We cannot determine whether Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington last week was a success without knowing the details of his conversation with President Donald Trump. It would also be naive to believe that their divergences, however deep they are in reality, could undermine the solid relationship between the two sides. That does not mean Israel is not growing increasingly anxious about the ongoing negotiations with Iran. The negotiations are not shocking as such, but the regional and international context renders the talks unfavorable. At a moment when Israel feels that its ability to impose its unilateral security approach is eroding, it faces the prospect of a return to diplomacy between the United States and Iran with regional backing.
Israel is not focused solely on the substance of a potential agreement; it also worries about the two sides holding talks as such. For years, Israel’s security doctrine has been founded on preventing Iran from becoming a latent nuclear power or a “threshold state,” and on perpetuating the perception of Iran as an existential threat that justifies maximal deterrence. Any negotiation track that gradually reintegrates Iran into the international system is seen as a direct blow to this doctrine, even if it includes constraints on the nuclear program.
The experience of the 2015 nuclear agreement very much remains in the Israeli political consciousness. For Tel Aviv, the agreement did not end the threat but merely postponed it, allowing Iran to catch its economic and political breath without addressing its regional behavior or its missile program. Today, Israel fears a repeat that would ease economic pressure on Iran and allow it to rebuild its influence in the region as the US pursues a deal that would lower tensions and avoid open military confrontation.
Israel’s anxiety does end with Iran; it is also concerned about the shift in the American approach itself. The negotiations reflect a broader tendency in Washington, which is increasingly seeking to manage conflicts rather than to resolve them, preferring compromise settlements over open-ended confrontation. This logic runs counter to Israel’s strategy of continuous pressure, military deterrence, and preventing the adversary from recovering. In Tel Aviv, any rapprochement between the US and Iran signals American reluctance to adopt Israel’s red lines as its benchmark.
Added to this is the divergences of Arab states’ positions. Many of them do not share Israel’s level of anxiety regarding the negotiations. A number of them see the talks as a means of lowering regional tensions rather than a direct threat to their security and stability, especially as they increasingly focus on economic stability, drawing investment, and managing risks.
With an American approach that does account for Israel’s concerns, and in light of normalization not automatically translating into solid and consistent strategic alliances, Israel’s anxiety runs deeper than the content of the negotiations. It also worries about its own place in the regional and international equation. Accustomed to being a decisive actor in matters of security and deterrence, Tel Aviv now finds itself constrainded by balances it does not control alone. It is being confronted with negotiations being held without it invovlement and whose pace it does not control. Indeed, much of this anxiety often seems to reflect fears of losing control.
As political and social polarization deepens, Israeli domestic politics becomes a crucial factor in explaining this anxiety around the negotiations. These fears have come to reflect a domestic crisis just as much as they reflect security concerns. In this context, Netanyahu’s government uses the “Iranian threat” to ensure a minimal degree of consensus and to postpone disputes over leadership and the future of the political system. This approach reveals an impasse for the government, which is happy to manage a climate of anxiety and fuel it rather than develop a long-term strategic vision for addressing regional shifts.
Does Israel have real policy alternatives to apprehension and escalation? Its options appear limited: war, Netanyahu’s preference, carries a high cost and seems unlikely; political pressure on Washington has its limits, and the prospect of a unified regional front is eroding.
Nonetheless, limited alternatives will not change Netanyahu’s policy, which rests on a simple equation: either settlements on his time that are tailored to his political and personal considerations, or a grey-zone that allows for wearing down Hamas without eliminating it, undermining Hezbollah’s capabilities while leaving capable of destabilizing Lebanon, and clipping Iran’s wings without removing it from the regional equation.
In light of these parameters, Netanyahu could seek to push Washington to the middle ground: an agreement focused on Iran’s nuclear program that grants Trump the win he seeks while allowing him to avoid war, in exchange for more military freedom of action against the Iranian ballistic missile program and Iran’s proxies. Such a temporary deal would satisfy both sides, but it kicks the can down the road rather than resolving the problem.
In sum, anxiety is a defensive mindset that can be exploited politically, but it does not constitute a policy or an alternative strategy that keeps up with rapid shifts. The solution that could assuage this anxiety is the outcome Israel rejects: engagement in talks for a comprehensive and durable regional peace settlement by which Israel agrees to live alongside an independent Palestinian entity that grants the Palestinians some of their rights.
