Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian seems to have a more harmonious relationship with the ruling establishment than his reformist and moderate predecessors, even better than former President Sheikh Hassan Rouhani and his team, who came under a lot of pressures, especially in foreign policy.
Despite his success in concluding the nuclear agreement, Rouhani had deep disagreements with the decision-makers of foreign policy, who restricted most of the policies of regional openness that he had planned. But today, some of those who had set these restrictions or conditions appear to be willing to show some flexibility to allow Pezeshkian to achieve some of his goals that suit them.
Since his election, Pezeshkian has been trying to convey his messages in several internal directions that have external explanations. He wants to show that his election is a turning point in the trends of the ruling institution that runs the state and the regime. He is betting on the possibility of a rapid response to some of his urgent messages at the internal level given the need to address the deteriorating situation on the economic and social levels.
But it is clear that he can neither manipulate the keys to foreign policy, nor is he allowed to even obtain them in order for him to use them as he likes. The holder of these keys is struggling to defend his areas of influence, making every effort to protect them and is not ready for any settlement despite the harsh blows he is receiving and the fact that preserving this influence becomes costly for Iran, both internally and at the foreign level.
Therefore, Pezeshkian and his diplomatic team may determine that the opportunity is now available to think about exploiting this influence and transforming it into a positive role with more flexibility in the neighborhood. This will inevitably bring about a great benefit for the state and the regime at home if those concerned are convinced of the possibility of taking constructive steps that will help Pezeshkian in turning his good intentions into concrete facts.
However, the leniency in regional and international foreign policies that Pezeshkian is calling for, which is matched by some limited flexibility from the parties concerned with these policies, especially regional ones, is not consistent with the negative realities that the regional situation is going through and their dangerous repercussions on its stability. This is due to the fact that the situation is radically connected to the potential expansion of the Israeli war on the Palestinian people outside the Gaza Strip, and the possible confrontation or regional war with Iran and its proxies.
This is emphasized in the intensity of the fighting that has been continuing for some time on the Lebanese front, whose area is expanding day after day, and which risks of turning into an open confrontation with Hezbollah or a comprehensive war against Lebanon, in addition to the escalation on the Yemen front.
After the Houthi drone that struck Tel Aviv, the Israeli retaliation, and the response to the expected reaction, the entire region can slide into an international confrontation that will be different from the war with Lebanon if we take into account the geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic conditions.
The repercussions of a war with Lebanon remain confined to the Lebanese borders, with a possible possibility of spreading to a limited extent to Syria, and to a very small extent to Iraq. However, the confrontation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden will have far-reaching consequences on regional and international stability.
This bleak regional scene, which portends devastating wars and geopolitical transformations in international relations, makes the mission of Pezeshkian and his diplomatic team difficult, even if there are sincere intentions, determination, and real support from the ruling establishment.
This file is restricted to the office of the Supreme Leader and its executive body, that is, the Revolutionary Guards’ Al-Quds Force, which practices a policy that is independent of all state agencies and institutions of the regime, including the Guards’ itself, and is currently going through sensitive circumstances.
Pezeshkian wants nothing more than to maneuver and waste time until the situation becomes clearer, both regionally and internationally.