The recent events in Sweida were not merely sectarian clashes between unruly, radical, or tribal forces and the people of Jabal al-Druze. Rather, they were also a window into the profound structural crisis that has been rattling Syria since the collapse of the Assad regime that no one shed a tear for.
This violent episode showed that this new Syria, which was supposed to break the shackles and legacy of sectarianism, is largely struggling to move toward the “virtue of stability” and take a unifying and inclusive approach. Syria has yet to develop an inclusive identity that moves beyond the mindset of militias and narrow loyalties.
This raises a fundamental question: Can Syria get back on its feet and build a unified and strong state without building genuine domestic consensus? Is there now an urgent need for a project of deep reconciliation under Arab auspices, perhaps led by Saudi Arabia, that would become a kind of new “Taif Agreement” that creates a bulwark against opportunistic regional and international meddling by Israel and other rival powers pursuing expansionist agendas?
At this stage, the Gulf position, particularly that of Saudi Arabia, has been premised on a clear principle: there can be no stability in the Levant without a unified, strong Syria free from the diseases of sectarianism, separatism, and extremism in all their forms.
However, this vision is faced with two major challenges. The first is the absence of the kind of consensus in Syria needed to rebuild state institutions on inclusive, civic foundations. Second, we have regional and international interventions by actors seeking to exploit and reproduce divisions, from Israel with its security considerations, to Türkiye and its northern dilemma, to Iran with proxies eager to return.
A particularly alarming recent development reported by research centers and think tanks is the emergence of a group called "Awliya al-Baas": a paramilitary propaganda organization linked to Iran, seeking to establish a new armed political faction opposed to the Syrian government.
The events in Sweida have exposed the frailty of the social contract among Syria’s various communities. The charge triggered a major explosion of violence that was followed by reprisals. In turn, Israel exploited the situation to impose painful security equations, with direct airstrikes in the heart of Damascus, raising the question of Syrian sovereignty once again.
More alarming than the armed clashes themselves is a sectarian and takfiri discourse that fuels these tensions and offers them false and dangerous political and moral legitimacy. However chaotic armed clashes may be, they remain a phenomenon that can be contained through political and security measures.
The culture of incitement seen in the pulpits, media, and social media is the real threat, as they create a climate that justifies any armed transgression. That is why any project to rebuild Syria must begin with confronting this discourse, as weapons are merely the outcome, while this culture that hinders the development of a national project that can rise to the forefront is the root cause.
Against this backdrop, many are repeatedly asking: Can Syria overcome its ordeal without a comprehensive reconciliation project, or does Syria need a comprehensive Arab agreement akin to the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese civil war? Such a project, if the political will needed to pursue it exists, could shut the door to opportunistic interventions by Israel, Türkiye, and Iran.
It could also lay the foundations for a clear social contract that guarantees minority rights, draws the outline of a cohesive decentralized state, restores national sovereignty, allows the state to control arms, and facilitates the expulsion of foreign fighters.
Yet, succeeding in this pursuit remains contingent on Syrians’ willingness to understand that national unity is not a luxury but an existential need.
The roots of the crisis are not limited to the people of Jabal al-Druze. A broader sense of insecurity, amid the absence of constitutional guarantees and apprehensions of certain pro-government forces, has unsettled Western states and the United States. Their approach is to create a “carrot-and-stick” dynamic, not a genuine pursuit of a new, unified Syria that includes all Syrians.
Syria is not simply undergoing a political transition after decades of Assad rule; it is confronted with a battle over the nature and essence of the state. Saudi Arabia and the moderate Arab states understand that supporting a unified Syria not only serves Syrians' interests; it is also a strategic Arab interest.
The real challenge is to build domestic legitimacy and social consensus, not getting Western powers (that are eager to end the headache of dealing with Syria) on side. Riyadh, by contrast, is keen on a sustainable partnership with Syria.
Yet, even this pursuit could run up against a hard fact: the final decision will always be Syrian, no matter what others do. A durable settlement can only emerge once Syrians themselves are convinced that the unity of their state is the last line of defense against fragmentation and foreign dependency, as well as the only path to a long-awaited resurgence after years of decline.
