Is it true that, after six months of confrontation, the region remains trapped in a situation of near-defeat and near-victory, where near-defeat is not enough to force one to swallow the bitter pill of submission, and near-victory is insufficient to impose a surrender? Is it also true that Trump cannot withdraw the fleets without a victory, and that Mojtaba Khamenei cannot agree to a deal that would shake the regime’s image and clip its regional wings?
It is no surprise that the generals of the Revolutionary Guards are speaking of a certain degree of victory. On the first day of the war, US-Israeli strikes severed the head of the regime. They killed Supreme Leader, along with officials, generals, and scientists, yet the regime absorbed the blow, survived, and retaliated. Iran chose to close the Strait of Hormuz and target neighboring countries. It attempted to choke the global economy to trigger an unprecedented crisis, hoping this would force a swift end to the war. However, the crisis did not reach the scale the Iranian regime had hoped for. Now, the world is witnessing a decline in the strategic importance of Hormuz. The closure of the strait is not absolute, and the region has seriously begun searching for alternatives.
If it is possible to speak of a near-victory simply because the Iranian regime survived, Tehran has nonetheless failed to inflict upon American forces what was inflicted upon its own installations, factories, and military infrastructure. It could not sink an American ship, inflict serious casualties on the US military, or prevent Israeli warplanes from dominating Tehran's airspace and roaming freely within it, while experts state the military strikes have set back the nuclear program and left Iran needing years to overcome the aftermath of the war.
There are those who speak of an American near-loss or near-defeat because the Iranian regime did not fall and managed to divert attention from the nuclear facilities to Hormuz. However, recent days have shown that the US possesses another card to continue the war, that of strangling the Iranian economy. While the process requires the cooperation from many nations, it is equally true that it will be difficult for several countries to sacrifice their economic relations with the US in order to rescue their relations with Iran.
China presents a uniquely complex factor. Added to this is that Trump, who was in a hurry to exit the war, has demonstrated an ability to wait despite the approaching midterm elections. Of course, Trump speaks of a decisive victory, recalling what befell the Iranian navy and air force, and reiterating that he foiled Iran’s game in Hormuz.
In Israel, opponents of Benjamin Netanyahu argue that he suffered a loss because he failed to topple the Iranian regime. Conversely, his supporters view the situation as a victory that must be completed, citing the blows dealt to Hamas and Hezbollah alongside advancing discussions regarding their disarmament in Gaza and Lebanon.
A thick fog hangs over the theater of conflict. Victories are not enough to impose surrender on the adversary, nor are defeats sufficient to compel realistic calculations. Trump will not accept a solution that does not allow for talk of victory, and Mojtaba Khamenei cannot accept a solution that is actually a defeat.
Thus, the confrontation appears open to a new chapter that differs from what prevailed during the first six months. Trump chose to launch a major economic war against Iran, betting that its results might achieve what military strikes did not. It is clear that the purpose is to weaken the regime and the position of hardliners within it, so that it comes to the negotiating table with a different mentality and fewer demands.
When a country comes under a foreign military attack, nationalist sentiments awaken and help cover up internal divisions. Opponents feel embarrassed and refrain from viewing the attack as an opportunity for themselves. Economic warfare is different. In the military war, the US and Israel attacked nuclear facilities, radars, Revolutionary Guards headquarters, and industrial complexes. Iran responded by bombing American targets in the region, targets in neighboring countries, and closed the Strait of Hormuz. Confronting a military attack is a matter that falls upon the army. In this type of confrontation, losses can be covered up with slogans of steadfastness and martyrdom.
Economic warfare is different. It drives the war into the homes of citizens - their jobs, the value of their salaries, bread, and prices of energy and goods. In a military war, the Revolutionary Guards can threaten to plunge the region into chaos and instability; it can launch missiles and drones, even if under unconvincing pretexts. In an economic war, the Guards’ generals possess neither the power nor the leverage. They cannot halt the deterioration of the Iranian rial, nor can they rein in prices if energy costs soar or the supply of available goods declines. A military war poses questions to military personnel. An economic war poses questions to the father, the mother, the worker, the teacher, and the student.
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Leader intervened to demand that there be no talk of negatives, warning against weakening national sentiment and social cohesion. He knows the heavy toll of economic deterioration; neither the missile arsenal can stop it, nor can fanning the embers of the revolution. He also knows that heading toward a widespread economic collapse could open the door for Iranians to take to the streets, despite the recent bloody crackdown that previously aborted protests.
Despite the Supreme Leader's words, President Masoud Pezeshkian found himself forced to reveal some truths, including that the American blockade has led to a 35 percent drop in exports and imports. Scenes of queues at gas stations provided evidence of what awaits Iran in the economic war. The question remains: can Iran escape economic strangulation by pivoting to military escalation, either directly or by proxy?
The most dangerous aspect of the crisis is that it remains open-ended and poised to accumulate further immense damage for both sides, the countries of the region, and the world. One must wait to see whether the economic war will alter the equation of near-defeat and near-victory.
