Iran does not have many friends, neither in the region nor internationally. Amid American threats of war over the past couple of months, however, Iran’s neighbors have voiced a desire to see conflict averted, as well as fears that it could spread if it were to erupt. They have urged both sides to take a diplomatic path. As for the broader international community, it has largely remained silent, save for the muted objections of Russia and China.
The only party beating the drums of war alongside US President Donald Trump is Israel. It claims that it supports a war because it is the primary target of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs, as well as the proxy forces it has propped up over the past three decades. Despite their discontent with Trump's policies, the Europeans fear that Iran could use its nuclear and ballistic programs to blackmail them, and they have been hardening their own sanctions since 2025.
Iran’s neighbors have many grievances against it, foremost among them Iran’s use of proxies and its interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Gulf states over the decades. Not only did Iran form militias and supply them with arms; more egregious still, it fomented sectarian strife and what resembles civil wars within these countries, preventing them from building functional states. Nor did it stop there: the militias it formed have been used in regional conflicts, as we saw with Hezbollah’s intervention against Israel and its intervention (2012–2024) in Syria to help President Assad maintain power.
Iran can, for its part, respond by pointing to the eight-year war (1980–1988) that Iraq waged against it with the support of several Arab states.
Iran, however, has not faced military or security challenges since 1988. Even with the United States, cyclical negotiations go back and forth. Iran cooperated (logistically, in its terms) with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it continues to benefit from the instability that has plagued Iran since the 2003 invasion.
The region has been rife with political and security skirmishes and clashes since the 1990s. Most rounds ended in Iran’s favor, with the United States often subsequently seeking appeasement or containment. Accordingly, Iran appeared to be gaining ground, albeit taking small steps, until the decisive Iraq round and its takeover of Syria.
Observers offer divergent explanations for the United States’ acquiescence to Iran until Trump arrived. In practice, Washington ceded ground to Tehran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its destabilizing concessions culminated in the 2015 nuclear agreement, which, as anyone familiar with the details knows, merely postponed nuclear breakout and failed to eliminate the threat altogether.
How, then, do we explain its gentleness drive for expansion, reach, and dominance? Is it the “ideological project” of the religious state? Or is it another version of Türkiye’s expansion, projection of influence, and geopolitical consolidation? Either way, Iran steadily and rapidly advanced rapidly on multiple fronts as the United States seemed to retreat at every turn, until the Trump thunderbolt hit in 2017.
Dismantling the Iranian project took several years; the assault began by severing its limbs and destroying its proxies and then moved to a direct strike on Iran. The initial aim was to set al-Qaeda and ISIS against Iran and its proxies. For its part, Iran claimed to be combating terrorism like the international coalition led by the United States. Until only a few months ago, Vali Nasr (author of The Shia Revival, 2007) had been framing his analysis of regional tensions as a Sunni–Shia conflict.
Yet, as Western powers have come to realize, the two sides of this conflict were competing over their antagonization of the West. The first rounds of strikes showed that the Iranian camp was no less fragile than the ISIS camp. And so, Israeli action backed by the US shattered Iran’s proxies, and its wings were clipped. The era of accommodation or containment was over, and it was time to grip Iran by the neck, even to threaten to suffocate it.
It is a new era. New terms and conditions of hegemony have emerged in the region and the world. Some compare the current phase to the “East of Suez” era (today it is the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea), as hegemony was shifting and the Americans overtook the British in the late 1960s. The United States has not left the region since.
Assuming they were untouchable- an illusion that must end, even if this demands the use of force- Iran and Türkiye stretched their arms. Who, then, has lost touch with reality and the balance of power: Khosrow or Caesar? Khosrow, this time, came draped in the Prophet’s cloak. As for Caesar, he has put his cross aside and mounted an aircraft carrier.
Iran, which does not believe in secular law, has been protesting the violations of international law by Iraq and its allies, and now Iranian officials decry the United States’ and Israel’s disregard for international law. Is it the strength or weakness of the law that drives the weak to seek its protection?
