The big question in Lebanon today is: When will Israel’s all-out war against Hezbollah resume, and what will it look like? A flood of Israeli statements, as well as the party’s own rhetoric and its effort to convince the press that it has recovered and is now prepared for war (figures associated with the party have gone as far as to speak of a new secret organization unlike anything that preceded it), have all created this sense of anxious anticipation.
Moreover, in one example of the torrent of US statements about Lebanon, the American envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack, fanned the flames. He warned that if Lebanon fails to disarm Hezbollah, Israel could take unilateral military action, “and the consequences would be grave.”
As for the Lebanese state, its officials seem like they are on another planet. Citizens are left wondering: who is the government addressing its statements about the danger of war with Israel to? Washington? Tel Aviv? The Arabs and the Islamic world? Or is it merely posturing for domestic ends?
It is difficult to understand the government’s stance. Its discourse makes the government seem like it is unaware of what had been achieved at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit: unprecedented engagement on the part of countries representing more than a billion and a half Arabs and Muslims, alongside the US and Europe, in a process that aims to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and establish lasting peace in the region that brings all Arabs and most Muslims together. It will be a long and difficult path, but the early signs suggest that a new era is emerging on the other side of the immense regional shifts of the past two years.
It seems that the Lebanese authorities have not understood the significance of the changes in neighboring Syria, nor the Hamas’s disarmament in Gaza and its political marginalization in Palestine or the scale of Hezbollah’s losses in Lebanon and Syria (from the assassination of its leaders, from the first to the third ranks and perhaps beyond, to the destruction of its arsenal and the devastation of its strongholds). They have not grasped the deeper implications of the American-Israeli war on Iran (the violation of its airspace and the strikes on its nuclear facilities) either.
How can the authorities convince the Lebanese, the Arabs, and the world that they recognize what is happening when they keep repeating the same mistakes, insisting on indirect negotiations with Israel and as though it were a bold or groundbreaking achievement? Worse, they have behaved as though Hezbollah won the war and can dictate terms- the ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024 grants Israel the right to monitor Lebanese territory with drones day and night, Israel has been conducting daily attacks and assassinations for more than nine months and continues to occupy Lebanese territory.
What does the Lebanese government want? Or rather, what is it waiting for? Does it expect a solution to come from abroad, allowing it to be a passive recipient without obligations? Who would come from “abroad?” American or European intervention is not on the cards; at best, one can expect initiatives similar to those that we’ve long grown accustomed to.
As for the Arabs, they have lost hope in Lebanon and the Lebanese, removing the country from their list of priorities. The only remaining foreign actor is Israel, and its war would be one of pure evil. An Israeli war is the worst thing that could happen to Lebanon: it would complicate matters, resolve nothing, and likely lead to the displacement of southerners to north of the Litani River or even farther, opening the door to all kinds of domestic crises and conflicts.
The more likely explanation is that the government prefers to maintain the status quo and keep things as they are, “managing” the crisis rather than solving it. It seems to believe that this is the least harmful of two bad options. In such a climate, stagnation entrenches a state of affairs that allows those blinded by political shortsightedness to focus on domestic concerns over regional shifts: from parliamentary elections to strengthening their positions and popularity along sectarian, regional, and partisan lines.
The Shiite duo (Amal and Hezbollah) seeks to consolidate its influence in Parliament and within its community, while Christian parties are competing for seats and leadership of their community. Others are preoccupied with restoring the powers of the presidency and reviving the slogan of a “strong president,” a tiresome and dangerous approach that has repeatedly failed. As for the Sunnis, “their leaders are searching for a street, and their street is searching for a leader,” as one observer put it.
It is difficult to find an alternative explanation for the government’s hesitation to adopt out-of-the-box approaches, joining the Arab and Muslim consensus on the need to end the conflict rather than hiding behind euphemisms like “durable truce.” The distinction between a “permanent truce” and a “durable truce” is fundamental: the former signals an end to the conflict with Israel, which would then be translated into concrete security arrangements.
Does anyone in the government understand the significance of taking such a bold position for the Americans, the Europeans, and especially Arab countries seeking to help Lebanon? Does anyone in power understand that it has the potential to create a new dynamic? Is there any official with the courage to take such a step?
Experience has taught the Lebanese to expect disappointments and carry on living, as the late historian Kamal Salibi titled his book, in “A House of Many Mansions.”
