At a moment of profound regional and international upheaval, as the rules that once governed the international system are being dismantled and redefined, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, emerges with a statement that leaves no room for interpretation: “At your service, Khamenei.” With this, he once again declares that his primary allegiance lies with Iran, and that his party is prepared to do whatever is required - even to engage in a second “support war” - to defend it against any threat. This is both a political position and an explicit declaration of alignment, one that shifts Lebanon from the category of a state seeking to reclaim its sovereignty to that of an open arena in a regional conflict over which it has no say.
It is not clear how Qassem’s words should be approached. Do they genuinely reflect the position of the “party” and its Iranian ally, or has this man been reduced to a propagandist tasked with keeping his base together? It is difficult to take his words seriously at this time, especially after the resounding losses suffered by his party and its axis and amid unprecedented US–EU tensions as US President Donald Trump seeks to redefine sovereignty and alliances. Moreover, Gaza has entered a grey zone between war and a peace settlement, Syria has been rid of the regime without yet reaching the threshold of stability, and Iran is being squeezed both domestically and globally.
As Lebanon desperately struggles, against this backdrop, to convince the world that it has returned to the logic of the state and turned the page on the militia, Qassem’s statement removes the final layers of ambiguity that the “party” had relied on for years before the war into which Lebanon was previously was dragged into under the banner of “support and distraction,” first in defence of Gaza and second in protection of Lebanon. Today, Palestine is not part of the discourse, there is no attempt at using it as moral cover. The agenda is now openly and explicitly to defend the Iranian regime, regardless of the cost to Lebanon. In this sense, Hezbollah has gone from being a local actor with foreign ties to an agent of another state.
This state of affairs reveals two truths. It confirms dialogue with the “party” on any issue is futile and untenable, especially regarding the usefulness or function of its weapons. Second, its weapons are no longer (even rhetorically) a deterrent meant to protect Lebanon but instruments for use in a battle that transcends its borders and the interests of its people.
The second is that it comes at an exceptional moment for Lebanon, perhaps unique in the long history of its collapse. For the first time in years, the Lebanese state (at least in words), through its presidency, government, and military institutions, is attempting to assert sovereignty and rebuild severed ties with the international community and the Arab world. It is keenly seeking to convince global capitals that Lebanon is no longer hostage to actors outside its authority. Accordingly, Qassem’s words cannot be read as an isolated partisan position; they undermine this fragile trajectory, seek to preemptively undermine trust, and deprive Lebanon of an opportunity- one that might never come again- to reposition itself as a state rather than an arena. A potential war is not the only threat. His statement also makes political and economic recovery less likely. How can Lebanon convince the international community that it is moving toward restoring its monopoly on armament as Hezbollah openly declares its allegiance to another state?
How can the “party” allow itself to line up for a war that even the United States, with all its might, hesitates to enter, not out of incapacity or fear of Iran but because of the potential repercussions? The most likely answer is not the “party’s” capabilities, however large its remaining arsenal may be, but its determination to monopolize Shiite representation. What Qassem, his party, and perhaps Iran seek is compensation through political gains reaped by the “party” and its base at the expense of other sects.
Here, a long-suppressed question arises within the Shiite community itself: is defending the Iranian regime in the interest of the Shiites of Lebanon, who have paid heavy prices in past wars? Or are they once again being used as human shields while living standards erode and what remains of their social and economic security disappears? This community is threatened, once more, becoming fodder for a regional conflict it has no control on direct interest in.
In the end, the issue is no longer a political or ideological disagreement; it has become a question of who decides the fate of the Shiites and of Lebanon more broadly. Is it the state and its institutions, or a party that openly declares foreign allegiance. Strikingly, the Shiites in particular, and Lebanese in general, are turning a blind eye to what is happening and continuing to bear the burden of new adventures and actions that trivialise their lives and the future of their children.
It is true that Lebanon has survived many wars and crises, but this is a different moment, both internationally and regionally. There are no signs that this will imminently change. How, then, can Lebanon, with all its sects, be spared the risks of this moment in which states are assessed by their ability to control their territory, in a world that Trump is reshaping through negotiations driven by power and influence? The lesson for Lebanese, officials and citizens alike (especially Shiites) is to abandon illusions and to give up “living with a lie.” They must acknowledge the truth about Hezbollah’s “capabilities.” In this context, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney words in Davos come to mind: “The system's power comes not from its truth, but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true, and its fragility comes from the same source.”
The choice between restoring the state and following foreign dictates can no longer be postponed or circumvented.
