Palestinians never obtained a political system with full sovereignty, authority, and capacity after the Arab League summit in Rabat that recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Instead, they had the so-called “regime of factions” that was ultimately headed by Fatah leader Yasser Arafat, whose charisma and exceptional abilities enabled him to remain at the helm for nearly forty years.
The “regime of factions,” which was supplemented by a number of Palestinian figures labeled “independents,” had been tailored to the needs of agreeing to a compromise to settle the Palestinian question. Thanks to the absolute pragmatism of Yasser Arafat and the rest of the Fatah top brass, the “system of factions” managed to take decisions that would have otherwise been impossible. Chief among them was the resolution issued by the “National Council” (the parliament-in-exile) calling for the establishment of a Palestinian national authority on any segment of the territory that the occupation withdrew from. At the time, the resolution was described as “transitional,” meaning that the ultimate goal of liberating all Palestinian territory had not been abandoned. With all the controversy the decision provoked, the most significant reaction (that ultimately led to its modification) was its characterization as “transitional,” which was unsatisfactory to a number of states that insisted the “transitional” be made “final.” Consequently, the term “transitional” was dropped from all the resolutions and documents of the PLO down to the present day.
The “regime of factions,” together with its unanimously recognized framework, the PLO, was integrated into the Arab system, with all its positives and negatives. As a result, the PLO lost important arenas of operations, imposing a shift toward two alternative tracks: first, intensifying resistance inside the occupied territories, which was followed by the unarmed intifada, and second, emphasizing the regional and international dimensions of political efforts.
Despite the divisions and conflicts it experienced, the “system of factions” was ideal for exile, as it allowed for effective leadership that could make decisions and shape a collective course of action. This remained the case until the profound and major transformation brought about by the success of the secret talks with Israel in Oslo, which inevitably changed the “regime,” adapting it to the Palestinians’ new political conditions. It was here that the idea of the “dual regime” emerged.
It added a parliamentary character to the previous system, which demanded the elections of a parliament, the Legislative Council, that would administer the areas governed by the Palestinian Authority, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while retaining the “regime of factions” through the PLO, which became a representative framework whose political authority extended to the Palestinian people as a whole. With the election of the first Legislative Council, in which all residents of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip took part, the “dual regime” introduced an unprecedented system: the political decision-making center was separated from the center of decisions concerning the present, future, and powers of the newly established Palestinian Authority.
Final say belonged to whichever center of power Arafat had been in. The funds accessed as a result of this new state of affairs were placed under the control of the Palestinian Authority and its institutions. The PLO, which was supposed to remain the supreme political authority and the source of greater legitimacy, was thereby placed under the Authority de facto, becoming like one of its ministries on an administrative and financial level.
The idea of preserving the “regime of factions” through the PLO was practical, constructive, and indeed necessary. It prevented the Palestinian cause from being confined to the besieged and limited geography of the National Authority. However, the other upshot was a failure to establish balance between the two components of the “dual regime.” Because Arafat presided over both components, they were fused together: the entire system became affected by- or rather, almost fully shaped by- the political process, whether positively or negatively.
At one stage, the Palestinians benefited from this “dual regime” as the settlement process was advancing. Indeed, it led to former US President Bill Clinton delivering a speech before a special session of the Palestinian National Council convened in Gaza. However, its harmful repercussions on both pillars of the system began to intensify as the political process stagnated and was left on the brink of collapse, where it remains today.
Given the composition of Palestinian society, both inside the homeland and in exile, Palestinians need the “dual regime” to safeguard unity and keep the various components of Palestinian politics together, allowing them to achieve their national objectives collectively. The failure of the Palestinian leadership to balance the two components of the “dual regime", however, has left Palestinian politics facing an extremely difficult impasse that it has yet to find a way out of, especially after infighting aggravated. Indeed, the current split between Gaza and the West Bank is one among others.
The reason for this difficult impasse is the same as the need for the “dual regime,” the division of Palestinians between homeland and exile and retaining the gains that the PLO had attained when it became the internationally recognized legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. At the same time, there remains the need to preserve what is left of the gains achieved by the Palestinian Authority. Despite the necessity of this “regime,” its dependence on the progress or stagnation of the political settlement process presents many disadvantages. It burdens the Palestinians with finding a balance between the two components for the world to engage with. This will remain exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, so long as divisions are not resolved.
