In June 1989, Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, died after months of illness. In the months leading up to his death, Western media focused on possible scenarios for the future of a republic hostile to the United States, Israel and the West. Much of that coverage was marked by optimism.
After a decade of Khomeini’s hardline rule, and less than nine months after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, hopes rose that peace would drive reform once the system’s founder was gone. Statements by senior officials hinted at easing tensions with neighboring states and even raised the possibility of dialogue with the United States, described as the “Great Satan.” Reports at the time also pointed to the start of indirect contacts between Tehran and Washington.
On the eve of the selection of Ali Khamenei as interim leader, the New York Times reported on June 5 that he was once seen as a hardline cleric when he became president in 1981, but was later viewed as more pragmatic, backing efforts to rebuild ties with the West, reduce Iran’s isolation and attract foreign investment after the war with Iraq. The Washington Post took a more positive tone, describing his selection on the same day as a gain for more moderate and pragmatic elements within the Iranian leadership.
Khamenei’s 37-year rule proved more hardline, more radical and more expansive in its support for Iranian-linked militancy than the 1980s. Although it began with signs of social and economic openness and talks with neighboring countries, driven by the late president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the outcome was greater extremism. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps expanded its influence over economic and social life and broadened its activities abroad to include groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Houthis and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as terrorist organizations around the globe.
In recent years, as Khamenei’s health declined and he aged, and after the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024 and the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in 2020, the issue of succession has come into focus. Two questions stand out: who will succeed the Supreme Leader, and how, and what kind of system will follow, and whether the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih can continue.
Several scenarios have been discussed, but uncertainty has deepened. Khamenei kept the amended 1989 constitution without interpretation or revision, avoiding changes that could reflect the transformations within the republic. He did not appoint a deputy and instead rotated figures through the presidency, parliament, the Revolutionary Guards and the army, creating competition centered on loyalty to his office. Attempts at reform from within, which peaked in the early 1990s and later took shape in the “Second of Khordad Front” in 1999 under President Mohammad Khatami, were eventually crushed through trials, executions and repression targeting journalists and independent intellectuals.
Over the decades, Khamenei sidelined potential rivals such as Morteza Motahhari and possible successors such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, while blocking legislation that could regulate the transfer of power or allow delegation in cases of illness or incapacity.
A defining feature of his rule was the marginalization of revolutionary figures and the rise of younger Revolutionary Guard members, whom he had helped shape alongside Mostafa Chamran during early training in Lebanon, funded by Libya. These figures led the Guards on the eve of the 2025 12-day war, and their protégés now lead Iran.
The system also projected a supposed rivalry between reformists and conservatives, which in practice amounted to a rotation of roles within the ruling elite. The so-called reformists, at best, served as theoreticians of extremism, while conservatives were responsible for backing militant groups and carrying out terrorist operations in the region and beyond.
Three main scenarios emerged over succession.
The first involves selecting a moderate senior cleric, potentially opening the door to easing international isolation and advancing economic and social reforms.
The second envisions the Revolutionary Guards installing a weak leader, allowing him to run the state while preserving the system's formal structure, without direct accountability to the public.
The third involves amending the constitution to limit Wilayat al-Faqih to religious and moral affairs, allowing the Guards to assume direct political authority through elections and potentially shifting the system from a revolutionary model to a state structure.
Alongside these scenarios, two models have been discussed that could allow the republic to continue without a full overhaul.
The first is a Chinese-style model, in which Revolutionary Guard leaders shift from ideological actors to national leaders focused on economic development and national interests rather than exporting the revolution.
The second is a Pakistani-style model, in which the Guards retain elements of their revolutionary ideology but act as guarantors of stability, overseeing political life while maintaining influence over government and parliament.
However, once US-Israeli strikes began in February, these scenarios shifted under external pressure. Within hours, Khamenei was killed, and within days the Revolutionary Guards announced the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s second son. While Mojtaba was named Supreme Leader, the title “Imam” used for his predecessors was absent, possibly reflecting doubts about his acceptance as a Shiite religious authority.
