President Joseph Aoun’s unprecedentedly clear and candid speech, explicitly labeled Hezbollah’s arms unauthorized by the state, was a long-awaited turning point in the complex relationship between the Lebanese state and the party. Nonetheless, this clarity was not translated into unequivocal executive decisions.
While the decisions adopted by the Lebanese cabinet over the two sessions it held on “removing illegal arms and asserting the state’s authority over all of its territory” suggest that the state is determined to confront this matter, it was phrased with the kind of ambiguity at that Lebanese politics excels at conveying. On the one hand, the army was tasked with devising a plan to achieve this objective, with the government failing to clarify whether it was referring to the “Army Command” or the “Higher Defense Council,” which hints at a certain evasion of responsibility. On the other hand, the government merely endorsed the “objectives” of the US paper without taking any position on the timetable it laid out.
Some argue that this approach was deliberate and intended to contain the party’s reaction, especially in light of the controversy around the decisions. The withdrawal of Shiite ministers from the session in protest, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem delivered a speech insisting that the party would never hand over its weapons, and the motorcycle rallies evocative of the “Black Shirts” reminded the Lebanese and the world that a repeat of May 7 is on the cards. Others who are more critical of the government, saw this ambiguity as an evasion of responsibility. They argue that the state, in all its branches and institutions, had yet to accept that the party had been defeated and that the country had entered a new phase in which Hezbollah no longer controls every aspect of political life.
The Lebanese authorities appear captive to Hezbollah’s supposed capacity to “intimidate,” failing to acknowledge the new state of affairs. It has thus left Lebanon at risk of squandering a historic opportunity to end the structural crisis posed by a non-state actor’s maintenance of its weapons. Fueling the debate, the government spokesperson claimed that the Shiite ministers’ withdrawal from the second session did not indicate an objection to disarmament in principle but to the procedural details. This claim was confirmed by some ministers, though most of them were named the Shiite duo led by Hezbollah, which has categorically refused to hand over its arms. Who are we to believe- some ministers of the Shiite duo or the party itself?
These reservations do not downplay the significance of the cabinet’s decisions. They should not be seen as a fleeting development or a ploy to absorb international pressure. Instead, they should be dealt with as a foundational moment that sets a long-overdue journey toward retrieving our sovereignty that, above all, requires clear political determination and recognition that Lebanon can no longer remain in limbo. Either this moment gives rise to a genuine effort to consolidate statehood and the state’s monopoly on arms, as well as to change Lebanon’s place in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Otherwise, Lebanon will have squandered another opportunity and what may be the country's last chance for salvation.
While we hope that such pessimism is excessive, we must again stress that Lebanon must now go from accommodating Hezbollah to furthering an alternative project that redefines Lebanon’s role in the region and its vision for the future of its relations, particularly with Arab and friendly states.
In a previous article, I laid a viable roadmap for resolving the weapons dilemma. It begins with Lebanon officially announcing that it will end its armed conflict with Israel once and for all, and developing arrangements for a cessation of hostilities, thereby removing the main pretext of the party’s arms. The second step is to hold a dialogue with the new Syrian regime that redefines bilateral relations on the basis of sovereignty and national interests rather than the dependency, breaking with the legacy that had legitimized non-state actors.
The aim of shifting from military confrontation to political contestation is urgently needed. It is a prerequisite for rejoining the international community on healthy terms and revitalizing Lebanon's democratic system, which has become pale, worn out, and sterile. Still, it has not fallen, and Lebanon remains a beacon of democracy when contrasted with the rabid, fanatical, rightward drift toward authoritarianism in Israel, and the rigid Islamist ideologies confronting national ones.
The Lebanese authorities must go all the way on this path they have begun to traverse, affirming the state’s sovereignty through a clear and unequivocal decision and recognizing that the era of military resistance and non-state actors has ended- not because Israel demands it, but because allowing Hezbollah to keep its arms will lead to Lebanon’s definitive collapse and close every door to international support to reconstruction and economic recovery.
The state has spoken. Will it have the courage to follow through on its promises? Here, a joke comes to mind: delusional that he was a grain of wheat, a man lived in constant fear that a chicken might eat him. After lots of therapy, he finally accepted that he was not a grain of wheat. In the last session, however, he nervously told his doctor: “I’m convinced I’m not a grain of wheat... now we need to convince the chicken!”
The real challenge, today- the test that will determine whether we have truly entered a post-Hezbollah era or remain its shadow as we await a miracle that will never come- is this: the state breaking Hezbollah’s grip over. It is now or never. If the political leadership does not acknowledge Hezbollah’s defeat, it will never build a future.
