In the 22 years that passed between September 11, 2001, and October 7, 2023, many things changed and much remained the same in Iraq. It continued to occupy a crucial geopolitical position, and the nature of its politics changed. After 9/11, Iraq became the arena for a globalization of regional politics, and with the attack of October 7, it became a stage for the regionalization of international politics.
In the first period, Washington surged forward to become the only international power directly shaping regional affairs as it sought retribution for a terrorist attack that would have global repercussions. Assuming that part of the problem lay within the region, it toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and an Ottoman legacy, which had governance in Iraq for over a century, without altering the geography.
In the second period, when Tel Aviv succeeded in framing the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation as an existential war, or a second war of independence, its narrative presented its retaliation as a reaction to an unprovoked assault rather than the result of an accumulation of its own actions. It sought to change the nature of the Palestinian struggle and render this international cause into a regional question managed solely by itself and to become a regional force capable of influencing international politics.
Confronted with Israel’s hubris, Iraq has once again become a focal point of regional geopolitics, not in line with Tel Aviv’s plans, which are rejected by every influential actor in the region. Indeed, every regional power seeks to prevent Iraq from becoming the arena of yet another international-regional conflict, encouraging its authorities to adapt to the shifts of October 7.
These shifts have upended Iran's regional strategy, which had itself been one ramification of 9/11 and has had a particularly consequential impact on Iraq in general and the Shiite community in particular - the largest demographic bloc in Iraq and one that would go on to run the state. State-building in Iraq remains in limbo, but that is not solely the fault of Shiite political actors, though they must shoulder more responsibility for changing Iraq’s political course than others.
Today, Shiite political forces must meet intertwined domestic and regional obligations. They preserved their authority but failed to develop a national project. The ideological and militant project they did develop is at a turning point: non-state actors have proven ineffective and become an existential threat. Decoupling political authority and armed actors, after the lines had been blurred, has become necessary.
As for the state and the Iraqi authorities, the current regional and international conditions impose a different approach. The habitual disregard for contradictions cannot continue. The issues in Iraq are complex, and the Shiite majority, which controls the state institutions, must go further than the “dialogue of the brave” and make “concessions of the brave.” This begins with choosing a prime minister who can be a leader rather than a chieftain or an apparatchik: a statesman who runs the government and leads its ministers to serve the country rather than subordinating it. Political and financial obligations pose particularly grave risks that could backfire on everyone if left unaddressed.
In sum, the 2003 system is losing its safety valves: Tehran is in retreat, Washington’s approach has shifted, Tel Aviv’s hubris continues, and Najaf maintains its distance. A single misstep is enough either to topple what remains of the regional order born of 9/11 and reshape the status quo.
