Three developments from this past week shed light on the predicament that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) find themselves in.
First, Colombian mercenaries were brought in to fight alongside the RSF in Darfur, as we learned from the video found on the phone of an RSF soldier killed during a failed offensive on the city of El Fasher. The uproar over the introduction of these mercenaries, along with others from neighboring countries, was amplified by reports in the Colombian press, including the testimony of one mercenary who had returned.
These reports detailed how they were recruited to fight, what tasks they were assigned, and how they made their way to western Sudan.
Second, American Senator Jim Risch, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has presented a bill to designate the RSF as a terrorist organization and to deal with it accordingly.
Third, the internal rifts within the RSF have aggravated as their disputes and some elements’ discontent boiled over to armed clashes. Certain tribal factions and recruits have begun to speak out about neglect and discrimination, especially over their marginalization in the "parallel government" (that government was immediately rejected and boycotted by the region and the world) last month.
All of these signs point to a multipronged crisis- military and social, both internally and externally. Neither expanding their operations in certain areas of Kordofan to prevent the army and its allies from advancing toward Darfur, nor their media outlets’ attempts to amplify noise in order to patch up the troubled scene and boost the morale of their recruits and supporters, do anything to change that.
The truth is that the RSF has lost a substantial number of forces and equipment, and it has suffered major defeats that forced it to retreat, becoming confined to Darfur and parts of Kordofan after its wide expansion in the early stages of the war. After around 28 months of fighting, it has become clear that the nucleus of its forces, its professional and trained fighters, has broken. Its transnational mobilization on ethnic and tribal lines has also sharply declined due to its defeats, reports of unpaid wages, and the shrinking opportunities for looting that had previously been widespread in areas like Khartoum, Gezira, and the central states during their occupation.
To compensate for its human losses, the RSF has, with encouragement and funding from its backers, increasingly turned to mercenaries from neighboring countries and other places like Colombia. It has also resorted to forcibly recruiting children and youths, pushing them to the frontlines after brief weapons training.
Despite funneling money to certain tribal leaders in an attempt to buy their loyalty and encourage them to send recruits, the RSF top brass does not seem like it can overcome its aggravating problems. There have been instances of desertion and mutiny on some fronts in Darfur and Kordofan. Discontent has grown among recruits. Increasingly frequently, we see them post videos criticizing their leadership over the lack of medical attention, their failure to pay salaries, and what they describe as discrimination between the various tribes within their ranks.
Further, several RSF advisors publicly defected, and it is said that some field commanders have been liquidated amid infighting among recruits, even in Nyala, which the RSF had declared the headquarters of its so-called “Peace Government.” Notably, influential tribal leaders in RSF strongholds have defied the group, rejecting the formation of a parallel government. All of this further compounds the RSF's crises. Key components (such as the Fur, Zaghawa, Midob tribes, as well as certain branches of the Rizeigat tribe) have sharpened their criticisms and opposition in response to the widespread atrocities and crimes that have been, and continue to be, committed.
So, where might things go from here? The RSF leadership and its backers are aware that, without a major military breakthrough, the cracks will only continue to grow, possibly leading to further open splits. That is why they have thrown all their weight and hopes behind two fronts. One is its new offensive seeking to raid the besieged city of El Fasher, and the other is its attacks in Kordofan that aim to undercut the army’s plans and obstruct its advance toward Darfur.
On both fronts, it has serious challenges. El Fasher has held firm; 226 attempted incursions have been repelled, and the army is expected to intensify its efforts to lift the siege. Accordingly, the battles in Kordofan will be decisive, and they could have major implications for the trajectory of the war in the coming period.
In a significant development in Kordofan, a group of local tribes have signed a charter to defend their areas, rallying behind the Sudanese Armed Forces to form a united military force, "Dignity Alliance – Shield of Kordofan;" it is currently taking part in battles against the RSF and standing up for civilians victimized by its systematic human rights violations.
All of this suggests that the RSF is not only facing a grave crisis but may have already entered the last stage of its gamble. If its offensives in Kordofan collapse, internal divisions will likely get worse. This could be a prelude to the army’s "final act.”
