Syria has witnessed two major events, not just one: the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of the Islamist group “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” to power.
The fall of al-Assad is part of a series of collapses of the fascist regimes of the 1960s, including Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar al-Gaddafi.
Similarly, the rise of “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” represents the third wave of fundamentalist movements. The first wave was led by Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran in the late 1970s. The second wave emerged during the revolutions of 2011, with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda under Ghannouchi in Tunisia, and the Houthis in Yemen. Now, it is Syria’s turn, although it is still too early to judge the outcome.
Al-Assad’s fall was expected. But it was delayed from its anticipated timeline in 2014 due to an emergency intervention that granted him an additional ten years, supported by Iran and Russia.
We saw al-Assad’s regime’s downfall as inevitable due to its transformation into a one-man, minority-led, socialist, Ba’athist, and Iran-aligned system. Additionally, the state itself had aged, and the capabilities of its institutions had deteriorated. Since taking power, Bashar al-Assad failed to create a unifying identity for his regime beyond being “a necessity for Iran,” which in itself brought about calamities and led to his downfall. Even his core supporters—Ba’athists and Alawites—abandoned him. His intelligence agencies were ineffective, and he ignored the threats he created for himself by making Syria the primary corridor between Tehran and its areas of influence at a time when the confrontation between Iran and Israel was intensifying. He failed to understand the profound implications of the events of October 7, 2023, prior to which Israel’s opposition to any change in Damascus was well established. In Idlib and Ankara, both Türkiye and the Syrian opposition recognized that change had become permissible, prompting them to advance on Damascus.
Al-Assad’s policies reflected his ignorance, allowing crises to pile up on three open fronts against him: with Türkiye, the Syrian armed opposition, and an indirect confrontation with Israel. These were challenges far beyond Syria’s capacity to manage, making it unsurprising that they ultimately blew up in his face.
How did al-Assad manage these crises? For example, in dealing with the refugee issue, he viewed the three million Syrians who fled to Türkiye as a problem for Erdogan to handle, a cost of the Turkish president’s positions and war against him. He rejected Erdogan’s request for reconciliation or even a visit to Damascus to negotiate and ignored demands to facilitate their return. While refugees were indeed a problem for the Ankara government, they also posed a threat to al-Assad’s regime. The three million refugees became a reservoir for the opposition, which easily recruited thousands from among them. It is difficult to understand how al-Assad overlooked the danger that these armed groups occupying vast areas of Syria posed, especially when a moment of weakness could prompt them to march on the capital.
The political relationship between Türkiye and Syria has historically been a drama of love and hate. Over the past century, Damascus has remained wary of Ankara’s intentions, though this has not precluded smooth relations along the border. Under Bashar al-Assad, managing relations with Türkiye differed from his father’s approach. During one of the crises between the two countries in 1989, Türkiye grew frustrated with Hafez al-Assad’s support for Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Türkiye demanded that Syria stop Öcalan’s activities and hand him over. When Hafez al-Assad refused, Türkiye amassed troops at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. Al-Assad filed a complaint with the administration of US President Bill Clinton, which responded by supporting Türkiye’s demands. Realizing the balance of power favored Türkiye, backed by Israel and the US, al-Assad capitulated and expelled Öcalan, leading to his arrest in Nairobi. Hafez understood that the balance of power was not in Syria’s favor.
Today, with Bashar al-Assad gone, millions of refugees will return to their homes, and Türkiye’s influence in Syria has increased, bolstered by its long-standing support for refugees and the opposition. Türkiye aims for a Syria allied to it, much like Iran sees Iraq as an extension of its geographical and strategic influence.
