It was on Oct. 7th. They woke up Benjamin Netanyahu, who found a cup of poison waiting for him. He couldn’t believe it at first glance. They came by land, air and sea.
Al-Qassam fighters are walking free in the settlements. They fire shells and bullets and take the hostages into the Gaza tunnels. Yehya Al-Sinwar’s trick misled the arrogant security services. It also affected the “invincible army.” It soon became clear that Hamas fighters crossing the electronic wall around Gaza was more terrifying than any attack that Israel had previously known.
Confrontation is not new. Israel has previously received many blows from Palestinian factions, but responded with something even harsher. This is not a slap. It’s a deep stab. Sinwar’s attack shook the settlements and the occupiers. It shook the security and military establishment and subjected the political institution to an unprecedented scandal.
Israel plunged into an “existential war,” as its senior officials said. The story is bigger than the recovery of the hostages, despite its importance to the Netanyahu government. It is to restore prestige and the ability to deter and ensure that another Sinwar does not emerge elsewhere.
It is now Dec. 4th. A river of blood and small coffins... Successive waves of displaced... A sea of rubble. A humanitarian truce allowed for the exchange of prisoners and the introduction of aid. The world dreamed that extending the truce would lead to a permanent ceasefire. But the confrontation is more complex than the world thought.
It is a war that is difficult to retreat from. Defeat carries an unbearable price. The price of risking rushing into confrontation is less than that of surrender. In this type of war, defeat has the taste of suicide. The war must be completed to eliminate Hamas and create a Gaza that does not harbor dangers against Israel.
This is what the American President heard, along with his Secretary of State and Defense Secretary. The Israeli government cannot see Hamas returning to ruling Gaza. Removing Hamas from the scene would require breaking its back, which is impossible without causing a new catastrophe. Hamas cannot accept the proposed “next day” scenarios, as it did not unleash the “Al-Aqsa Flood” in order to retire after it.
After nearly two months, questions continue about what went through the minds of Al-Sinwar and Al-Qassam General Muhammad Al-Deif before launching the Al-Aqsa Flood. Did Sinwar consider that the attack would result in the return of a number of hostages that would allow “the Israeli prisons to be cleansed of Palestinian detainees”?
Did he expect Israel to respond with an incursion similar to previous invasions, followed by a ceasefire and the completion of a swap deal that would strengthen Hamas’ standing in both Gaza and the West Bank and establish it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people?
Did he rule out the possibility that Israel responds with an indefinite war of killing and destruction? Did he take into account the likelihood that America would move its fleets and its president to ensure that Hamas would not win and would not have a role in the “next day”? Is it true what some say, that Hamas was surprised by the settlements being completely exposed to its fighters, so it went so far as to inflict unprecedented losses on the Israelis?
Many questions arise. Did Sinwar decide to strike a painful blow at Israel, or did he intend to spark a wide-scale war, regardless of international calculations and consequences? Did he ignite the war, relying on the belief that a broad and brutal Israeli response would necessarily lead to a regional confrontation?
Did he believe that his partners in the axis of resistance will consider the war their own, and will rush to engage in it? Did he assume that Iran would ignite the region in the face of the Americans, and the world would hurry to extinguish the fire in a rapidly flammable region? Is it true that the timing of the battle was the big secret between Sinwar and Deif, and that the allies knew about the earthquake only after it started? Does Sinwar have the right to put his allies in the face of such a dangerous fait accompli, or was he confident that they were already preparing for a “major strike”, no matter how late it was?
Many more questions are raised. Will Sinwar accept the retirement of Al-Qassam in exchange for a firm international promise to launch a political process leading to a two-state solution? Does he agree to sit in a Palestinian state that will necessarily recognize the other state, or does he actually demand a Palestine from the river to the sea?
Did Sinwar believe that he could tip the international and regional balance and force everyone to deal with Hamas, forgetting that the PLO did not become internationally accepted until it reexamined some of its expressions and phrases?
The sixty-year-old Sinwar spent 24 years in Israeli prisons. He was liberated by Hamas in 2011 in the Shalit deal, the day Israel released more than a thousand detainees in exchange for Hamas’ discharge of soldier Gilad Shalit.
From his long stay in prison, he concluded that the war was wide open and that it was nothing less than a war of existence.
I realized the depth of this conflict from a story recounted to me by the former head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal, when we were in Damascus, delving into the movement’s story since its birth.
I asked him how the official allowed himself to send a young man on a suicide operation. He was quick to respond: “We consider them martyrdom operations imposed by persistent Israeli injustice.”
He told me that a young man named Mohammad Fathi Farhat (17-years-old) submitted a request to the leadership of Al-Qassam Brigades, to carry out a martyrdom operation. The command rejected his request out of mercy for his family, as his brother had carried out an operation of this kind and his older brother was being chased.
After a while, the leadership received a letter from the young man’s mother saying: “I do not allow you to reject his desire for martyrdom, and I hope you accept his request.” The Hamas leaders agreed, and the mother accompanied her son’s preparations. When she heard the news of his departure, she put on her best clothes and began to receive the well-wishers. Her eldest son was later killed.
How cruel is this war! Israel informs its visitors that it cannot retreat. Hamas cannot back down. Did Sinwar carry out a coup against the history of exchanged strikes with Israel? Where will he be the “next day”? Will Hamas accept to return to the mantle of the Palestinian Authority to avoid a disaster? Did Sinwar succeed in reversing the equation, or did he encircle Hamas with an explosive belt and push it into a “martyrdom operation”?
