lose after Washington and Tel Aviv waged a war to topple the regime.
From this vantage point, these hardliners, especially within the IRGC, seek to “change the rules of the game” in line with their available strengths and pressure points, after having paid dearly in the first rounds of confrontation.
At the top of those priorities was killing the head of the regime, followed by successive operations aimed at destroying the IRGC and Iran’s vital economic infrastructure, as well as pursuing Tehran’s ideological and strategic allies.
This decision to change the rules of the game began with two steps, military and economic: targeting military bases in the Gulf region and closing the Strait of Hormuz, decisions with unpredictable consequences, especially under an American president like Donald Trump.
Closing an international waterway as crucial as the Strait of Hormuz is not enough to assume that only “enemies” will see themselves as the targets. In reality, many parties now feel dragged into a costly and dangerous conflict they could have done without. Although these parties seek to mediate, they may find themselves unable to do so amid sharp polarization and high stakes.
The current situation in Lebanon constitutes a painful manifestation of this polarization, a reality familiar to the Lebanese, the Arabs, the Israelis, and of course, the Americans.
It is well known that Lebanon was founded in 1920 after a world war that redrew maps and revived regional wars and feuds dating back to the “Eastern Question” of the eighteenth century. That founding enlarged the territory of the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate (then predominantly Christian in its population) and incorporated large areas with Muslim majorities.
The Mutasarrifate had itself been established at the end of a civil war between 1840 and 1860, which helps explain why modern Lebanon’s history has been marked by fragility, limited consensus, and externally sponsored settlements.
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon under a right-wing Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, and a right-wing American president, Ronald Reagan, with the aim of eliminating the Palestinian resistance.
Today, Lebanon is being invaded again, and we are told that the declared objective is to strike Hezbollah, which did not even exist in 1982.
The tragedy of the Lebanese is that some did not oppose the 1982 invasion, and even tried to justify it as necessary to end Palestinian dominance imposed by force of arms. Today, there is again no consensus in rejecting the current invasion, as some justify it as a way to end Iranian dominance.
The absence of opposition in the past, like the absence of consensus today, will not protect this small entity that always risks being the first to lose out.
