Poland is emblematic of the fate of weak countries surrounded by strong ones, which may pay the price of the wars of the strong as well as their agreement.
It has been partitioned three times in its history, and, for years, it disappeared from the map. Mind you, a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was formed in 1385, and it was a formidable and powerful state in the 16th century.
The country was partitioned for the first time in 1772, after Russia, Prussia, and Austria agreed on the dividing lines drawn up by Prussia’s King Frederick II. It was partitioned a second time in 1793 - an episode that many historians explain through the conservative regimes’ struggle against the French Revolution. These regimes saw Poland's reformist policies, including its 1791 constitution, as the result of the French Jacobins’ influence. Accordingly, Russia seized most of the territory that is now Ukraine and Belarus, while the Prussians seized important territories and cities, such as Poznan and Gdansk. Russia annexed an area of 250,000 square kilometers, while Prussia acquired 58,000 square kilometers, leaving the Commonwealth with only 215,000 square kilometers.
It was partitioned a third and last time in 1795. Initially, the decision had been a reaction to a Polish patriotic peasant uprising that sought reunification. However, the uprising was crushed by a Russian clampdown and the country was reconfigured with the aim of averting future uprisings. Ultimately, Prussia seized Warsaw and Austria took Krakow and Lublin, while Russia expanded westward and captured Vilnius, the capital of present-day Lithuania.
Despite the eruption of numerous uprisings in former Polish territories, the Poles were made to wait until the end of World War I in 1918 for their state to return to existence.
The Poles certainly made mistakes here and there along the way, in developing their political system and economic plans. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that, amid tensions in Europe, the "game of nations" was the primary reason for what happened, leaving the weak country’s shrinking political reality shaped by a polarized regional order.
This overview of the Polish experience was not presented because partition is the only threat facing the countries of the Levant, but because the "game of nations" could leave us at existential junctures in which partition becomes a real possibility, as do civil wars and the denial of self-determination and sovereignty.
The Levant has had to live under a balance of terror between Iran and Israel that presided over successive calamities. This overarching political dynamic has weakened (while maintaining nominal unity) the region in a manner similar to how Poland had been weakened by its repeated partition.
It is not insignificant that as soon as the recent war between Iran and Israel broke out, Levantine politicians or developments disappeared from the news cycle. Indeed, almost nothing linked to Gaza and Palestine, from solidarity movements to state actions, has been mentioned since. The reason for this is that the direct clash between Iran and Israel seemed to be the nucleus and foundation of the polarized regional system.
However, if this suffocating regional balance were to collapse, it would probably not meet a strong Levant with a reasonable degree of homogeneity.
This state of affairs does not rule out the possibility of the Levant benefiting from potential shifts, but it does oblige the people of the region to strive to make that happen, taking steps that make up for some of the weaknesses in their position and allowing them to become more adaptable to any new situation they could find themselves in.
What always remains troubling, in assessing one’s negotiating capabilities and positions, is the course of our modern history: major shifts in our conditions have all come from without, whereby we only contributed as spectators, condemning or supporting the outside powers. This passivity that has defined, and continues to define, our engagement with events and circumstances certainly remains a factor that reinforces foreign actors’ overwhelming control over our future.
Our societies, in any case, must also do their part at this particular stage. They must resist taking the initiative and "filling the void" that the collapse of the bipolar regional order will leave behind with their only commodities: fanaticism, sectarian fervor, and the potential civil war.
Will we manage to build political and social structures superior to those that emerged after the Americans toppled Saddam Hussein, for example? One could reply, rightly, that the actions of foreign powers were a prominent hindrance to Iraq's elevation to a higher stage. However, it is also true that preparations for a civil conflict predated the involvement of outside powers, and the fear is that these preparations - be it in Iraq and elsewhere - will continue, albeit with less intensity, after any external framework collapses.
As for how to obtain some protection from this rock-bottom, this could be achieved by proposing maps and frameworks for states that are better suited to any new realities, making our politics and institutions more representative of the popular wishes - whether religious, sectarian, or ethnic, aggrieved or marginalized.
That obliges us to develop a recovery program that partially compensates for our having had no control over our history and leaving change to factors alone for so long.
