Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem declared his opposition to disarming the party. “We will not allow anyone to disarm Hezbollah or the resistance. The idea of disarmament must be removed from the dictionary,” adding that these weapons had liberated the country and protected its sovereignty.
He then upped the ante. “We will confront anyone who attacks the resistance or tries to take its arms, just as we confronted Israel, America, and their agents.”
The truth is that the rhetoric of Sheikh Naim betrays a structural problem. It does not deviate from the discourse that Hezbollah had been promoting before the Israeli assault on Lebanon, which took thousands of lives, turned hundreds of buildings to rubble, wiped out entire villages, and crushed Hezbollah’s military capabilities. His recent speech reflects a disconnect from reality, as he failed to distinguish between the achievements of the resistance (when the party played a major role in liberating South Lebanon through a national war supported by the majority of Lebanese) and its most recent war with Israel, which had been instigated by ideological considerations and to achieve regional objectives that Lebanon does not necessarily benefit from.
The Lebanese people, in all their diversity, certainly support the Palestinian people. They want to stand in solidarity with them, and want to support them politically, legally, and in the media. However, they are not willing to take part in a war that has harmed Lebanon and has not benefited Gaza.
The narrative of armed resistance is in a bind because it ignores reality. It refuses to open the door to new forms of civil and peaceful resistance because that would engender an ideological shift that Hezbollah wants to avoid. Civic-minded trans-sectarian communities could work with international institutions to expose Israeli crimes in Lebanon and Palestine, laying the groundwork for a new political project that would not rule out armed struggle but would only resort to violence when necessary and if there is a domestic consensus on bearing the consequences.
The ideological and doctrinal bonds of the resistance factions in Lebanon and elsewhere cannot, on their own, compel them to fight Israel as one, meaning that the “unity of fronts” slogan cannot be implemented on the ground. The ideology of resistance shared by Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and armed factions in Yemen and Iraq do not negate the distinct domestic and regional consideration of each group, regardless of their local context and social composition, that shape their decisions.
Hezbollah has failed to acknowledge this fact in its recent statements. In addressing those who disagree with it, it has repeated the same rhetoric that it had directed at Israel in the past, ignoring the will of the majority in Lebanon, who want to move past the formula of “the people, the army, and the resistance,” which may have been legitimate in a previous era.
Moreover, the “pure” model of resistance, which had once united the Lebanese when the country was occupied until 2000, is not there anymore. Resistance has been repurposed to serve regional agendas, and the support war it had instigated in solidarity with Gaza- a war that left many martyrs in its wake but failed to achieve its goals due to its disregard for popular consensus opposed to this course of action.
The ideology of resistance once cultivated a strong organizational structure and ideologically committed cadres, most of whom genuinely believed in what they were doing. Its proponents have made immense sacrifices, with many becoming martyrs. However, this ideology has failed to read local and international developments because it does not see individuals and citizens. We can see this in Lebanon today, as Hezbollah goes against the state and ignores the will of the majority demanding that its weapons be handed over.
No ideological organization, whatever its creed, should detach itself from its societal context in the name of resistance, doctrine, patriotism, or any other ideology. It should not disregard the considerations and choices of individuals, even when the cause it espouses is noble, such as resisting occupation. No political or resistance ideology, whether religious or secular, can succeed if it sees itself to be above people and individuals, no matter how noble its aims. People should never be viewed as fodder for any ideology.
The problem, and peril, of Hezbollah’s current rhetoric is that it fails to recognize recent shifts. Claiming that the call to hand over Hezbollah’s weapons to the Lebanese state has been made in reaction to Israel’s assault is misleading; this position dates back to 2006 and has become increasingly popular over the past two decades, eventually becoming a view shared by the vast majority of Lebanese citizens.
Hezbollah now has a historic opportunity to cast itself in a new light. It has the chance to prepare some of its militants to integrate into Lebanon’s emerging state institutions. In the past, compensation and both civilian and military training had been left to Iran. However, just as Hezbollah is being called upon to reflect, reassess, and develop a new political project and discourse, the political system in Lebanon also needs comprehensive reform and self-reflection.
