In a hypothetical world where United States and Israel are not part of the global political landscape, would it be reasonable to think the Iranian regime, with its nuclear ambitions, ballistic missiles, and networks of militias, could become a genuine partner for the Gulf states, given that nearly 80% of its attacks have targeted these countries?
The answer to this counterfactual shows that the nature of the regime has been the core issue since 1979. It has a long record of destabilizing the region without the presence of its adversaries.
If we assume that the war’s strategic objectives - transforming Iran into a non-nuclear state, the obliteration its long-range missile arsenal, and ending its support for armed factions - or some of them, are achieved, balances of power in the region and the world would begin to be reshaped beyond non-military dynamics:
First: International and regional pressure to resolve the Palestinian question would likely intensify, as would the push to integrate the region into a broader economic-security network. “Stability for integration” would become the regional formula, prioritizing supply chains and economic integration over traditional politics-centered settlements.
Second: The Iranian regime would likely wither gradually, as have Hamas and Hezbollah, under compounded pressures. The war will likely have deep economic and political repercussions that will transform the relationship between society and the political system, deepening its crisis of political legitimacy and enlarging the gap between the regime and the public. This could open the door to radical shifts amid divisions within the ruling elite alongside popular protests, especially if the regime continues to reject meaningful reform and political concessions.
Third: With the Iranian regime weakened, its relationship with its proxy networks of militias and armed factions across the region, both in terms of support levels and its capacity for control and direction, would automatically be set back. A revival of the modern state as a concept - in line with the definition of Max Weber: a sovereign entity that monopolizes “legitimate violence” within its borders - would likely follow. This definition could evolve into an operational policy imposed through international and regional tools aimed at containing and disarming non-state actors, foremost among them the militias of Iraq and Lebanon. This would restore national armies as the sole legitimate framework for bearing arms.
This trajectory could later extend to more complex environments such as Yemen, where tribal structures intersect with factionalism, making disarmament akin to creating a new social contract. The restoration of a state monopoly over arms would likely usher in a turbulent transitional phase, with these countries seeing clashes and temporary disorder before a centralized state model stabilizes.
Fourth: The geopolitics of maritime trade would likely be recalibrated, with measures taken to protect vital chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab, strengthen maritime security, and ensure the flow of energy and trade. At the same time, alternative routes that reduce reliance on traditional pathways, such as China’s Belt and Road, will be developed, reinforcing the region’s role as a central hub for global trade.
Fifth: The logic of alliances and blocs would likely become the defining feature of the next phase. New regional or transregional coalitions could emerge, while existing coalitions would be strengthened, with greater integration of the intersection of security, economic, and technological dimensions. Alliances would shift from traditional defensive formats to comprehensive frameworks for managing national security, supply chains, and investment.
The defensive dimension of security would become especially prominent, enabling states to enhance deterrence capabilities, share intelligence, coordinate air and maritime defense systems, and improve readiness to respond to shared threats. This would reduce the cost for states and allow them to avoid unilateral confrontation while increasing the effectiveness of collective protection. Key states would also engage in building diverse global networks, managing their balances between major powers to adapt to a shifting international environment.
Sixth: Domestic political divisions in the United States will likely deepen as a result of the economic repercussions of the war. A declaration of victory by the Donald Trump administration would not end the domestic debate; rather, the polarization could intensify as economic pressure and the financial costs of the war mount amid divergent assessments of its outcomes, with the war potentially straining the American political system.
Seventh: An economic crisis could erupt in the post-war phase as a result of the war’s global economic repercussions. Its impact, however, would be more severe on poorer regional states lacking financial flexibility and the capacity to absorb shocks.
Eighth: Israel, in turn, would not be immune to these ramifications. It would likely see growing internal strife that is not necessarily tied to the war’s outcomes. Even in the event of military victory, tensions could rise over the structure of the state, its identity, its security doctrine, and the political legacy of Benjamin Netanyahu, deepening polarization between the right-wing parties rallying around Netanyahu and a centrist-left opposition and potentially leading to re-engagement with the Palestinian issue as the crisis is externalized.
Ninth: The effects of these regional shifts go beyond the Middle East to influence global power balances, particularly China’s place in the international system. The regulation of trade routes, the construction of alternative corridors, and strengthening of security alliances would all place pressure on Beijing’s transcontinental projects and reshape the global landscape of economic and strategic influence. At the same time, the western hemisphere, especially Latin America, including countries such as Venezuela, could receive increased US attention. A revival of the “Monroe Doctrine” could be pursued to prevent rival powers from expanding into the United States’ sphere of influence, ultimately reconfiguring Latin America in line with arrangements in the Eurasian space designed to curb the rise of competing powers.
In conclusion, assuming the realization of these strategic objectives or some of them, the post-war phase would reshape both the region and the world. Only the governments that understand this shift and act with strategic foresight will be able to seize its opportunities and direct its outcomes to their advantage.
