Hezbollah, through the statements of Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem and its paramilitary deputy Hussein Al-Hajj Hassan, preempted President Joseph Aoun’s recent speech, which reignited the spirit of his inaugural address and affirmed the state’s exclusive right to bear arms.
The party also sought to prepare for Tuesday's cabinet session, which is expected to address Hezbollah’s arms. The party’s response was unequivocal: “Calls for us to hand over our weapons are an illusion that will never come true... handing Israel the very force that protects Lebanon.”
This fault line between the mindset of the state and that of resistance reinforces the sense of being trapped in a vicious circle. International initiatives have failed to break the impasse over Hezbollah’s arms, and the Lebanese government’s response to the latest US proposal does not suggest a real shift in the state’s stance. On the contrary, it has shown that we are still stuck in a “back-and-forth,” that is, we remain stagnant and continue to waste opportunities.
Lebanon cannot overcome its structural crisis or implement a comprehensive plan to disarm Hezbollah without making progress on two parallel political tracks that create a clear roadmap. The first is an official statement that Lebanon is definitively ending its military conflict with Israel, coupled with the pursuit of an agreement that would bring about a final, lasting end to hostilities along the Lebanese border. That would allow Lebanon to take back its currently occupied territories, demarcate its borders, and impose the army’s control.
Unless the Lebanese government takes this step, followed by a credible plan for the disarmament of the party, Hezbollah will continue to threaten renewed war. Lebanon, in such a scenario, will receive neither the support it needs to avoid becoming a failed state nor the aid required for reconstruction.
A formal Lebanese decision to close the chapter on military operations for good does not mean relinquishing Lebanon’s efforts to ensure the rights of the Palestinian people or normalizing relations with Israel. Nor does it imply reconciliation with Israel. What it does do is remove Lebanon from the conflict and armed resistance, stripping away the central pretext for Hezbollah’s continued armament and turning the issue of disarmament into a matter of practical implementation.
The second track is serious political engagement to reshape its relationship with Syria.
Lebanon can no longer afford to be a bystander as the region shifts, especially Syrian-Israeli agreements lead to major shifts in the regional balance of power and Syria’s role in the region. Lebanon cannot continue to turn its back on developments east of its border, especially with the Syrian refugee crisis weighing heavily on the country, in both demographic and economic terms.
The Syrian detainees are a burden on the country, both in terms of security and legally, and the demarcation of the eastern and northern borders, including the Shebaa Farms, cannot be resolved without a comprehensive settlement with Damascus.
One must also not forget the Treaty of Brotherhood and Cooperation, signed under Syria’s hegemony, now needs to be revised or annulled in a manner that respects Lebanese sovereignty.
Positive relations with Syria would also strip Israel of a card it used to extort the country because of the chaos at the border, and it would obstruct any attempt to revive hybrid alliances between certain Christian factions and Hezbollah.
The current moment may represent a rare opportunity for Lebanon. Iran, Hezbollah’s primary ally, is grappling with deep internal crises. The regime is focused on saving itself, and it is being forced to reposition itself internationally. Meanwhile, post-Assad Syria finds itself compelled to open up to the world and pursue Arab and international recognition and support, including large-scale investments.
By contrast, Lebanon seems trapped in a 1960s mindset, incapable of adapting to the changes of 2023–2024 or genuinely engaging in any constructive regional project. Can it redefine its position and turn away from a pattern of subservience to regional axes, and from a fatalistic view of its territory as a battlefield for others? Can it take the initiative and play its role as a sovereign, civil, and neutral state?
Opportunities are fleeting.
What we need today is to pull Lebanon out of its current gray zone. Bold policy and a strategic vision are needed, allowing us not just to manage the crisis, but to overcome it.
A third option is possible. We can choose neither the Axis of Resistance nor unconditional normalization. A civil, sovereign, and open state that rejects war without renouncing principles of justice and peoples’ rights is possible.
Lebanon can have a state that places diplomacy and development at the forefront, builds balanced foreign relations grounded in shared interests, and prioritizes social and economic advancement over the perpetuation of conflict, not ideological affiliations or sectarian loyalties. A state with the will to choose a clear path, rather than waiting for others’ agreements to ride their wave or pay their price.
