Iranians are Afforded Rights Denied to the Lebanese

According to the Iranian constitution, the transition period is to last fifty days, and this stipulation was applied to the letter. There was no delay; fifty days after President Ebrahim Raisi's passing, Masoud Pezeshkian was elected Iran’s new president. Meanwhile, Lebanon has not elected a new president or government since Michel Aoun left the presidential palace in Baabda on October 30, 2022- 626 days ago. The election of a new president has been stalled through the deliberate disruption of the country’s constitutional processes. The country’s laws have been ignored, and its institutions and political life have been paralyzed. The irony, here, is that Iran's friends, allies, or followers are responsible for Lebanon’s constitutional void.
Fifty days was the interval between Raisi’s passing and the election of his successor. The regime refused to leave the president’s office vacant. The constitution was immediately applied, with the president's powers transferred to his deputy, who oversaw the transitional period. His government organized the elections, which were decided by the Iranian voters. Although the regime limited the number of candidates, no party, faction, or ethnic or sectarian groups were made to hold a dialogue or consultation. It did not make consensus nor prior agreement on the next president a prerequisite to his election, unlike its allies in Lebanon.
During the transitional period, the Iranian regime did not seek the assistance of international friends to resolve a constitutional crisis. No quintet or sextet committee was formed to this end, and no friendly or prominent countries sent envoys. They did not appoint special or permanent envoys to help fill executive presidential vacancies. In contrast, in Lebanon- the country of envoys, consuls, and regional and international committees- every power in the world has intervened to help end the vacancy. Some have good intentions, and others have done so out of self interest.
Tehran, one of the prominent advisors or key players in the Lebanese crisis, has not advised its allies or those whom it gives marching orders to trim their unconstitutional terms for the election of a president. It is as though the "duo" (Hezbollah and Amal Movement), which controls the Lebanese state and the country’s state, is tasked with the role that the Constitutional Council plays in Iran, allowing them to identify the interests of the Lebanese regime on their terms. They have slammed Lebanon’s laws, constitution, institutions, and what remains of its fragile democracy against the wall, insisting on their right to scrutinize and determine the eligibility of presidential candidates. Since the presidential and executive vacuum began, this "duo" has nominated only one candidate for the presidency, and it is trying to impose him on the Lebanese people.
In Iran, as a result of critical domestic and foreign circumstances, the regime chose a figure who could satisfy everyone, someone who could be called a man with "several fathers" at least domestically. He cannot be classified as fully aligned with either side. Pezeshkian is somewhat acceptable to some parties and somewhat opposed by others. In Lebanon, in contrast, the terms demanded for the election of the next president will make ending the vacuum more difficult. He will be elected through the imposition of one side’s terms on the other, with factions getting what they want at the expense of other factions or communities. That could make him a president of domestic and foreign crises. Although President Pezeshkian says his government will continue to pursue reconciliation with Iran's friends, especially its regional neighbors, it does not seem that anyone in Lebanon is betting on a shift in the international context that end the disregard for all of Lebanon's friends, particularly its Arab neighbors, in favor of one side.
Iran’s leadership is aware of the magnitude of the shifts underway globally and the risks for regional stability created by the war on Gaza and its aftermath. They are trying to address these issues through the pragmatic figure of Pezeshkian and his reformist camp that seeks moderate foreign policy. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the "duo" continues to reject any figure who could ensure domestic balance and form a government capable of helping Lebanon overcome this crisis. In light of real fears following the Israeli war on Gaza and its link to the shift in the United States’ stance, the Iranian regime has brought back to the fore figures with whom the international community wants to negotiate. In Lebanon, on the other hand, Hezbollah has said that the government is the only entity authorized to negotiate, but it has forgotten or deliberately overlooked the fact that it makes decisions of war and peace, not the state.