Everyone is doing their part to ensure a “political solution.” The United States and Iran are moving along two parallel tracks, with the trajectories of diplomacy and military force progressing simultaneously. Indeed, the two sides have divergent objectives: Washington seeks to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, while the latter wants economic sanctions lifted, and intertwined disagreements have complicated the task of the Omani mediator.
In the second round of US–Iranian talks held in Geneva on February 17, the two parties agreed to a “guiding framework,” paving the way for a move to more tangible issues in about two weeks. This next round will be more decisive, leading to either another round of talk or toward military escalation.
The statements of officials from both countries have simultaneously emphasized both “diplomacy” and “deterrence.” President Donald Trump said that the talks are “ongoing” while pointing to the deployment of major naval assets.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, on the same day of the “negotiations,” raised the tone and directly threatened the American fleet: “The army that thinks it is the strongest in the world might receive a slap that puts it down and leaves it unable to get back up.”
The simultaneity of compromising and belligerent rhetoric creates an unusual closed-door “bargaining” climate. Both sides are signaling that the costs of failure will be high, even as they point to the prospects of success in an attempt to recalibrate the balance of risks in its own favor.
In this context, the function of Khamenei’s rhetoric becomes clear. It put a ceiling on Iranian flexibility. Although it sends signals that some may view as “negative,” it could also grant Iranian negotiators more room for maneuver. The regime is fond of “brinkmanship,” an approach that, though it had been somewhat successful with previous US administrations, carries immense risks with Trump.
The Iranians hope that this posture will allow them to reject the demand for “zero enrichment,” deeming it “irrational” and asserting their right to enrichment at levels approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
As for other concessions Iran could offer, they are contained within a phased technical package: its stockpile of highly enriched uranium through dilution or conversion or monitoring arrangements through international supervision, an expansion of inspection and verification measures and the drafting of a timetable for corresponding sanction relief.
Nevertheless, there remains a chasm between the United States and Iran. Vice President JD Vance told the Wall Street Journal that Iran had yet to respond to a key demand on enrichment, and he warned that it did not have much time to submit proposals to narrow the gaps. Secretary of State Marco Rubio appears fully aware of the challenge. “No one has ever been able to do a successful deal with Iran, but we're going to try,” he recently said.
Rubio’s remarks suggest that the administration is open to the possibility, albeit marginal, that it could conclude an interim arrangement whereby restrictions and monitoring of the nuclear program are granted for a gradual easing of sanctions, deferring other issues to a later date without giving Iran carte blanche.
The Omani mediators are working with the space between the two ceilings. In a statement by the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted Minister Badr al-Busaidi’s affirmation that “serious efforts to define a number of guiding principles for a final deal.” He added that “much work is yet to be done, and the parties are left with clear next steps before the next meeting.” In the Arabic version of the statement, it is clear that the “principles” do not constitute a fully-fledged political agreement but rather a bridge toward technical formulations that can be tested.
The implications for the region hang in a delicate balance. Success in the next round, through clear technical steps, would reduce risks in the Gulf and contain threats to maritime trade, allowing for more progress toward de-escalation. A collapse would raise the likelihood of hard tools, with repercussions for maritime security, energy prices, and the investment climate. Some newspapers described the round as having produced no breakthrough, with only “modest progress.” This characterization seems accurate, as deals are made through agreements on the details.
The next round seems like it will be a more concrete test. Will Tehran present technical proposals that Washington deems verifiable? A package that regulates high-enriched stockpiles, expands verification, and couples this with phased sanctions relief would make a deal more likely. An agreement will be less likely if “zero enrichment” is demanded and the mechanisms for lifting sanctions remain vague, or if military threats undermine mediators’ efforts. In any case, negotiations progress under the shadow of fleets, and this is by design.
