A new Iran means an Iran different from the one we have known for four decades. Perhaps a modern civilian system could emerge, or the current system itself but with different policies, moving toward openness, including toward the West, ending its status as a “state of war” and engaging in political and economic competition and new regional alliances.
Is this cause for concern? And why?
Some of those who believe this theory argue that the old, besieged Iran is safer for its neighbors than an open Iran.
Their view holds that Iran is a major regional state and a dormant economic giant that has been stifled by ideologically driven clerics. Therefore, openness would change the equation and make competition difficult for countries such as the Gulf states, as well as Iraq and Egypt. The situation would become even more challenging and complex if Iran reconciled with Israel and normalized relations with it. The region would then have two dominant powers.
In my view, this scenario is very possible. Every cycle has an end, and we are witnessing the erosion of the old Iranian system, which may collapse on its own or as a result of the imminent confrontation with the United States and Israel. Another strong possibility is that the system withstands the military challenge but changes from within, as happened previously with Russia and China.
Here we assume that change is possible in both cases. Of course, this does not negate other possibilities, such as the regime surviving and maintaining its old policies, or partially changing and becoming more extreme and closed. We will set aside these two possibilities and focus on the likelihood of “change” as a policy, regardless of whether the ruling system remains or not.
Iran has long been and remains an active regional axis. Since adopting a policy of exporting revolutions, it has been the primary source of tension, wars, and military competition. Even those who shared in spreading chaos, such as Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi, had a lesser impact.
Iran’s policy based on confrontations and military axes worries the region and drains its resources. US sanctions have weakened its economy without granting other countries any added advantage. The chaos and destabilization from Iran have cost the region dearly, driven away international investors, and forced most governments to focus on entrenchment and counter-alliances.
An open and stable Iran would be a source of revitalization for the region, not impoverishment, as some fear. There are various models around the world showing how the rise of one country elevates the region rather than diminishing it.
What about the possibility of a future relationship between Iran and Israel? This is highly plausible. Contrary to what may appear, Iranian-Israeli tension since the revolution until today has been the result of competition over dominance, not deeply rooted hostility, despite the political, religious, and historical rhetoric of the two systems. Israel did not accept Iran’s regional dominance because it could threaten it, and Iran was expanding in what it considered its sphere of influence by seeking control over Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and other Levant countries. Had Israel accepted coexistence with Iranian expansion, the confrontation might not have occurred. This scenario is almost impossible for the Hebrew state to accept, as it fears expansionist intentions. Moreover, it would not accept any regional power possessing such enormous influence, even if it were neutral. The project of the current system in Tehran was to build an Iranian Islamic empire, just as the Turks once had their vast state, and the Arabs before them.
The project has collapsed because it is unrealistic in today’s world. Secondly, although the Iranian regime is capable of manufacturing advanced weapons and building dangerous regional networks, it is administratively and economically backward and immersed in a hardline ideology rejected globally, even by supporting countries such as China and Russia.
A relationship between Tehran and Tel Aviv is possible, perhaps even under the current regime if its policies change, as Israel has direct and semi-direct relations with nearly half of the other Arab and regional states. Could the relationship turn into an alliance? Unlikely, because Iran is currently the camp against which regional powers align. If it changes, then against whom would Israel and Iran align? Iran could become a promising market for regional countries if its approach changes. It might resemble Saudi Arabia, for example, which is an important contributor to the economies of many Arab and regional states.
Economic competition with Iran would lift the region to new levels and push countries to focus on developing their capabilities. It could serve as inspiration, like Saudi Arabia in its Vision 2030, which outlined a plan to strengthen multiple income sources instead of dangerous reliance on oil alone. The old Iran is a burden on the region and a cause of resource depletion. It is hoped that we will see a new Iran that is successful, prosperous, and stable, because that would benefit its neighbors. Imagine having South Korea as your neighbor, which also emerged devastated in the 1950s, as did Singapore and Ireland, once the poorest in Europe. Successful countries create a positive and prosperous regional environment.
