From time to time, leaders of the Darfur movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement issue statements that raise both confusion and concern. These statements hint at leveraging arms to consolidate positions or to obtain concessions in exchange for continuing to fight alongside the army against the Rapid Support Forces.
The fact is that since the Juba Agreement was signed, the question has not been whether Darfur movements secured their share of power, but how they will navigate Sudan's current moment: with the mindset of a state or that of a militia. The agreement was not an endpoint. It was the beginning of a far more demanding challenge: transitioning from the mentality of armed movements to that of a responsible partner in state-building.
In this context, it is hard to ignore that combining “state privileges” with “non-state tools of force” is not sustainable. Even if such an arrangement appears workable in the short term, it ultimately sows the seeds of instability over the medium and long term. Dual authority is fundamentally incompatible with statehood: either there is a single source of authority and decision-making, or the entire system becomes an arena of open contestation. If there is one lesson people have drawn from this war, it is that the experience of the Rapid Support Forces must not be repeated.
Some movements obtained executive positions and sovereign posts after Juba, an understandable outcome of a peace settlement. These positions, however, must not be treated as spoils of war. They are public responsibilities and must be assessed by their results. What is required, therefore, is a shift from the logic of “political rewards” to that of “accountability.” Anyone in public office must be judged by performance, not by the power balances that brought them there.
The problem begins when weapons are used, even implicitly, as instruments of political pressure. Resorting to force in moments of disagreement does not only threaten opponents; it undermines the legitimacy of the state itself. More alarmingly, the persistence of this dynamic transforms weapons from a “temporary means” into an “acquired right.” Over time, bearing arms is no longer tied to exceptional circumstances. It becomes embedded in political and organizational identity, as seen elsewhere in the region. Fighters come to view it as a source of status, leaders tie their influence to it, and any call for disarmament becomes an existential threat rather than a reform measure.
What might be called “war economies” gradually take shape in parallel: off-budget resources, informal activities, and networks of interest that thrive on, or resist, oversight. Such a system does not merely exist on the margins of the state; it competes with it. The longer this cycle persists, the harder it becomes to break.
Equally dangerous is the continued use of mobilizing rhetoric built around the “center/periphery” divide. Such discourse may be understandable in times of war, where identity serves as a tool of mobilization, but it becomes destructive within a state. A state is not built by dividing citizens or fueling regionalism and resentment, but by uniting them around a shared project. Repeating the same worn-out slogans produces no new solutions; it merely reproduces the same crisis in different terms. What is needed today is genuine integration into an inclusive state project, strengthening its institutions, and learning from wars that have brought Sudan nothing but destruction, deep underdevelopment, and chronic instability.
In the current situation, some movements are fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces while maintaining separate command structures. What is needed now is a shift in loyalty from movement to state. This requires integrating these forces into the army and other regular institutions through clear frameworks: full registration of personnel and weapons, and a unified chain of command. The ultimate goal is to bring all arms under state control, ensuring no armed group operates outside it. In parallel, all forces must contribute to removing the remnants of war, promoting coexistence, rejecting regionalist rhetoric, and accepting the principle of peaceful democratic transfer of power. The aim is a stable Sudan where legitimacy is earned through elections, not weapons, and where demands are pursued within institutions through peaceful means, not by obstructing the state or taking up arms against it.
If these movements are serious about becoming durable political actors, they must articulate a national discourse that transcends regional boundaries and speaks to all Sudanese, backed by clear programs. This applies not only to Darfur movements but to all armed movements across the country.
The required transformation will not be easy. It demands giving up immediate advantages such as direct influence and financial gains. In return, it opens the door to greater and more sustainable rewards: genuine political legitimacy, long-term stability, a constructive role within the state, and participation in building it rather than undermining it.
