From the Lebanese local agreement, represented by the nomination of former Finance Minister Jihad Azour to the post of President of the Republic by the majority of the opposition forces and some of the ruling parties, to the appointment of the Elysée of former French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian as its presidential envoy to Lebanon, an external agreement seems to be taking shape.
Le Drian’s appointment, in its content - that is, in its diplomatic approach to Lebanon and the Arab region - would establish a turning point in the French position, and correct the course of the relations between Paris and the capitals of the five countries concerned with Lebanon, led by Riyadh and Washington, after a period of divergence of views.
This will make it more difficult for the candidate of the so-called axis of the resistance to reach the Baabda Palace.
In the first deal, it has become known that its parties have agreed in the first place on rejecting the candidate of the “duo” (Amal Movement and Hezbollah). They are supported by the majority of the Christian forces and personalities, as well as by the understanding of the Church (Bkirki-Vatican), which succeeded in blocking the nomination of former Minister Sleiman Franjieh.
In fact, it seems that Franjieh is no longer the only Paris candidate for the Lebanese presidency.
In addition, the consensus succeeded in forcing Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to call for an election session on June 14, after he had tried to avoid it. Consequently, the “duo” is now preoccupied with counting the votes, knowing that the candidate appears to be comfortably ahead of Franjieh, despite the abstention of some “Change” deputies, who refuse to vote for Azour under the pretext of not lining up with the rest of the parties, while some of them went to think of a third candidate.
The dilemma here is that these options, for a large part of the “October Revolution” audience and its groups, do not reflect their choices. This reality has widened the gap between a balanced “October” group and some deputies of Change.
There are those who see the need to vote for Azour, even if it comes in contrast to the uprising’s discourse, and after the shock of Michel Aoun’s failed visit to Damascus in its timing and objectives. Others believe that the goal of the “October” deputies and the opposition at this stage is political par excellence, as bringing down the Hezbollah candidate is a bigger issue than electing Azour.
Paris has opened the doors of the second agreement regionally and internationally by choosing Minister Le Drian as a special envoy to Lebanon. He will naturally book his seat at the table of the five-member committee.
This will inevitably be at the expense of a French party within the decision-making circle in the Elysée, which previously secured French coverage for the opposition candidate.
Le Drian’s political approach largely coincides with most of the members of the quintet committee, as he represents a French political current that has a traditional viewpoint in the relationship with the Arab world and the Middle East, taking into account the historical principles of the French ties with the Arab official system since its inception nearly a century ago.
Practically, Le Drian’s appointment can be explained by several factors, foremost of which is that Paris took a step back, which is first linked to preparations to back down from adopting Franjieh’s candidacy, and secondly, to open up to other consensual options.
Inside the Elysée corridors, Le Drian will give a new impetus to the French interest in Lebanon, as he will work alongside several influential personalities, who closely follow Lebanese affairs.
It is possible that he will correct the course of some policies that contradict the nature of the traditional relationship that binds France to Lebanon. Le Drian’s approach is largely consistent with the positions of his Foreign Ministry, which in turn differs from the views of some advisors in the Elysée that need to be rectified.
He will also be more in line with the position of regional and international parties regarding Lebanon, and will mitigate the Lebanese, especially Christian, criticism of France’s recent stances.
Accordingly, from Azour, as a real candidate for the presidency of the republic, to Le Drian, as a French envoy, it seems that matters internally and externally are being corrected in terms of candidacy and stance, but the solution is not necessarily close.
