Four Scenarios for The Day After in Gaza

The Palestinian struggle is at the forefront of the regional priorities agenda after a years-long absence that resulted from the need to put out the many other fires that have broken out. The Palestinian question has now become the most pressing and volatile concern in the region following Israel's genocidal war on Gaza. The war gave rise to a temporally and spatially open-ended conflict, as a new element has been added to the struggle: the "unity of arenas" strategy. As a result, the geography of the war has been gradually expanding, and the nature of the conflict has changed. The October War (Yom Kippur War), the last of the Arab-Israeli wars, was confined to neighboring countries directly involved. After that, we saw "asymmetric" wars between an occupying power and resistance movements, whether in Palestine or Lebanon.
With the war on Gaza, the conflict has further transformed again. It is now a conflict between an occupying state on one side, and on the other, a coalition of factions and forces supporting the resistance in the occupied territories. This shift was made in the name of transnational ideological and identitarian solidarity, and it is an operational strategy that some have turned into a key card play in the "game of nations" underway in the region.
What scenarios could await us once the "day after" arrives?
First scenario: A protracted war of attrition that remains chronologically open-ended amid efforts to contain it geographically, as well as to prevent it from escalating into a full-blown regional war that would threaten the stability and security of the Middle East and “reshuffle the cards” in the region. One segment of this scenario would be an agreement among the "three influential parties" to contain the conflict, both geographically and in terms of the nature of attacks, as they work to gradually de-intensity the conflict until the war ends altogether.
This scenario would involve temporary ceasefires whose sustainability would hinge on the achievement of certain goals that Israel has reiterated on a daily basis. These goals include the release of prisoners, total Israeli security and military control over the Gaza Strip, and allowing a political authority formed in partnership between the Palestinians, Arabs, and international actors to administer Gaza through a predetermined framework. However, this scenario is practically impossible, as it would essentially legitimize the reoccupation of Gaza at no cost to Israel.
Second scenario: The region slides into an open war that reshuffles the cards. Ending such a war would require a "grand bargain" among the key regional and international actors involved. However, such a bargain would not lead to a stable and sustained settlement, as it does not address the root causes of the conflict: the perpetuation and consolidation of the occupation. So long as these root causes are not addressed, the likelihood of hostilities resuming in a different form would remain high.
Third scenario: Israel continues its overt attempts (through the increasing Judaization of the West Bank—both geographically and demographically) to establish Greater Israel. This remains the Israelis’ explicitly stated strategic and ideological goal, as reflected by Israel’s policies amid the social and political hegemony of religious and traditional right-wing factions. Implicitly, the other side of the coin, here, is the revival of the so-called "Jordanian option." Various "soft" approaches to creating this link between the West Bank and Jordan are already being discussed. It goes without saying that the Jordanians and Palestinians clearly and firmly reject this idea.
Fourth scenario: The "realistic" way this war ends is through a Security Council resolution for a permanent ceasefire, rather than the frameworks for a partial or conditional truce laid out in current proposals. The Security Council was established to maintain global peace, security, and stability, as well as ensure the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Doing so requires taking this path: taking the decisions and exerting the pressure needed to ensure Israel's compliance, which is in the interests of all the parties involved, both within the region and beyond.
After that, an international conference attended by the key international actors would be held to revive the peace process and oversee and support its implementation within the framework of relevant UN Resolutions and international law, leading to a two-state solution. There are several impediments to reaching the two-state solution, most of them coming from Israel. Nonetheless, it remains the only legal, internationally recognized, moral, and realistic path to achieving comprehensive, just, and lasting peace. The other options we mentioned are temporary solutions that essentially buy us time but further complicate the path toward a solution. These kinds of stop-gap measures would perpetuate the conflict and lead to its resumption in new forms by different parties.
To sum up, achieving these partial solutions is relatively easy. However, they can only create temporary calm, kicking the can down the road at great cost without creating real peace. On the other hand, the two-state solution and an end to the occupation, while difficult (indeed, extremely difficult) to achieve given the current circumstances, remains the only solution that can- if the conditions we mentioned are met, which is more than possible- lead to a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace. It would open a new chapter in the region, creating new priorities and state-relation patterns.