Between the natural state and the parallel state that stands in its place, especially in functional terms, the Shiite duo (Hezbollah and Amal Movement) has succeeded in entrenching sectarianism through a distorted iteration of older failed Lebanese models. In truth, the duo’s conduct at the height of its ascendancy did not break the pattern. The pressing question, however, remains. Why insist on repeating the mistakes of those who had been there before?
The Shiite question in Lebanon is now being raised in light of two key turning points: social and political, internal and external. The first is the October 17 protests: an unfinished collective push for change. The second is the October 7 attacks and their repercussions in Lebanon and the region. Thus, the pressing Shiite question, on all its levels (intra-Shiite, national, and external) has come to the forefront, overtaking what has long been a foundational question since the creation of the state.
If the Shiite consciousness in Lebanon was broadly shaped by a sense of marginalization - one that Shiite political elites, heirs to both traditional political families and the left, have heavily exploited; the Amal Movement, after the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, adopted the slogan of “the deprived,” while Hezbollah raised the banner of “the oppressed” to monopolize the representation of the community - they failed, however, to reckon with the fact that transforming these slogans from demands into instruments of power would create crises with other communities and bring dysfunction to the state. Having a non-state army neither resolved Shiites’ sense of disorientation nor addressed their underlying issues; instead, it reproduced them.
In an early effort to grapple with the Shiite question, Hani Fahs sought to address Shiite mistrust of the state. While acknowledging the community’s historic marginalization, he rejected the idea of turning the community into a closed unit or a substitute for the state. Shiites, he believed, cannot achieve political fulfillment outside the state, and the state cannot have stability without the Shiites' full integration as citizens rather than as a separate component.
In this respect, Fahs uses what Iraqi thinker Abdul-Jabbar al-Rifai calls the “component paradigm:” transforming sects into self-sufficient political entities that take precedence over the idea of the nation. In this model, the individual is not defined as a citizen but as a member of a sectarian component of the state, and their rights are determined by the group they belong to. The state thus recedes from being a shared home to an arena for competition among groups.
If there is indeed a Shiite issue in Lebanon, the sounder path forward, for both Shiites and Lebanon, is to resolve it nationally. In its current iteration, the first question of how to address the issue must be directed to Shiites themselves. The ruling Shiite duo alone bears responsibility for providing an answer.
It would be unjust to question the Shiite community’s ultimate belonging to Lebanon. Nonetheless, its current leadership is showing that it believes in “conditional patriotism” shaped by considerations beyond citizenship: a particularistic identity that fosters an illusory sense of superiority, rests on the notion of permanent dominance, and leads to inertia and ideological encampment when confronted with setbacks.
Therefore, the broader Shiite question in Lebanon cannot be turned into a confrontation with the state. Rather, the relationship must be redefined. More specifically, it is a question of geography and its loss- of the systematic erasure of southern memory, of the loss of lives, infrastructure, and livelihoods, and of the risks of dispersion. It is also a question of what the community wants, and what it can realistically achieve as a sect. Here, questions of identity, partnership, role, and choices come to the fore, as does the question of permanent “resistance” and its elevation to an alternative for the authority of the state.
