Ruling a country is already complex. One must consolidate legitimacy and maintain firm trust between governance and the people. One must listen closely to the people, not simply make do with official reports that often do not raise doubts or address difficult questions. The daily concerns of the people cannot be ignored, especially when the levels of poverty rise, the national currency plummets and inflation soars. The flame of hope must be kept alive, otherwise the dam will burst and the mounting anger, bitterness and resentment will take hold.
In maintaining states, the ruler must know the story and the world. Several countries have paid hefty prices for placing decision-making in the hands of a man who is ignorant of international balances and major world powers. Some rulers overestimated their power and the power of their countries. They lost touch between them and the facts and realities on the ground.
One day, Saddam Hussein believed he could invade Kuwait without paying a price. Moammar al-Gadhafi believe he could pester the United States and bomb planes. The Iranian regime believed it could destroy the Marines headquarters in Beirut, killing hundreds of American soldiers without consequence.
Some rulers believed that the economy was a secondary affair that could be handled by loyalists rather than competent people. They believed they could hand out spoils to the loyalists and address the people through the brutality of the security forces. They believed that waiting was the best way forward and that paving the way for change would lead to strife and collapse. Any demand for reform was viewed with suspicion that should be remedied with death or imprisonment.
Stagnation is one of the deadliest diseases faced by individuals and countries. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was an expert in protecting stagnation. His prime minister Alexei Kosygin tried to make proposals about increasing production and stimulating the economy, but the hardliners soon turned against him and consolidated stagnation. When Mikhail Gorbachev came along in the mid-1980s to return the regime back on the track of rebuilding and transparency, the entire system imploded and the Soviet Union collapsed.
The only thing the Arab regimes learned from Gorbachev is that his project was one of failure. On August 19, 1991, Baghdad hosted dialogue between a government and Kurdish delegations. They heard of the coup against Gorbachev in Moscow. The government delegation then changed its tone towards the other, going so far as to insult it, which prompted it to leave the meeting.
Bashar al-Assad looked at Gorbachev from the same angle. He pledged reforms but the generals he inherited from his father were quick to convince him that giving an inch in a country that is ruled by a minority will only lead to a greater storm. He paid no heed to the stagnation and mounting economic failures and the regime met its demise.
China was lucky. In the late 1970s, a man named Deng Xiaoping came along. He realized that Mao Zedong's ideas were no longer applicable, especially when it came to the economy. He maintained the Communist Party as a means to keep stability, while adopting a policy of reform and openness and embracing trade and investment. He saved the regime and the country. His policy helped save hundreds of millions of Chinese people from poverty and today China is the world's second largest economy and a massive hub of advancement and technology.
Deng was preoccupying himself with protecting stability when the Iranian revolution erupted. Today's events prove that it has derived no lessons from Gorbachev and Deng's experiences.
Yes, the Khomeini revolution was not born from either of those two camps, but that does not mean that it has not aged. The Iranian leadership acted as though its main goals were on the foreign front, not the internal one. It believed that it could change the features of the region. One cannot deny that its regional offensive achieved successes that led several of its generals to boast about controlling four Arab capitals. The Iranian revolution left its mark in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sanaa.
The Iranian leadership overestimated its strength and underestimated the West. It did not expect an American president to order the killing of Qasem Soleimani. It did not expect the same president to be reelected and to order its jets to punish Iran for enriching uranium and stoking regional tensions. It certainly did not expect Benjamin Netanyahu's government to send its planes to occupy Tehran's airspace and kill Iran's generals and scientists. The Iranian leadership did not realize that times have changed.
It was again taken by surprise from another place. Yehya al-Sinwar launched his Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and cost Israel thousands of lives. The operation, however, soon backfired and struck Hezbollah at its core and uprooted the Assad regime with the winds of change reaching Iran itself.
This is not the first time that the Iranian authorities have to contend with widespread protests. But it is the first time they have taken place since the destruction of the "Axis of Resistance" and with Sharaa's Syria striking partnership with the US and ending the military aspect of the conflict with Israel. It also has to contend with demands for Hamas to lay down its arms in Gaza and Hezbollah to lay down its arms in Lebanon.
What applied to the Russian and Chinese revolutions applies to the Iranian revolution. It must come back to reality and face the facts and numbers. It must change the way it approaches the internal scene and it must open a door to the outside world. The rule is clear: the revolution can either follow Deng's model and save itself and reconcile with its people and the world, or it can await the arrival of a Gorbachev and the ensuing collapse. Deng respected Mao, but he did not allow him to rule China from the grave.
