It would be a mistake to overlook the unique opportunities presented by the region’s shifting strategic landscape following the resounding success of President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Until recently, this all seemed almost unimaginable, and seizing this opportunity hinges not only on the Americans; the Arab states must also rise to the occasion. Both sides must leverage their influence and resources to generate the momentum needed to deal with every powder keg. Be they active, dormant, or on the brink of eruption, the region’s volcanoes could hinder efforts to consolidate the progress achieved thus far.
That is not to downplay the challenges and risks that continue to undercut efforts to advance genuine peace and stability in the Middle East should not be underestimated. They include the region’s weak and ineffective governments, entrenched sectarian, ethnic, and political divisions, the devastating fallout from the war in Gaza, instability in Lebanon, and the precarious situation in Syria.
Three main flashpoints threaten to break the emerging American-Arab momentum. Chief among them is Gaza, which remains a particularly complex challenge. Hamas has collapsed and lost international and Arab support, even sympathy, but Israel is the real impediment. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his legal quagmires have made things far more difficult. Moreover, his hardline government is a symptom of the extreme religious right’s rising influence and popularity, and that was before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood inflamed by Israel’s paranoia further.
Ending the war in Gaza will require extraordinary steps by the US coupled with Arab pressure on Washington and a coordinated American Arab effort to compel Netanyahu to engage in final-status negotiations, recognize the rights of the Palestinian people, and commit to initiating a process to establish a Palestinian state. A breakthrough of this nature would allow for some stability in both Gaza and the West Bank, facilitate the effort to reform the Palestinian Authority, and allow Arab and Gulf states to support reconstruction.
A sensible solution for Iran’s nuclear program could help ease Netanyahu’s apprehensions about the perceived threat posed by Iran.
Today, Tehran is weaker than ever. Its proxies, like Hezbollah and Hamas, have been degraded, its defenses have been destroyed, and an economic crisis is stifling the country. As a result, it could be open to negotiating a new nuclear deal on terms that are more favorable to the United States: permanent restrictions on uranium enrichment, its ballistic missile program, and its regional activity. Trump is well-placed to strike such a deal, as he can leverage his influence in Congress and credibly threaten the use of force.
Containment has been pursued in Syria, through the Saudi initiative that the US has supported by lifting sanctions. Much more than sanctions relief will be needed to stabilize the country and achieve the broader objective of integrating Syria into the camp of moderate Arab states after it had long been a lynchpin for the so-called Axis of Resistance and Iranian influence, facilitating the operations of its drug trafficking and terrorism networks.
The rise of the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is seen as a potential turning point. Building a “new Syria” is now possible. However, genuine commitment to reform is needed to ensure the success of this transitional phase, as is sustained Arab-American support. US policy is not the only contingency, the Arab role will be equally essential. This influence must be translated into concrete measures regarding the presence of US forces, sanctions, and Gulf financial assistance. Washington may also play a mediating role between the new regime, the Kurds, and Türkiye.
The expectations of the new leadership are clear: combat terrorism, normalize relations with Israel, address the presence of Russian troops, and definitively break with the Axis of Resistance.
In Lebanon, we find the most complex challenges: entrenched sectarian divisions, Hezbollah’s deep penetration of state institutions, its monopoly on Shiite political representation, and its arsenal. The new government must understand that there is no imminent risk of civil war if it is to navigate the Hezbollah question and break the Shiite community’s identification with the party. Instilling this conviction is just as crucial for the US and Arab states’ push as essential as calls for disarmament; indeed, it is a necessary prerequisite for disarmament.
There is also a need for US-Arab coordination to push the new leadership to unequivocally position Lebanon within the axis of Arab moderation, aligning the country with the latter’s regional peace initiative and embracing both the responsibilities and the rewards that come with it. Disarmament must begin with a statement that lays out a clear vision for Lebanon’s regional role. Next, the government must present a concrete timeline for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the Palestinian factions to underscore the state’s authority ahead of the elections, which could bring the party back to power if the government fails to assert itself.
Many regional and international actors see the developments that followed Trump’s tour as a setback, and the vigilant among us have not forgotten the consistent failures of US policy in the region over the past three decades. Nearly every American push for peace or stability in the Middle East has ended in disappointment: from Bill Clinton’s failed peace process to George W. Bush’s misadventure in Iraq, to the disillusionment with Barack Obama following the Arab Spring (particularly his stance on Iran), to the rising tensions under Trump, and finally, to the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the wars in Gaza and Lebanon during Joe Biden’s presidency.
This is a volatile geopolitical and geoeconomic moment that presents rare opportunities for making breakthroughs in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. They must be seized wisely.
