The confrontation between Sudan and Ethiopia is no longer a border dispute or a dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Recent drone attacks that were followed by the direct accusations Sudan has leveled at Addis Ababa suggest that the two countries’ relationship has reached a far more critical juncture amid a transition from "shadow war" to the brink of open confrontation.
The question in Sudan is no longer whether Ethiopia has been intervening in the ongoing war but how far that intervention would have to go before triggering a direct clash between the two countries. Khartoum is now making explicit accusations regarding the drones that targeted Khartoum Airport and other sites that it claims had been launched from Ethiopian territory.
Addis Ababa (itself consumed by domestic crises and conflicts) appears to be taking a posture that breaks with the traditional calculations governing relations between the two countries.
The official spokesman of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Brigadier General Asim Awad Abdel Wahab, was careful to stress that the government and Sudanese state agencies have undeniable evidence proving that the drones originated from Ethiopian territory, presenting detailed information, including specific dates, about drone attacks launched from Ethiopia's Bahir Dar Airport.
The Ethiopian government's denial was neither sufficient nor convincing. It has not contained the situation, particularly in light of international reports that had, as early as last year, shed light on a large camp inside Ethiopian territory used to train and support the Rapid Support Forces, equipped with airstrips and drone hangars. Those reports, which are backed by satellite imagery, also pointed to dozens of flights delivering arms to the RSF. According to Sudanese sources, intelligence agencies detected suspicious movements along the border early on, and Khartoum warned Ethiopia about this late last year.
From Khartoum's perspective, Abiy Ahmed's government has chosen to support a scheme overseen by regional actors, opening the way for RSF movements in border areas that allowed for attacks in Blue Nile State. Given the documented facts of the matter and investigative reports published by international outlets, Ethiopia's denials have done little to create doubt, especially as statements of condemnation and concern emerged from influential regional powers, as well as from the United Nations, the Arab League, the Muslim World League, and the US administration.
Already locked in a complex civil war, Sudan has no incentive to confront Ethiopia without solid evidence to support its accusations. At the same time, it recognizes that it has cards to play should it be forced to move from diplomatic objections to direct or indirect retaliation.
Ethiopia has its own domestic concerns. Abiy Ahmed's government faces mounting challenges, including the activities of several armed movements in several regions. Among them is the Benishangul Liberation Movement, which reportedly launched attacks on RSF camps inside Ethiopian territory a few days ago. The specter of conflict resuming in the Tigray region also looms despite the 2022 agreement, and Ethiopia also faces the expanding campaign of the Amhara "Fano" front against the government.
Even so, Sudan seems to have opted for patience and strategic restraint. It seeks to avoid a regional war between two major states in the Horn of Africa, with all the wide-ranging security and regional consequences that would entail. For this reason, Khartoum has yet to move beyond diplomatic escalation. It has summoned its ambassador from Addis Ababa "for consultations," asked for an emergency Arab League meeting, and signaled that it could ask the Security Council and regional organizations to increase political pressure on Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia's entanglement in the Sudan crisis did not begin with the drone war. Addis Ababa has, in Khartoum’s view, been favorable to the RSF from the start of the Sudanese conflict.
The clearest early indication of this support was the public reception given to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in Addis Ababa during the first few months of the war.
Various reports have also shown Ethiopian territory is being used as a transit route for arms shipments to the RSF. Since then, its involvement has escalated, according to Sudanese accusations, to direct logistical and military support, ultimately culminating in the drone strikes.
The most important question remains: is Ethiopia’s shadow war shifting into open confrontation with Sudan? If so, would that confrontation remain confined to the two countries, or would it spark a broader regional war in a region already brimming with tensions and resentments?
That is the real challenge currently imposing itself on both the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea as civil wars become increasingly entangled with regional plans and competition over corridors, resources and the redrawing of influence maps in the region.
