Tom Barrack’s recent statements can no longer be dismissed as casual remarks or diplomatic slips. He is the US Envoy to Syria and Lebanon, and they should not be downplayed; indeed, explaining his rhetoric as political naivete is itself naive. Barrack speaks in his capacity as the official representative of the most powerful state in the world.
The stream of Barrack’s noteworthy stances begins with his remarks to “The National.” “I honestly think that they are going to say ‘the world will pass us by. Why? You have Israel on one side, you have Iran on the other, and now you have Syria manifesting itself so quickly that if Lebanon doesn’t move, it’s going to be Bilad Al Sham again.”In his most recent visit, he openly recognized Iran’s role in Lebanon, presenting it neighbor that cannot be ignored. Deliberately and diplomatically choosing his words, he stressed that Hezbollah cannot make demands with “giving something in return,” implying that the party will not concede without demanding a price.
If we set aside any assumption of political naivete, Barrack’s statements point to one of two possibilities: either his rhetoric is the result of confusion and strategic ambiguity within the U.S. administration itself, or it has not been sufficiently coordinating with Israel. In both cases, the outcome is similar: Lebanon, once again, is not a priority to Washington, and it is being managed callously.
Most Lebanese media outlets have framed Barrack’s latest visit as a positive development that follows the government’s decision on monopolizing arms, downplaying the deeper implications of his statements regarding Hezbollah and Iran, which are very consequential.
First, they indirectly poured cold water on the threats Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem made in his latest speech (that there would be “no life” in Lebanon if the party’s weapons were touched and that Hezbollah cannot exist without “the resistance”.) Barrack’s rhetoric could be interpreted as an offer to reward the party for the harm it has caused over decades: the lives, infrastructure, and institutions it has destroyed, both in Lebanon and across the region.
Second, his statements risk squandering the fragile momentum behind Lebanon’s institutions and the state’s push to monopolize arms, particularly after the army was tasked with presenting its plan to implement the decision. Barrack’s framing opens the door to reproducing troubling political habits: delay, compromise, and ambiguous formulas open to endless interpretation.
Barrack’s positions suggest that the US approach is to secure “gains” for Lebanon’s Shiite community, ostensibly to safeguard the sect’s role within the political system. In practice- given today’s balance of power- doing so would only cement Hezbollah’s role as the guardian and sole representative of the Shiite community, albeit nominally as part of a duo that includes the Amal Movement. Put bluntly, Barrack frames Lebanon’s Shiites as a monolith supportive of Hezbollah, or at best to the “Hezbollah-Amal” duo, ignoring the significant segments of the Shiite community opposed to both and overlooking the far-reaching implications that this assumption could have for Lebanon’s social fabric.
Barrack’s remarks also overlook a critical question: What, exactly, does Washington want from Lebanon’s Shiites? After their liberation from Hezbollah’s dominance by force of arms, will they be left under its ideological and political shadow? Is the US prepared to ignore the party’s organic ties to Iran, its ideological project, and the influence its alliance exerts on Lebanon’s institutions and communal dynamics?
Adding to the confusion, Barrack now presents Iran as a necessary partner. It is referred to as a “neighbor,” despite calls for “historic settlement” with a “new Syria” from which Iran has been entirely sidelined following the fall of the Assad regime.
The hard fact is that Hezbollah and its surrounding ecosystem cannot simply be bypassed; any future settlement must include them. The question of restricting armament is but one element of a wider range of issues, including the conclusive cessation of attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory, Lebanon’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (the most challenging of them) the nature of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran. As we have stressed before, this relationship is layered, complex, and multifaceted. There are religious, cultural, social, and political dimensions to it. Ironically, of all these dimensions, Hezbollah’s arms are the least dangerous, In principle, they are the most negotiable.
Realism also demands, however, rejecting half-baked settlements that carry the seeds of future conflicts. Recognizing Hezbollah, or even the Hezbollah-Amal duo, as the sole representatives of the Shiite community would have a domino effect on Lebanon’s institutions, security forces, educational structures, and national social cohesion, given the party’s ideological rigidity allegiance to Tehran.
In the end, Barrack’s statements are neither innocent nor incidental. They expose the ambiguity of Washington’s policy. The bigger fear is that his remarks reveal the tip of an iceberg- that he is hinting at quiet recalibration within the US administration as it weighs its regional priorities and objectives.
As we noted earlier this month, in this very column “It is not implausible that Barrack’s apparent ‘political naivete’ is a cover for more complicated plans founded on tacit arrangements negotiated quietly behind closed doors being pursued outside formal frameworks.” These could include “concessions from Hezbollah in exchange for American political guarantees.”
For Lebanon, this means that if concessions are to be made, the leadership cannot compromise on its demands. At the top of that list: an explicit commitment from Hezbollah to permanently end all military operations beyond Lebanon’s borders, and, critically, to formally endorse a permanent armistice with Israel.
