Despite the importance of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza and southern Lebanon, and of that happening sooner rather than later, not many have argued that such a development would open the door to a conclusive peace. The fact is that the fighters themselves, in all of the conflict’s many fronts, do not see a ceasefire as anything more than a brief pause on a long and winding journey. Even if we set aside their grand retrograde objectives, as they have been articulated by the various fighters themselves, a ceasefire cannot absorb or eliminate the direct ramifications of this war. The complications around Gaza's future and the nature of "the day after," or Benjamin Netanyahu's redundant highhanded vows to "totally annihilate" Hamas, are nothing but miniature representations of the destructive potentialities that could await us. That much can be said before we even get into the speculation about Israel’s war on Lebanon expanding once its war in Gaza winds down.
As we know, Israel can itself expect intense clashes between its prime minister and his many opponents, including the army’s top brass. It is widely believed, though this is not inevitably how things will play out, that these clashes will be fought in the political arena. However, a political resolution immediately becomes less likely whenever the two sides of a clash are the military establishment, which is backed by secular groups, and religious forces.
For its part, Hamas- and this is no longer a secret- might find itself confronted with an array of internal difficulties, be it quarrels between its leaders in Gaza and those who are abroad, increased tensions with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Ramallah, or most consequently, strains in the relationship between its fighters and the people of Gaza, whom the Israelis have subjected to a criminal genocidal campaign due to the October 7 operation, which could at best be called idiotic.
However, doesn't this assessment apply to the entire region that has participated and continues to participate in the fighting?
Regardless of how the conflict between Israel and Hamas develops, there is almost no chance of a political process resolving the conflicts and potential conflicts of the Arab countries concerned.
Naturally, the survival of the Houthi movement in Yemen, which was born of the country’s civil war and consolidated its authority through that war, and has received lavish support from Iran because of it, hinges on the persistence of violence and tension. Since the Gaza war broke out, the scope of the Houthis’ military operations has stretched beyond Yemen, with its function expanding to encompass maritime routes and global trade. Thus, if peace were to come to Yemen as a result of an Israeli-Hamas ceasefire or anything else, it is valid to speculate that the Houthis would be harmed by losing this role.
As for Syria, despite not being directly involved in the war, the territory it gifted to the militias that are taking part in the fighting has become part of a landscape divided among numerous occupying forces. Syria is also home to many areas that have "special status," from Sweida in the south to Idlib in the north, as well as Hasakah and its surroundings in the northeast. Genuine peace in Syria, regardless of the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire, would certainly bring down the ecosystem that had arisen around the ongoing civil war as it is embodied by the Assad regime.
While it is true that we do not find forces ready to fight Hezbollah or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Lebanon and Iraq, politics hardly plays any role in diluting the bellicose antagonism that defines inter-communal relations in either country. We are looking at two countries where the majority of the population- irrespective of the war in Gaza, and this had been the case even before it began- believe that these armed militias, which depend on support from Iran, are locking the country in a perpetual civil and sectarian war. In fact, the Gaza war itself presents these militias with a compelling pretext to ramp up their wars against their own people and societies, and to consolidate their control. A quick overview of Hezbollah’s statements is enough to confirm that it promises the Lebanese society nothing but perpetual war and subjugation.
Moreover, Iran itself would not be comforted by stability if it is not a partner in creating it. And it is inherently unlikely for Iran to become a partner in ensuring stability or to be invited to join such a partnership, even after a figure labeled a moderate reformist was chosen for the presidency, which yields little influence.
This highlights a dimension of the conflict that is often overlooked in explanations of the Gaza war: the profoundly belligerent nature of the warring forces and their collective need for war. Everything Gaza has undergone and continues to undergo does not represent a rupture with a way of life. This war may, on the other hand, represent the culmination of this way of life. Thus, this is not a question of a major war that minor wars must be silenced for, so that the demands of the "principle contradiction" can be addressed. Along these same lines, ending the war does not galvanize the forces of peace, liberation, and stability that war had marginalized, as is typically said of wars and their capacity for disrupting "normal life." The lords of "minor wars" require the "major war" to the same extent that lords of the "major war" require the "minor wars." These two types of war, if we accept the assumption that they are two distinct types, are both required by a region whose forces insist on turning it into a barren wasteland.
