Per the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Israel’s airstrike on an Iranian consulate building in the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus killed seven military advisors. Among them was Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a prominent leader in its foreign arm, the Quds Force, who became the third to be killed by Israel since the war in Gaza began.
Zahedi is considered the most prominent Quds Force leader to be liquidated since Qasem Soleimani was assassinated in Baghdad in early 2020, IRGC logistics chief Razi Mousavi was eliminated in Syria, and IRGC and Quds Force Intelligence Chief Hojjatollah Omidvar was killed, also in Syria. In addition to these assassinations, Israel has also assassinated security officials and nuclear scientists inside Iran, as well as attacking military and nuclear facilities, stealing the archive of Iran’s Nuclear program, and its other operations against Iranian interests in Syria. This list of Israeli targets indicates that what we are seeing is a direct Iranian-Israeli war. This conflict has gone beyond war against Tehran's proxies, with varied military operations in Syria becoming routine.
This introduction reminds us of a recurrent theme in this column, which is that the October 7 operation and the Gaza war that followed are bigger than the conflict between Hamas and Israel. These events are merely the catalyst that sparked direct conflict between Iran and Israel following their decades-long shadow war. As the Gaza war rages on, the fronts of the Iranian-Israeli-Western war are shifting. This is evident from the developments we are seeing on Syrian soil and Hezbollah's so-called war of support in South Lebanon, Houthi piracy in the Red Sea, the aggressive actions of Iraqi militias allied with Iran, and most recently, attempts to destabilize Jordan.
Indeed, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal called on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan to engage in the Gaza war and expand the war against Israel. Some have called this effort to turn Jordan into a new resistance front "Jordan Flood." The risks of incitement against Jordan are multifaceted, and they are not new. This campaign against Jordan began with the smuggling of Captagon pills, arms, and explosive drones across the Syrian border. It escalated to the point of incitement when Iraqi Hezbollah announced that it was prepared to arm thousands of volunteers in Jordan to allow for opening a front against Israel. The aim of this campaign against Jordan aims to spread unrest and instability in the Hashemite Kingdom, end its peace treaty with Israel, and overthrow the regime to change the security equation in the region.
All these actions reaffirm that the war unfolding today goes beyond the battles between Hamas and Israel in Gaza. It is a war being waged by the Iranian regime with the aim of undercutting regional security through all the forces associated or allied with it, as well as others that it uses or that use it to achieve tactical objectives and form temporary alliances, with each side leveraging them to further its own interests and long-term objectives.
That suggests that Iran and Israel are taking separate tracks that intersect and complement one another. Israel uses its war against Hamas as a facade for its war against Iran’s axis and proxies, while the latter exploits Hamas and the Gaza war to push back against all the regional and international rivals standing in the way of its expansionist goals. It is a preemptive war that Tehran is waging to safeguard its role and position in the region, broaden its sphere of influence, and empower its allies to allow for confronting the threat of a regional peace project whose contours are beginning to emerge through the efforts to create peace and stability in the region, resolve conflicts where possible, and build the foundations for sustainable regional and international cooperation.
Neither can Israel claim that the only goal of its ongoing war in Gaza is to eliminate Hamas and root it out of the sector, nor can Iran, after all the recent developments that have been unfolding at a rapid pace, claim that it and its allies across the region have mobilized solely to save and support Hamas. Fatah's accusations against Iran, its claims that Tehran "is spreading chaos and lawlessness and exploiting the sacred cause" were made against this backdrop.
The regime in Iran is fully aware that its primary enemy is the trajectory of stability, prosperity, and peace. Iran has hit back against it by investing in the region's domestic and foreign conflicts. This does not mean that Iran seeks a large-scale war. Rather, its policies are founded on disruption and small, mobile wars, as well as creating political and economic instability in several regional countries. The region has been dealing with this for years.
Iran has many reasons to avoid a large-scale war, the most significant of which are that it is too weak militarily to face Washington, its economy is in decline, and it is isolated on the world stage, except for its relationships with Russia and China. It is fully aware of the limitations of these two powers and that neither of them is willing to fight alongside it in a major regional war.
Iran's domestic situation remains a black box. Moreover, Israeli strikes are depriving Iran of crucial officials and experts, including pillars of the revolution and nuclear scientists. It remains unclear who will replace them, how their abilities and expertise compare to their predecessors', or how their elimination will impact the regime's strength and reactions. These strikes also underline the extent to which Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment, especially at the intelligence level.
On the other hand, Israel is exploiting this limited regional war. Since the US would prefer to avoid, or rather has prohibited, a fully-fledged war against Iran, Israel has used this conflict to inflict as much damage as it can against the Palestinians on all fronts, and to seek revenge against Hamas. Some members of Benjamin Netanyahu's government might be aiming to displace Palestinians from the Strip or make living there untenable.
Accordingly, we can conclude that whatever form Iran's retaliation against the strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus takes, it will not change the scene that has prevailed in the region since October 2023. The only thing that has changed is that the identities of the belligerents have become clearer. This has rendered half measures and settlements ineffective, and it means that comprehensive military solutions are not likely in the short and medium term. There remains hope for a comprehensive political initiative that brings peace, ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and establishes the foundations for regional security. The conflict must be taken from the battlefield to the negotiation table, through the initiative of the US president, before his "anger" at Netanyahu fades against the noise of the presidential elections.
