A scheme to steal public and private money, which is known in Baghdad as the Noor Zuhair heist, and the evaporation of bank deposits and dubious financial engineering allegedly that former governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon Riad Salameh has been accused of, pose a challenge to the political forces and institutions of both countries (Iraq and Lebanon), especially their judiciary.
Practically speaking, the apparent perpetrators, Riad Salameh and Noor Zuhair, cannot be blamed for the schemes alone. Several parties are implicated in their crimes, covering up their plunder of public and private funds. They are now threatened by a historic scandal that will have an impact on the ruling political class and the future of the political process in both countries if two requisites are met: first, if the judiciaries of both countries managed to do what they are supposed to without political pressure getting in the way, allowing them to get to the bottom of these crimes, and second, if the accused share what they know and expose their partners. That has led a well-known Iraqi political figure famous for his prudence and moderation, to demand that Noor Zuhair be tried publicly, warning that the political process is at risk.
Talk of Iraq’s political process being in peril has resurfaced. That cannot be attributed to the Noor Zuhair heist alone. It seems that a key catalyst is the talk of senior officials being wiretapped. Some of the information that has been attained is being leaked, and it is also being used for blackmail, turning the head of the Commission of Integrity, Judge Haidar Hanoun, into a "crown witness." Hanoun has confessed to his own wrongdoing, as well as that of others, in a government bribery case. However, he recused himself of the decision to release Nour Zuhair.
In Beirut, a “star witness” has yet to emerge in the case surrounding deposits and financial engineering. However, the public prosecutor in the Court of Cassation, who surprised many by ordering the arrest of Riad Salameh over a minor embezzlement charge, now faces a significant challenge to the integrity and independence of his institution. The Court cannot try Salameh as the sole defendant, nor can it prosecute the others implicated as executors of his decisions. It is equally constrained in releasing him on bail or for lack of evidence.
In a sectarian and divided country plagued by a constitutional crisis and widespread paralysis, any political, security, or financial conviction is inevitably viewed through a sectarian lens. Perpetrators are often perceived as victims of sectarian bias. Salameh’s predicament is that his detention cannot last long, as pressure will mount to expose not just the agents acting on his behalf but also his partners in the larger scheme. These partners, of course, belong to other sects, and their sectarian leaders must first withdraw their protection before any charges can proceed, threatening the stability of the ruling system.
Furthermore, any judge who orders Salameh’s release risks having their own political and sectarian “cover” called into question, as they could be seen as protecting Salameh. This could lead to chaos and street protests, further jeopardizing what little remains of Lebanon’s fragile stability.
The ruling Iraqi "Coordination Framework" is grappling with a range of challenges, from court disputes to suspicions of surveillance targeting its senior officials. A key issue it faces is the erosion of trust within its own ranks and in its government. Open discussions have emerged about how to address these problems and the future of its leadership.
At the same time, the immunity of Lebanon's ruling system is weakening, both internally and externally. For the first time, it faces the real threat of losing its cohesion under judicial pressures more intense than those faced by Salameh and his schemes—pressures that almost seem inevitable.
The two countries, or two arenas of "liberation and martyrdom," from Baghdad to Beirut, seem to share the same fate. From Nour Zuhair to Riad Salameh, it appears that the actions of the Lebanese and Iraqi political classes will not go without a reaction from their rivals or the masses. In Iraq, the situation is particularly volatile. It seems that another "October" may be imminent.
