It appears that the US-Iranian memorandum of understanding and the 60-day transitional period, intended to ease tensions and create favorable conditions for negotiations between Washington and Tehran, are on the verge of collapse. Some consider it to have suffered a knockout blow in light of the military escalation in the Gulf and the war of words between two sides.
Furthermore, multiple Pakistani, as well as American sources, point to a state of division within Iran between the "civilian" troika, specifically the President, the Speaker of Parliament, and the Foreign Minister, whose policies are characterized by pragmatism, and the radical Revolutionary Guard, which, according to those sources, holds the actual decision-making power on the ground and remains hardline in its positions.
All the escalation we are witnessing today, in terms of both geography and firepower, initiated by Washington alongside an Iranian response reaching the Gulf states, comes in the form of escalatory Iranian threatening messages. This is also yielding further negative consequences for the "day after" the war regarding Iranian relations with the Arab Gulf states.
Every indicator suggests we are facing a moment of escalation whose objective may be to deliver mutual deterrent messages. However, it constitutes a clear and highly probable slide, though one cannot be entirely certain in this regard, toward an open-ended war whose scope, immediate repercussions, and subsequent ripples across the region no one can predict should it occur. In this respect, the Middle East is living at a crossroads fraught with open dangers and varying scenarios, and the coming days will tell us where the region is headed.
In the same context, along the axis of crises and wars from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, the idea or proposal to form a trilateral US-Iranian-Lebanese committee to work on stopping the war in Lebanon never took off. This did not come as a surprise to many, considering that it would have "officially" and practically cemented Iran’s role, from Washington's perspective, as a "partner" in managing the Lebanese-Israeli dossier, whether in war, truce, or understanding. This is something Washington rejects, even if it had accepted it "verbally" at a certain moment.
Instead, Washington moved toward sponsoring and embracing the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. Some argue that the structuring of these talks effectively decouples the conflicting tracks in the region. This decoupling is something the Lebanese authorities - both the presidency and the government - adhere to in principle and with absolute clarity, even as they remain cognizant of the difficulties and challenges of these negotiations. They maintain this stance on the grounds that the decision of war and peace, alongside the exclusivity of weapons, must remain among their core and absolute sovereign responsibilities. This is precisely what they aim to achieve as a fundamental prerequisite on the path toward "the return to the state."
This is naturally no easy feat under current conditions. Domestically, the most significant obstacle remains the principled opposition from forces ideologically or politically aligned with Iran. This opposition manifests under various banners, yet its objective is clear: to maintain the de facto "unity of arenas" and entrench a return to the previously existing balance of power, albeit with minor adjustments.
Another form of varied opposition exists as well; these factions are not necessarily against negotiations conducted by the political authority, but they harbor reservations or criticisms to varying degrees regarding the premises, rules, and trajectory of the talks, with some offering alternative proposals in this regard.
These are matters that can be addressed through a serious, necessary, and much-needed domestic dialogue, in which everyone must participate regardless of their stance. This dialogue must accompany the negotiations and provide practical proposals that strengthen Lebanon's negotiating position, while contributing to the formulation of the roadmap and its reference points that must be adhered to throughout the negotiating track.
These negotiations face a myriad of challenges, the most significant and dangerous of which is undoubtedly Israeli policy. This policy aims to entrench the occupation and enforce control under various pretexts and arguments, capitalizing on a balance of power on the ground that tilts in its favor. Consequently, the US role remains more than necessary to pressure Israel in this regard. Many are asking whether Washington is prepared to alter its well-known policies and exert the required pressure on Israel to facilitate the negotiating track - a question to which a clear answer is not easily obtained.
This trajectory, whose primary and foundational objective from Lebanon’s perspective remains the end of the occupation, requires the Lebanese Armed Forces to exert total control over the region extending from south of the Litani River to the internationally recognized Lebanese borders. It also entails finalizing these borders by settling the remaining disputed points. It is a path fraught with numerous difficulties and challenges, and it remains undoubtedly affected by the multifaceted, multi-party conflict across the Gulf and the wider region.
Yet, this trajectory remains essential to liberating the land and reclaiming actual sovereignty, particularly if it is reinforced - as previously noted - by a domestic national dialogue. This must be a dialogue of ideas, not of slogans; a dialogue that crystalizes practical proposals and formulas to support and strengthen the Lebanese position throughout a "long journey" fraught with obstacles.
This "journey" also undoubtedly aims, alongside the objectives we mentioned, to terminate a role Lebanon has historically known in its modern history and for which it has always paid a heavy price: the role of serving as an "arena for the wars of others," as Ghassan Tueni used to remind us.
