On October 28, 2023, in the early days of the Gaza war, also known as Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, I published an analytic piece in this newspaper that sought to go beyond the immediate event and anticipate not the limited confrontation but possible trajectories that it could precipitate.
At the time, sharp, perhaps even pessimistic conclusions, seem to have been drawn. I argued that “Iran was not absent and had encouraged this operation,” and I pointed to several indications to this effect. However, the developments over the years since have shown that this reading was not exaggerated. The trajectory it projected gradually unfolded, eventually becoming tangible reality.
Early on in the ongoing conflict between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other, I had read the war as a “powder keg exploding," and I touched on the potential repercussions of the operation for the Gulf states.
The central argument of that analysis was that Iran was not a distant party but rather a “visible hidden actor” operating through a network of complex relationships with non-state actors (i.e., militias) across multiple arenas. This “proactive engagement,” as it was described at the time, was not limited to political support by Iran, which had created an integrated system for arming, financing, and training militia from Gaza to southern Lebanon, and from Iraq to Yemen, with cells in other locations. This system laid the groundwork for a state “that would rule the Islamic world from Tehran.”
What followed affirms the pertinence of this characterization. The proxies entered the conflict either simultaneously or in stages, transforming the war from a confrontation in Gaza into an open regional condition. In Iraq and Syria, foreign bases and interests were targeted; in southern Lebanon, clashes erupted; and in the Bab al-Mandab, new threats to maritime security emerged. These were not spontaneous reactions but part of a strategy based on distributing pressure and expanding the scope of the conflict.
This early analysis also suggested that Iran seeks to impose itself as an unavoidable party to any settlement and sought to become the “white elephant in the room” of negotiations. At one point, its former foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, even proposed hosting prisoner exchanges between Hamas and Israel in Tehran.
This prediction of Iranian intervention has largely materialized. In Tehran’s view, it has become difficult to envision de-escalation or a regional arrangement that bypasses Tehran and fails to accommodate its demands for expansion and influence, or at least taking its perceived interests into account.
The early analysis also warned that the Gulf states could, despite their attempts not to, find themselves drawn into the conflict. This has indeed happened. More than two years after the article’s publication, missile and drone attacks (direct and through proxies) have struck facilities in every Gulf country since February 28. These attacks aim to impose a new equation: “stability in the region will not be possible unless Iranian interests are taken into account.”
This approach reflects expansionist ambitions, particularly in the Gulf. Over the past two years, such pressures have recurred in various forms, weakening the Gulf’s security environment. With each round of escalation, the central idea was reaffirmed: the conflict is no longer confined to Israel and Hamas. It has become part of a broader regional struggle in which the Palestinian issue obscures the real objective.
The analysis also likened the Middle East to a “powder keg.” The events that have followed demonstrate that this keg was not only flammable but had already begun releasing successive sparks, each carrying the potential for violent conflict. Although the full explosion was recent, the region had been gradually becoming increasingly combustible for a long time.
Today, two years on and following the full-scale eruption, which has rendered these intentions visible, one can say that this early analysis has been validated. It anticipated the nature of Iran’s strategy, its mechanisms of action, the expansion of the conflict across multiple arenas, and the potential for direct impact on the Gulf. Most importantly, it highlighted that structural conflict could spark a series of rounds.
That early reading was a warning about an agenda driven by expansionist impulses. Unless the roots of this trajectory are addressed, the region will remain on the edge: every truce will be temporary and stability will remain fragile, awaiting a new round of escalation.
No one knows the ultimate outcomes of the ongoing conflict. But we can say one thing for sure: without a change in the doctrine of the Iranian regime- unless it renounces its project to export the revolution and build allied proxy forces under a political “nationalist” doctrine underpinned by religious doctrine- the crisis will endure.
To conclude: the problem is not in the prediction, but in ignoring it... what was warned about has come to pass.
