Iraq’s designation of Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) as terrorist organizations, whose assets must therefore be confiscated, was a warm-up for ending the era of Iranophilic militias.
Swiftly walking this step back, under the flimsy pretext that the designation had been made "inadvertently," was an attempt to consolidate this era.
The two steps in opposite directions are immensely significant. Indeed, they point to an internal struggle in Baghdad whose outcome has yet to be decided, as with each step reflecting the aspirations of substantial local communities and the relentless pressure exerted by foreign actors.
The designation, which the US probably pushed for, speaks to the aspirations of Iraqi communities striving to withdraw from regional conflict, especially since the confrontations have effectively ended on fronts directly concerned. These segments of the population are also keen to maintain good relations with the United States in the face of the clear threats posed by ISIS and the suffocating pressures of Iran.
As for the reversal of this decision, which Tehran probably pushed for, it speaks to the aspirations of other Iraqi communities who want militias to maintain control over the state’s centers of power and to remain part of the battered “Axis of Resistance.” This camp seeks to entrench the exclusivity of Iraq’s relationship with Iran, the militias’ patron, and thus to do away with US influence and end Iraq’s relationship with the United States.
Such a struggle, in which internal and external factors are mutually reinforcing, is likely to persist for a while. However, it is also likely that, though it could potentially entail suffering and hardship, it will not be a long while. The era of militias in Iraq does not have an impressive record, and the deteriorating conditions of Iran do not strengthen the case for this bet either.
In any case, the designation and its repeal suggest that the country has entered a phase of dualism, even if this dualism takes a winding and obscure path or even if it stumbles along the way. Lebanon, for its part, is undergoing a similar phase, though in its own way. President Joseph Aoun, in appointing former ambassador Simon Karam as head of the Lebanese delegation to the “Mechanism”, shifted away from the cautious stance he had been taking thus far, earning him a share of Hezbollah’s vitriol after the party had persistently channeled its vitriol at Prime Minister Nawaf Salam alone. Even Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, Hezbollah’s traditional ally, has recalibrated, occupying a more ambiguous position that combines approval of the decision with objection, and acknowledgement of prior knowledge of the decision to appoint Karam with denial of prior knowledge.
Moreover, some would add Hezbollah itself, or at least a wing of the party, to this list of mercurials. This wing, as some observers suggest, could not have been oblivious of Berri’s approval, just as they could not have reacted with anything but opposition to the decision that they effectively had approved through Berri’s approval. If in his latest speech, Naim Qassem combined support for the diplomatic initiative with refusal to lay down the party’s arms, we should always keep in mind that the party’s representatives in government have neither resigned nor abstained from undertaking their ministerial duties. Following Hezbollah’s rhetoric and actions, one finds a portrait of confusion and contradiction that reflects the unenviable position the party finds itself in today.
As in Iraq, it is difficult to discuss developments in Lebanon without mentioning the extensively reported pressure applied by the US, through the many envoys whose visits to the country dominate the print media, our television screens, and social media.
As for Syria under Sharaa, given the difference of the change that unfolded there, this shift and its conclusion are no secret, nor, for that matter, is the role of the US.
Regardless of everything else, be it positive or negative, that could be said about the new Syrian authorities, the era of “resistance” and Iranian influence has become part of the country’s and its people’s past. Meanwhile, the United States is overseeing security negotiations between Damascus and Tel Aviv that Israel’s repeated assaults have not foiled. According to a recent editorial in the newly established newspaper “Al-Thawra al-Suriyya”, “The Syrian government has ruled out the idea of a fully-fledged war with the Israelis at this stage, as such a war could lead to the disintegration of Syria and deprive the country of this historic opportunity to build a state. Indeed, Netanyahu had undoubtedly been hoping for exactly that. Despite {Israel’s} numerous and deliberate provocations, the Syrian government exercised restraint and turned to official Arab states for help curbing the Israeli escalation.”
The developments mentioned above, with all of their differences and variant magnitudes, are among the repercussions of the earthquake that has hit Iran. We can also see some signs of this earthquake in Iran itself. It is like watching passengers escape a sinking boat. It seems that Israel seeks to transfer from the Iranian boat onto its own, exploiting the lack of options and helplessness of a region in defeat. As it continues to bomb Lebanon and Syria, “Israel Hayom” reported that Israel’s army would remain in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon for “an extended period.”
While we should not underestimate the hurdles and challenges of this transitional phase, the fact remains that the only card available is having the US pressurizing the Jewish state. We will continue to feel the necessity of such pressure to avoid moving from one boat to another, hoping that it is serious and effective.
