Three important inferences can be drawn from the recent investigative report published by Reuters. It presents detailed information, supported by satellite imagery, about a fully integrated military support base that is home to an airstrip, a drone control center, and a training facility for thousands of fighters from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and mercenaries, with supply routes coming from Somaliland.
The first inference is that we are facing an attempt to ignite a new front in the Sudanese conflict after the army and allied forces had made significant progress on the western axis, notably in Kordofan. The second concerns Ethiopia’s ambitions; backed by foreign actors, it is seeking to change the regional balance of power to achieve objectives tied to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, its claims over Sudanese agricultural lands in the al-Fashqa area, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s goal of gaining access to a seaport, whether through the port of Berbera in Somaliland or the Eritrean port of Assab.
The third inference is that the Ethiopian government is doubling down to overcome domestic problems amid tensions in Tigray, the ongoing conflict in the Amhara region with the Fano Front, as well as clashes in Oromia.
The well-documented Reuters report (includes images, and testimonies from 15 sources, provided detailed accounts of how the base was built and financed, and the training it hosts. Everything in the report confirms the conclusions that had been drawn by the Sudanese intelligence last year, some of which were leaked or discussed by General al-Burhan, who has warned of neighboring countries’ attempts to fuel the war. Over this period, the Sudanese army moved large forces to the Blue Nile axis in anticipation of escalation, which enabled it to repel this year’s attacks by the RSF and its People’s Liberation Movement (Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction) allies in that area.
Although the report underscores the role of foreign players in the Sudanese conflict, as well as certain parties' plots to perpetuate and broaden the chaos (with obvious implications this carries for regional countries and Red Sea security), the reality is that Ethiopian involvement is not new, even if it has now become broader and more alarming.
Since the war began, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has taken positions that reflect his involvement in the foreign plot to prop up the RSF. During the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in July 2023 (three months into the war), he claimed that Sudan had been struggling to deal with a “vacuum of leadership,” calling for the imposition of a no-fly zone and the intervention of international forces.
That was not the only stance he has voiced. In December 2023, Abiy Ahmed received RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti), as part of a tour the latter had been making to grant himself legitimacy as a potential leader at a time when his forces were expanding. Hemeti was received like a state official and a guard of honor in Addis Ababa, and Abiy Ahmed deliberately made the images of his meeting with Hemeti and his delegation public.
Those earlier positions demonstrate the trajectory of Abiy Ahmed’s involvement in Sudan’s war. The signals he had sent in 2023 were translated into the dangerous escalation of 2026. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Ethiopia has become the major logistics hub of the RSF and its political allies after arms supplies via Chad and Libya were severely curbed.
What are the broader implications of these developments?
Arming and resupply of the RSF with weapons and mercenaries, as well as the construction of a support base in Ethiopia, cannot be understood in isolation of other schemes aimed at encirclement and the fomenting of chaos and instability in the region, from Bab al-Mandab to the Red Sea. Ethiopia is operating on three parallel fronts, and it has found allies. Their project goes beyond merely boosting Addis Ababa’s influence in the Horn of Africa; it must be seen within the broader regional context and its implications for regional national security.
In addition to the Sudan front, Ethiopia is making moves on the so-called “Republic of Somaliland.” Addis Ababa signed an agreement with its leadership to obtain maritime access and establish a military base in exchange for diplomatic recognition. These steps have enraged the Somali federal government, and the situation has aggravated further after Israel entered the fray and recognized Somaliland, given all that this entails for regional security.
Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access also explains its growing tensions with Eritrea, which it has repeatedly accused of occupying Ethiopian territory or supporting movements opposed to the regime. Throughout, Addis Ababa has simultaneously sought to bargain for access to a seaport, with its eye on Eritrea’s port of Assab.
The Reuters report places Sudan’s war at the heart of this complex and the network of actors seeking to destabilize the region and change the balance of power between the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Given that this scheme has become clear and documented, steps to contain and foil it will probably intensify soon- not only in support of Sudan but in defense of regional security.
