Israel did not stop bombing Lebanese territory during the ongoing negotiations between delegations from the two countries in Washington under American sponsorship, not even temporarily. It has undermined the Lebanese government, which is trying, through every “safe” means, to confine weapons to the hands of the state. It has thereby weakened trust among communities that do not support Hezbollah and have been horrified by Israel’s systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and are becoming increasingly doubtful of the government’s ability to deter the brutal occupying power that continues its bombardment unchecked.
Lebanon’s situation is more complicated than that of any country that has entered peace or war negotiations with Israel, because it was not Lebanon but an armed organization operating on its territory that triggered this conflict to “support for Iran.” That had not been the case for Egypt, for example, which fought the 1973 war to liberate its occupied land and then entered into “disengagement” negotiations that were followed by President Anwar Sadat’s initiative, his visit to Jerusalem, and a separate peace agreement through which Egypt regained its occupied territories. Meanwhile, the remaining Arab-Israeli conflict issues, foremost among them the Palestinian question, had remained unaddressed until the 1993 Oslo Accords, which Israel ultimately foiled through settlement expansion in the West Bank and its siege of Gaza.
The conduct of the current Israeli government breaks with the approach of its predecessors. Israeli society has fundamentally changed. The division is no longer between the Likud and Labor parties, nor between right, left, and center, but rather between extremists and even more extreme factions. This shift has shaken in peace as a guaranteed and secure alternative for all.
The contrast with the Sadat era is stark. He and his supporters were confident that peace would bear fruit and even regarded it as synonymous with prosperity, development, and solving Egypt’s economic problems. Moreover, his peace process yielded immediate results on the ground through Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and its return to Egyptian sovereignty. The Camp David Accords became a “pillar of the region” for nearly half a century. Many things changed, but not this agreement, which endured and remained a bulwark against war between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
This confidence in peace made war seem unlikely, especially since those who raised its banner at the Arab level at the time were the so-called “Steadfastness and Confrontation Front” and fought one another rather than Israel. Things changed after the Iranian Revolution, with Iran building regional alliances and fostering proxies who all raised the banner of war and armed resistance, eventually leading to Hamas’s October 7, 2023 operation, which followed by Lebanon’s wars with Israel, ignited by Hezbollah “in support of Gaza” and then “in support of Iran”, and culminated in the American-Israeli war against Iran and all its negative repercussions for the region and the world.
In truth, the results of these wars were not a step toward the liberation of Palestine, nor can they be described as “popular wars of liberation” waged for independence and freedom. Instead, they consolidated the occupation and expanded it to Gaza and Lebanon, weakened Iran, and fueled skepticism within every constituency that had raised the banner of war and armed resistance regarding their usefulness in the current context, and even their ability to achieve the goals they proclaimed.
The choice between war and peace in the trajectory of the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been accompanied by confidence bordering on certainty in each choice. Those who fought on the Arab side in 1948, 1967, and 1973, regardless of performance, victory, or defeat, believed that war was the only path to liberating the land and restoring rights. The Egyptian soldier who crossed the Suez Canal had no doubt that this was the sole means through which Sinai and the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967 could be liberated. This certainty later returned “in reverse form” with Sadat’s peace initiative. He had no doubt that he would achieve his objective through peace and that Sinai had “fully returned to us” through his bold move, even if many opposed it.
Confidence in the regional choices, whether to seek peace or war, was shaken with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It has almost entirely disappeared over the past three years. War and armed resistance no longer inspire the same confidence and certainty that they once had during the war to liberate southern Lebanon in 2000, for example, when there was a conviction that armed resistance, including Hezbollah, would force Israel to withdraw.
The situation today has changed fundamentally. The wars of armed organizations have failed, while those committed to moderation, peace, and civil and legal resistance to occupation cannot abandon deterrence. They must also recognize that the “new Israel” no longer has “friend and foe,” and that any state shielded from accountability and the rule of law poses a threat to everyone.
