It is a sign of the times that the word “revolution” now refers to something different from what it once did. The term does not, in this brief column, imply any prior value judgment, be it negative or positive, nor does it carry any of the connotations that various ideologies have assigned to it.
It refers, here, to a process that overthrows a ruling elite or threatens to overthrow it, that ends a status quo or threatens to, or that breaks with the framework of states and their borders or threatens to, regardless of the magnitude of the economic, social, and cultural shifts that precipitated by the revolution, which may be substantial or not be.
In the context of Arab politics, a “revolution” had mostly referred to actions that undermined western hegemony. This was true of the Algerian revolution against the French, the South Yemeni revolution against the British, and the Palestinian revolution against the Israelis. It was particularly true of Iran's 1979 revolution. Even the military coups that called themselves revolutions ultimately pushed back against western influence.
This broad trend is not negated by the few marginal exceptions to the rule, such as Husni al-Zaim’s agreement with the Americans on the construction of oil pipelines, or the ambivalence of the first few years that followed the July coup in Egypt.
Later, with the revolutionary wave of the “Arab Spring,” we were faced with an attempt to adjust priorities. Geopolitical issues took a backseat to emphasis on domestic concerns of each country, with less attention going to transnational struggles, especially the Palestinian cause. This time, the West was not demonized, and seeking its assistance to confront a local tyrant, as happened in Gaddafi’s Libya, was not ruled out.
When those revolutions morphed into civil wars or authoritarian regimes, this shift did not disappear. If anything, it probably intensified and deepened. Three major developments seem to have paved the way for this trajectory.
First, the revolutions of central and eastern Europe against communist regimes and the subsequent “color revolutions” pushed in the direction of emphasizing democracy and rejecting Soviet totalitarianism and the “causes” in whose name those nations had been ruled. In doing so, they openly embraced the European–American model, enthusiastically seeking assistance from these countries and aspiring to join their multilateral international institutions.
Second, the 2003 Iraq war also played an influential role, both materially and ideologically. As a process that combined occupation and liberation, in the Japanese sense, it shattered the prevailing “leftist” and “nationalist” dogma that placed the two in absolute opposition to one another, leaving “the people” to take responsibility for their fate after liberating them from a tyrant.
Lastly, we have the rot that had accumulated in Arab police states over this period and their abandonment of the ideas that had once been used to justify their existence. It thus became impossible for the “Arab national cause,” or any other, to conceal its shameful actions or mend fences.
In parallel, the old revolutionaries could not coherently place themselves within the dividing lines of these emerging questions. That is how, from the start, we saw some come out to declare themselves “against” the Taliban and “against” the Americans in Afghanistan, before others spoke out in support of the “Arab Spring” revolutions and in opposition to foreign intervention in support of these revolutions, or voiced opposition to Israel’s current war and welcomed many of its outcomes.
As for the notion of “revolution” at present, it has changed radically, and this applies everywhere. It is laser focused on the Iranian era, along the lines that the European and “color” revolutions had broken with the Soviet era, and not in any sense along the lines of previous revolutions against the West. The “moderate” forces of these revolutions fancy American policies and preferences, while the “radicals” fancy those of Israel.
The United States is widely seen to represent contained revolutions with limited external repercussions, whereas the Jewish state represents total revolution and disregard for any potential repercussions. The revolutionaries with an affinity for the United States and those who prefer Israel usually diverge far more sharply than the Israelis and Americans themselves.
Broadly speaking, the former conservatives have become revolutionaries, while the former revolutionaries have become conservatives who call for a pause in operations, whatever their interpretation, at the point they have reached, pushing and calling for avoiding the change that they had once done nothing but urge. As yesterday’s revolutionaries and today’s conservatives stutter, yesterday’s conservatives and today’s revolutionaries have seized the stage for themselves, presenting alternatives that allow for a clean break with the past.
However, this fanatical salvationary impulse remains frightening, and it is shared by the revolutions of both yesterday and today. Prudence remains as necessary now as it was then. When the idealization of upheaval prevails, politics - as a nonviolent struggle waged within and over the middle ground - fades into the background. That is what we are witnessing today, not only in our region but across the globe.
Our world is coming to resemble a patient suffering from a fever of over 40 degrees Celsius. Either the fever imminently begins to subside, which does not seem likely, or it will continue to rise, inevitably ending in death, with wars and flames fanned everywhere.
