The Lebanese authority’s attempt to renew the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) did not succeed. This was expected due to the US position, which has "officially" held for some time that it is time to reduce UN expenses, particularly for global peacekeeping forces. There is a conviction that Washington is no longer enthusiastic about this UN approach to containing and managing existing conflicts.
Many observers believe that at the forefront of such examples from the American perspective is the issue of UNIFIL, along with Washington's interest - with the launch of negotiations - in bringing about a change in the UN framework for managing the situation in the south. This involves abandoning the role of the UN in this regard, moving perhaps, as some claim, toward adopting the framework agreement for the US-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli peace negotiations as an alternative to relevant international resolutions.
This alternative is ruled out because a UN framework remains necessary, regardless of how a new international force might be structured. This force would be required to fill the vacuum left by UNIFIL. Furthermore, it would have to manage a transitional phase that is deeply uncertain, given that the underlying peace negotiations are still in their infancy. This ambiguity is caused by Israel’s refusal of a ceasefire, a rejection of the previously agreed-upon pilot zones - even though the start of their implementation revealed major disagreements due to impossible Israeli conditions - and "a refusal to withdraw from the security belt established by Israel in southern Lebanon until the issue of weapons across all Lebanese territories is entirely resolved," as Israeli officials remind us nearly every day.
This completely contradicts the Lebanese proposal, which calls for a step-by-step approach starting with the Lebanese army taking control south of the Litani River, alongside a total ceasefire by Israel. As a reminder, with the expiration of UNIFIL's mandate at the end of this year, the three proposals for a new UN force, which varied in troop numbers and certain duties, and were presented by the UN Secretary-General in June to fill the vacuum left by UNIFIL, have practically been dropped.
Discussions are currently centered on establishing a mechanism to verify the implementation of what is required under the negotiating framework, regarding the Israeli withdrawal and the full deployment of the Lebanese army. This is also no easy task. Italy reportedly has reservations, rather than a rejection, regarding the nascent proposal for it to assume the administration or supervision of this mechanism, unless there are actual security guarantees regarding the possibility of violations taking place against its forces. Violations that could, as mentioned, serve as political messages transmitted through security means.
Moreover, Israel has vetoes against certain countries, such as France, Spain, and Türkiye, among others, participating in this mechanism. Questions are also being raised about whether the planned force will be a European or joint European-international force, meaning a European weight with the participation of countries from other regions. Disagreements will also undoubtedly surround the international legal reference for this proposed force, because such a reference provides it with legitimacy, effectiveness, and consequently, the credibility to carry out its duties within a political and security environment open to all possibilities.
Some observers note that it is absolutely vital to contain the Israeli escalation and prevent it from expanding further in firepower and territorial occupation. Avoiding the risk of such a spiral is considered essential to keep the negotiations from collapsing entirely. However, there are no signs on the horizon that this will happen, particularly regarding an Israeli ceasefire.
Within this framework, some believe it is necessary to wait until after the parliamentary elections in Israel, given that Netanyahu is waging his electoral battle through his military escalation in Lebanon. However, this view warrants more than one observation. Israel's declared wartime objectives will not change after the elections, as they reflect a vision that is strategic for some and ideological for others within the current Israeli ruling establishment, given the dominance of the far-right in both its strategic and religious-ideological dimensions.
Any political alliance reflecting the election results will not bring about a fundamental change in the goals of the war or in its management, even if some of the voices that grew louder on the eve of the elections fade, the rhetoric quietens, or the method of serving these known objectives changes. The bottom line is that the "return to the state" in Lebanon, which remains a goal or a fundamental prerequisite for achieving national political, economic, and societal stability, requires the state's total return to assuming its core functions like any other country. Foremost among these duties is the decision of war and peace and imposing state monopoly over weapons.
The primary and fundamental gateway to achieve this, as an absolutely essential prerequisite, lies in exerting pressure on Israel. This must come principally from the US, given the historically, practically, and realistically unique relationship between the two countries, as well as Washington's current role in "engineering" and managing the negotiations. Pressure must also come from international powers whose weight and relations with Israel make them capable - should they genuinely desire - of halting the escalating Israeli war and the mounting Lebanese hemorrhaging on all fronts and forcing the acceptance of a ceasefire and a gradual withdrawal as previously mentioned.
This would allow the Lebanese army alone to assume full control, in an initial phase, from south of the Litani River to Lebanon’s international borders. This requires emphasizing the reactivation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement framework, which does not expire with time as some believe or as Israel desires. It also requires working to solidify Lebanon's borders, rather than demarcate them, as they are already fundamentally defined, by resolving certain disputed points.
This is the actual, practical, and realistic gateway to a "return to the state" and an end to Lebanon's role as a playground for "other people's wars."
