The 2019 financial and economic collapse presented an exceptional opportunity to chart a new path that could pull Lebanon out of rock bottom. However, the power-hungry political establishment, which had been postponing the collapse since 2017, made protecting bankrupt banks its top priority, facilitating capital flight to saddle depositors and society at large with the cost of the collapse. Hezbollah rescued the corruption inherent to the sectarian power-sharing system that repressed the October uprising. Lebanon squandered a historic opportunity to recover following the collapse that had impoverished millions and led to a surge in unemployment.
Despite the calamity of the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020, the corrupt regime backed by the lawless militias maintained power and put the costs of the collapse on society. The collapse was aggravated by the gimmicks of central bank circulars that manipulated the exchange rate and shielded the powerful. Liquid assets exceeded $30 billion at the time; this would have been enough to launch a serious recovery program if accountability and transparency had been sought. Instead, the mafia–militia alliance, fronted by Hassan Diab’s government, torpedoed the Lazard Plan. Parliament, the judiciary, and the media then focused on protecting the looters and preserving a rent-seeking economy that serves their interests.
The catastrophic “support” war, which crushed Hezbollah, bloated with power and deluded about its capabilities, ended in a devastating defeat for the country. Regional upheaval rages on as Israel strikes Iran’s arms and pushes Iran out of the new Syria. Thus, at the beginning of last year, it seemed that change was possible and that Lebanon was no longer impervious to transformation. Hopes for entering an era of change were heightened by the arrival of Joseph Aoun, portrayed as an outsider, to the presidency. The optimism grew following the appointment of Nawaf Salam, who had headed the International Court of Justice, as prime minister. Yet, little has been achieved relative to the immense aspirations of that moment.
Their agenda was centered on implementing UN Resolution 1701 and enforcing the ceasefire, especially its preamble, which calls for the disarmament of non-state actors across Lebanon and names the six bodies entitled to bear arms: the army: Internal Security Forces, General Security, State Security, Customs, and municipal police. The seventh clause of the agreement also stipulates dismantling militia and paramilitary infrastructure, including groups that hide under scout uniforms. This approach preemptively repudiated self-serving interpretations of the ceasefire agreement; its texts are clear. What has been achieved south of the Litani is important, but progress remains modest nationwide. More troubling still is the willful blindness to the dangers of Hezbollah’s accusatory, delegitimising discourse, as well as those of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s claims regarding the split between the south and north of the Litani.
They also came with an agenda of accountability and genuine reform. A positive atmosphere arose after the prime minister pledged economic and political reform in his first televised appearance, stressing that the challenge was to impel skilled expatriates to return. He spoke of the need to reverse the current trajectory so that the trend of migration would shift from outward to inward. He also pledged that the government would take on the burden of recovery and reconstruction, and he described electoral laws since the official end of the civil war in 1990 as being unconstitutional.
From the president’s oath of office to the ministerial statement, Lebanon appeared to be on the verge of launching a national state project built around the monopolization by the legitimate authorities and on financial-economic reform grounded in accountability, with a forensic auditing explicitly promised in the ministerial statement. However, 2025 has ended and the promise that it would be the year of exclusive state control over weapons has not been respected. Meanwhile, the steps being taken under the banner of financial reform are suspicious, as they leap over accountability, oversight, and forensic auditing in the caverns of corruption at the central bank, ministries, and commercial banks. It is a fixed truth that forensic auditing is what reveals how accounts were formed, legitimate and illegitimate alike, so that suspects can be referred to the judiciary for prosecution. Instead, the plan effectively grants amnesty for perpetrators of financial crimes, akin to amnesty once granted for war crimes. The first amnesty plunged Lebanon into the abyss; the second will prevent the emergence of a functional state in Lebanon.
At this juncture, proceeding with parliamentary elections on schedule next May (under the pretext of respecting the constitution and safeguarding authorities’ neutrality) would be a betrayal of aspirations for a that guarantees citizens’ rights, safeguards freedoms, and retains sovereignty. They would be packaged elections that reproduce the same system within the framework of an electoral law at odds with structural reforms such as the megacenter and the right of expatriates to vote for all 128 MPs. Most dangerous of all, they will take place under the shadow of illegitimate armament and in areas resembling ghettos, where arms, incitement, and bribery determine voters’ choices. Accordingly, such elections would engender a parliament identical to those that had legalized corruption, protected the corrupt, prevented the country from being rescued in 2019, and hindered change in 2025.
Completing disarmament and launching genuine reform must take precedence over elections, allowing Lebanon to elect a parliament that does not reproduce corruption, isolation, and subservience, reflecting the will of the electorate and realizing their goal of building the long-awaited homeland that Lebanon deserves.
