The claim that Iran has sold out Hezbollah stems purely from political spite and the grudges it provokes. Strategic and geopolitical calculations shape Iran’s relationship with the most prominent formation that grew out of Khomeini's revolutionary ideology, Hezbollah, and its leaders. Regardless of the current moment’s significance, this relationship is not defined by isolated individual actions. Hezbollah is not just a militia sponsored by Iran, nor is its assassinated leader, Hassan Nasrallah, merely an ally. Hezbollah is an extension of Tehran's regional influence; it is integral to Iran’s strategic deterrence against Israel, and it mobilizes and fosters the Shiite-Arab axis on Iran’s behalf. Given its position in Iran’s strategy, Hezbollah cannot be bought and sold.
The fact is that the assassination of Nasrallah, the near-total dismantling of the party's military infrastructure, and the systematic assassination of its reservoir of talented cadres and leaders, represent a total defeat for Iran. The collapse of the "Hezbollah regime” following Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination is a geopolitical earthquake comparable to that which erupted with the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. The latter opened the door to an Iranian invasion of the Levant, and the former will open the door to its departure.
The attrition of Hezbollah that has left it close to the end- after Hamas had been crushed and amid increasing pressure on the Houthis and Iraqi militias- strikes at the heart of Iran's proxy war doctrine. It is no secret that Hezbollah is the crown jewel of this strategy that Iran has invested in financially, logistically, and ideologically for many difficult decades, primarily to ensure that neither Israel nor the United States engage in a direct conflict with Iran.
Now, Iran's immediate goal is to reorganize and restructure Hezbollah, such that the organization’s continuity is ensured, through the appointment of a new Secretary-General and a team who can reassure the “community of resistance” and begin the arduous journey out of this life and death crisis that Hezbollah has been confronting over the past 11 months. No one understands better than Iran that this restructuring, which is fraught with strategic challenges, will (at least temporarily) diminish Hezbollah's military and political effectiveness, and will thereby undermine Iran's influence in Lebanon and beyond.
Another, unforeseen, restructuring effort will prove more difficult: addressing the fierce infighting in Iran itself. Iran sees the assassination of Nasrallah as a direct challenge to its standing in the region, and its base of support, both within and outside Iran, has placed immense pressure on the leadership because of the lofty expectations that Iranian propaganda had fueled. The Iranian regime’s primary task is to strike a balance in managing its reactions. Some demand more aggressive direct retaliation to these setbacks, but Tehran cannot currently afford to react this way. Others argue that not retaliating would cost Iran its standing and that if it continues to exercise “strategic patience,” Iran could lose its control over allies and proxies.
Recent events have not only undermined Hezbollah's operational capabilities; they have also upended regional power dynamics at Iran’s expense and deprived Iran of its crown jewel in the region. Thus, we can now argue that we might be seeing a shift in the balance of power in Lebanon, as well as the Arab Levant more broadly, and that this shift can be exploited to push back against Iran's influence in Lebanon and Syria. With Hezbollah weakened, other political factions- Christian and Druze forces, and even some Lebanese Shiite figures and entities- could start distancing themselves from Iran and begin to seek political cover under the umbrella of Arab countries, especially the Gulf states.
Since the challenges to Iran’s influence will not automatically translate into a formula for stability in Lebanon and the region- indeed, Iran could try to reassert its control by other means, including support for sectarian militias- the Arabs have a window of opportunity to play a role vis-a-vis Iran and assure it that off ramps are available.
It is also an opportune moment to bolster Arab influence in Lebanon, not merely through humanitarian aid but through political initiatives that take advantage of the partial but substantial vacuum left by the events unfolding in the country.
The assassination of Nasrallah and the blows to Hezbollah pose strategic challenges for Iran, potentially heightening risks of regional instability and escalation between Iran's network of proxies on the one hand, and Israel on the other, as well as possibly some Arab states. Nonetheless, this development is a major opportunity that cannot be missed. Hezbollah’s hegemony over the Lebanese political system and its role in Iran's regional strategy will be very different after September 27, 2024.
It seems that the real test will be finding creative ways to take advantage of Hezbollah losing its dominance without destabilizing Lebanon's fragile political system or its sectarian balances, nor cornering Iran and compelling it to bring the system crashing down.
