Undoubtedly, the economic and financial fallout from the US war on Iran contributed to the Democratic Party's victory in securing control of both chambers of the US Congress - the Senate and House of Representatives. Nevertheless, foreign policy and the ultimate decision to go to war remain vested in the president, even as Congress retains the power to leverage certain policies by obstructing the execution of specific decisions, particularly in "financial or operational" domains.
The question raised today is whether the election results will prompt US President Donald Trump to reconsider certain policies, priorities, and approaches - chief among them in the Middle East being the Lebanese file, specifically the negotiating track managed by Washington under the banner of the "Framework Agreement" it drafted. Notably, this negotiating path has seen no actual progress due to the lack of US pressure on Israel to halt its ongoing war, a prerequisite that remains vital for effective negotiations.
The Israeli elections have concluded, opening up various scenarios for the mandate and formation of a new government among far-right political factions. These components share a unified outlook on the war and its intended objectives, even as their primary figures, namely Netanyahu and Eisenkot, diverge on specific tactical aspects of the Israeli approach rather than its strategic goals, particularly regarding the "day after" on the Lebanese front.
Faced with these shifts in shifting priorities, the necessary approach, the execution of strategic goals, and the lessons learned for the "day after" while awaiting a new Israeli government - with a return to the polls remaining a possibility if a coalition fails to form, as seen in past precedents - the question remains as to what tomorrow holds for the Lebanese-Israeli track. This is unfolding in a Middle East gripped by interconnected and overlapping wars, disputes, and conflicts, even if their root causes were not originally linked.
In this context, from a Lebanese perspective, four potential scenarios can be examined under the so-called "waiting period," resulting from the halt in negotiations until a new Israeli government is formed:
The first scenario involves the continuation of the Israeli war, which is useful to Netanyahu and serves as one of his primary cards to form a new government under his leadership. There is no deterrent, particularly from the US, to halt this conflict, which carries transformative objectives on the ground from the perspective of Israeli security, as reiterated by the Israeli political leadership across all its factions. It remains a self-restrained war, fluctuating in escalation and de-escalation in terms of both firepower and combat geography, and is considered a pivotal asset for future negotiations, as well as a tool to effectively stall them from Israel's perspective.
The second scenario points toward a shift toward an expanded, open-ended Israeli war across a wider geography by expanding the occupation as Israel threatens, in order to impose a new reality on the ground that would form the baseline for any future negotiations. Until then, it aims to establish a new status quo in the "Lebanese combat theater" - a situation that generates further complexities and variables for the "day after" whenever that day arrives, not only for the Lebanese front, but particularly at the Levantine level and across the Middle East in general.
The third scenario involves Washington accepting the US-Iranian understanding signed "remotely" between the two parties through Pakistani mediation last June, which begins with a ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon.
In practice, if Washington pressures Israel to accept this as a "transitional solution" - a move some might justify even as the Israeli occupation of the border strip persists and the status quo remains unchanged - it would yield an arrangement reminiscent of the written 1996 April Understanding, which regulated the combat theater during the Israeli occupation. This would effectively mark a return to the pre-Gaza support war status quo, defined by the establishment of an Israeli security strip and temporary guarantees tied to the evolving conflict objectives of the parties involved: an open-ended truce heavily contingent on the broader regional landscape.
Such a status quo would remain fragile, liable to collapse at the first turn. While this scenario would incorporate adjustments to the ground and negotiations, the core situation regarding war, peace, and strategic decisions would remain fundamentally unchanged.
The fourth scenario entails returning to negotiations from where they stood when suspended, or building upon the third scenario if a ceasefire is achieved. Such a truce cannot serve as the end of the road for the Lebanese authority, nor can it be locked in as a permanent fait accompli; instead, it must act as a catalyst to revive talks through this new ceasefire variable, while accounting for the unavoidable new parameters created by this situation.
Lebanon must also draw lessons from the recent past to clearly and firmly assert what I term the "negotiating references" it must uphold. Chief among these is the 1949 General Armistice Agreement, which remains legally valid irrespective of subsequent conflicts in their various forms, serving as the foundational international legal framework governing relations between two parties in a state of war.
The same principle applies to relevant United Nations resolutions, most notably Resolution 1701, alongside the necessity of mapping out a negotiating roadmap with a flexible yet finite timeline. Adhering to these points, which are anchored in international legitimacy, its resolutions, rulings, principles, and customs, is absolutely vital for an effective return to the negotiating table.
