“Yes, but with a big but!” This was the answer that speaking on condition of anonymity, French officials responded to our question whether they were impressed by visiting Iraqi Prime Minster Ali Falih al-Zaidi.
The yes part was about finding the 41-year-old al-Zaidi, a young politician, with enough charisma to ensure a longer run in Iraqi politics where since the end of the Baathist rule meteoric rises and falls have been the norm.
The but part was about whether the new boy on the block would show enough backbone to take-on a motely of domestic and foreign forces determined to keep post-Baath Iraq in a limbo.
As is often the case, a number of gold fountain-pens were used to initial a series of memoranda of understanding both with the French state and private corporations.
The partly state-owned energy giant TotalEnergies agreed to increase its investments in Iraq from $12 to $16 billion without specifying a time-span.
Another MoU was signed with another semi-public outfit to build a giant data center near Baghdad. Al-Zaidi also agreed to revive part of the special relationship that Iraq had with France during Saddam Hussein’s reign in military fields.
Although not spelled out, the accord implied that Iraq would switch part of its weapons procurement from the US to France. Another MoU envisages the building of a drone manufacturing complex in Iraq.
The golden pens were also kept busy a day later when al-Zaidi - boosted by his longer than expected session with President Emmanuel Macron -went to Berlin for a meeting with Chancellor Friedrich Merz. A hot topic in Berlin talks was the need to diversify transit outlets for Iraqi energy exports.
The subtext of that topic is the assumption by Paris and Berlin that Iran will continue playing fast and loose with the Strait of Hormuz.
Diplomatic observers in both Paris and Berlin say Iraq under al-Zaidi seems a more promising partner than under other PMs since the fall of the Baathist regime. Nevertheless, al-Zaidi must still pass a number of tests.
“The first test,” says a senior French source “is to show how independent he is from the regime in Tehran.”
That may sound like a pertinent question. Al-Zaidi could not have become prime minister without the say-so of Shiite ad Kurdish parties linked to Tehran.
Time will tell but my hunch is that al-Zaidi, indeed a whole new generation of Iraqi politicians, long to free themselves from the shackles imposed by the Khomeinists in post-Saddam times.
We must also remember that under Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden Tehran’s intervention in Iraqi affairs was tacitly accepted by Washington.
With the Khomeinist regime severely weakened and incapable of developing a coherent foreign policy Iraqis would have a greater opportunity to play their own tune.
Another key test for al-Zaidi is whether he can deliver on the promise to disband militia groups that often act as a state within the state. It seems that both Macron and Merz spent a good part of the session with al-Zaidi to hammer in that “urgent need.”
A government that cannot prevent foreign-backed militias from firing missiles and drones at another country cannot be seen as a serious partner in defense and security matters.
In that context al-Zaidi’s record so far is mixed at best.
Of the five Tehran-controlled militias, so far only two have agreed to be absorbed into official security structures.
That is good but not good enough because the groups concerned will keep some of their weapons and a softer version of their chain of command nominally under a larger official command and control system.
Three other militia groups, in fact the wildest, have wiggled out of any accord with al-Zaidi’s government using the excuse of “fighting ISIS” as a fig-leaf. Their dissolution is a sine qua non for Iraq being accepted as a serious partner for the European Union.
Whether the Hormuz tragi-comical show continues, the idea of linking Iraq’s huge energy resources to European markets via pipelines to the Mediterranean makes both political and business sense.
That, however, is subject to two imperatives.
First, Syria, the best route in business terms, must achieve a measure of stability under the rule of law, a tall order you might say. For that to happen, Israel and Türkiye need to curtail their ambitions in Syria where they are trying to set up glacis close their borders with the war-torn nation.
The second route passing through the Kurdish Autonomous territory to Türkiye also needs a change in Ankara’s plan to acquire a droit-de-regard in parts of northern Iraq while encouraging Turcoman secessionism with the excuse that the infamous Treaty of Lausanne has lapsed.
France and Germany also have a number of underbrush issues with Baghdad, little irritants that undermine confidence.
Berlin is concerned about a few dozen German citizens of Kurdish Turkish origin languishing in Iraqi prisons.
The unfortunate wannabe guerrillas had moved to Iraq to create a branch of the now dissolved PKK for armed operations against Iran. Captured by Iran-backed Iraqi Kurdish groups they were handed to Baghdad authorities.
France’s main underbrush issue concerns financial compensation that Iraq owes a number of French companies who made losses when Saddam was overthrown.
Iraq has the geopolitical, demographic and cultural wherewithal to hit above its weight, especially at a time that the whole region is ripe for an historic re-figuration.
Iraq also needs to reassert the authority of the central government, ensure greater harmony between the two parts of the Kurdish Autonomous Region, demarcate its continental shelf line with Kuwait, forge closer ties with the GCC and Jordan and help open and reactivate the Shatt all-Arab without necessarily adopting a hostile posture against Iran.
Apart from the quixotic operations of Tehran proxies mentioned above, Iraq has managed to steer clear of the imbroglio that has led to a senseless war in the region.
Can al-Zaidi seize that opportunity?
The answer is: yes, if.
A big if.