Khamenei himself could not have become Supreme Leader in 1989 with the rank of "hojatoleslam”. The constitution was amended two months later, and he was elevated to “ayatollah” to assume the position.
The question now is no longer who will succeed Khamenei, but what remains of the Wilayat al-Faqih system after this transition.
This is not only a constitutional issue but a practical one. Since the appointment of the new, largely unseen leader, it is unclear who controls decisions of war and peace in Iran during the current conflict. With Washington announcing talks with Iran’s “new” leaders, it is also unclear who manages the crisis or who can accept a ceasefire.
Formally, the constitutional framework in Iran remains in place. The Supreme Leader is still commander-in-chief, with authority over war, peace, mobilization and key appointments. In practice, power has long been shaped by its concentration within the Supreme Leader’s office and among senior Revolutionary Guard figures.
The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei marks a sharp shift in religious legitimacy. He does not hold the rank of “ayatollah”, which has become closely tied to the image of the Supreme Leader. Despite his influence within his father’s office, he lacks the religious authority envisioned by the system’s founders. This weakens the religious dimension of the role, even if it remains constitutionally intact. It also undermines a core principle of the Islamic Republic, the rejection of hereditary rule. The system now appears less as a revolutionary project and more as a structure sustained by closed networks of loyalty.
In effect, Iran appears to have moved toward the second scenario, with real power shifting to the Revolutionary Guards, while the position of Supreme Leader becomes largely symbolic. The new leader may hold the family name and loyalty networks, but the Guards control the military and the means of coercion.
The doctrine of the Hidden Imam in Twelver Shiism historically elevated the role of clerics, especially senior jurists, to that of leaders and intermediaries. This role was strengthened over time, particularly during the Qajar period in the 19th century.
The concept of Wilayat al-Faqih, outlined by Khomeini in his 1970 book “Islamic Government” and influenced by Nur al-Din al-Karaki and Abul Aala Maududi, was a key attempt to integrate the state into Shiite religious doctrine. Although initially supported by figures, such as Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Mozzafar Baghai, many later criticized its absolutist form and were imprisoned.
In the past decade, nationalist sentiment has grown, even within the Revolutionary Guards and official discourse. While the Supreme Leader once rejected pre-Islamic Persian history, the system now appears unable to counter this trend amid declining religious faith, renewed protests and economic pressures. After the 12-day war, the regime unveiled a statue of the Sasanian king Shapur I in Tehran’s Enghelab Square, alongside images of Soleimani and Amir Hajizadeh, bearing the words, “You will kneel before Iran again.”
The weakening of Wilayat al-Faqih represents a setback for modern Shiite political Islam. Unlike its Sunni counterpart, which failed to establish a caliphate, this model's failure may push the system backward. The doctrine that underpinned the authority of Khomeini and Khamenei may revert to a more limited form.
More broadly, the current Iranian system, regardless of its leadership, faces the likely end of the Wilayat al-Faqih project, even if the republic itself endures. The military no longer appears to place significant weight on clerical authority.
Khomeini sought to establish the rule of the jurist as a substitute for the absent Imam, but that authority now appears to be receding again under the new leader. There is clear symbolism: the system shifts from Shiite eschatology toward a hybrid nationalism, while the Supreme Leader himself becomes largely absent from view.
In his 2009 book “Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shiism,” Abbas Amanat speaks of a Hussainiya in Kashan dating back to the Qajar era, where an inscription reads, “Waiting is our doctrine.”
The recent war has shown that under pressure, Iran does not move toward moderation or reform, but toward greater extremism. As crises deepen, the system turns not to Wilayat al-Faqih, but to what can be described as the rule of the Guards.
At that point, Wilayat al-Faqih is no longer the true basis of power, but a final cover for a system that has become military in substance, familial in symbolism, aggressive in behavior and more fragile than its official rhetoric suggests.
