Iranian ambitions in the Gulf did not begin with the Iranian revolution. They are an extension of a conception that had taken shape during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah in the 1970s amid Iran’s rapid ascent, which was driven by an unprecedented oil boom, military modernization, and an explicit ambition to become the region’s dominant power. It is not the ambitions that changed after the revolution, but the tools and discourse through which they were pursued.
Amid all the analytical noise surrounding the current war, an important book that resonated deeply with Gulf elites has largely been overlooked. In the mid-1970s, Iranian diplomat Fereydoun Hoveyda, who served as Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations and was the brother of Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, offered an early diagnosis by warning of a looming shift in the regional balance of power and that the Shah’s Iran had been on course to become the Gulf’s dominant force, thanks to its vast surplus and a modernized army.
More troubling still was his contention that such dominance would naturally lead to expansionism, even if it is not explicitly pursued. He identified the late 1970s as a critical juncture, warning that unchecked ambition would ultimately drain society; this dynamic did indeed contribute to the revolution.
Hoveyda believed that Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf had left a vacuum the Shah sought to fill, casting Iran as the region’s “policeman.” This vision is underpinned by a sense of ethnic superiority, reinforced by the Shah’s self-image as heir to a historic Persian legacy. The core insight remains: when resources converge with ambition, expansion becomes an option, and its costs rise.
This nationalist project never came to fruition. The revolution toppled Iran’s political system, but did not undermine the expansionist drive; it merely reshaped it. The project shifted from a purely nationalist framework to a nationalist-religious hybrid that instrumentalized sectarianism for political ends. The discourse was not built around “modern Iran as a great power,” but about “revolutionary Iran,” “exporting the model,” and the regime’s divine mandate.
The new regime inherited the instruments of power and added a more potent one: ideology. Where the Shah relied on the army and the economy, the post-1979 regime relied on ideological networks and layered military force. This project did not require direct invasion. Instead, loyalist factions were formed in other societies. The same costs that had weakened the Shah weighed on the mullahs as well, deepening poverty and hardship at home.
In Iraq, Tehran invested billions of dollars in a multi-layered network of ideological projection. In Lebanon, Hezbollah became a model for building a state within a state. In Syria, Iran intervened to protect a strategic ally, successfully entrenching military and political influence, until it failed. In Yemen, it backed the Houthis as a lever it could pull on the Gulf’s southern flank.
Expansion within the Gulf states themselves manifested itself differently: forming parallel entities on the Lebanese or Iraqi model was not feasible, and efforts were made to plant limited networks focused on ideological propaganda. These attempts largely remained contained, as the overwhelming majority of Gulf citizens maintained their national loyalties.
The fundamental differences between the Shah’s project - as it was outlined by Hoveyda - and the mullahs’ project are in the means, not the objective. The former was a nationalist project seeking dominance through hard power. The latter is a nationalist-religious project that instrumentalizes sectarianism and draws on both soft and hard power. In both cases, the Gulf remains the pivotal arena and the strategic prize.
It is striking that Hoveyda’s views, written before the revolution, provide insights into today’s landscape. His warnings about imbalance in the regional order, the dangers of power being concentrated in a single country, and the toll this exacts on its economy all resonate today, albeit in a different register. The difference is that the tools have grown more complex. The contest has shifted from geographic control to winning hearts and minds.
The relationship with the West has also transformed. The Shah was a Western ally; the current regime has taken an adversarial posture. Yet the outcome is structurally similar: leveraging the West to consolidate Iran’s regional position- through alliance in the former and through confrontation in the latter. Both, in the framework of their respective regimes, serve the same goal: cementing Iran’s role as an indispensable regional player.
The question remains: can this ambition be contained? Experience suggests the answer does not lie in direct confrontation but in building a coherent regional balance. The Gulf states, which Hoveyda once described in the 1970s as weak, have demonstrated resilience, adaptability, and capacity for resistance. Nonetheless, the challenge persists and attempts at infiltration continue.
Iran’s ambitions in the Gulf are not an aberration; they are the culmination of a trajectory. Regimes have changed and slogans have evolved, but the underlying project remains: the pursuit of a regional role, often at the expense of the Iranian people themselves. Tracing this arc back to the Shah shows that while the form changes, the essence does not: a power in search of a sphere of influence.
Final thought: from the Shah’s nationalism to the mullahs’ ideological rule, the defeat is one and the same.
