Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif criticized Russia, not behind closed doors, but on camera. He claimed that “from the first day of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, the Russians opposed our enrichment factory.” He then added: “They said they would not allow Iran to produce fuel for the Bushehr [nuclear power plant], and they tried to prevent this up until the last day... We see China and Russia as strategic allies, but they simply see Iran as a friend.”
Elaborating further, Zarif argues: “Thinking of permanent alliances is a pitfall.” He then added that he believes “it is dangerous for Iran to be anti-Russian or anti-US. We should prioritize our national interests like the Russians do.”
Alright, is this the first time Iran criticizes Moscow, and Zarif in particular, criticizes Russia? Certainly not. In April 2021, leaked audio emerged of Zarif discussing Russia’s attempts to undermine the 2015 nuclear deal.
In the leak, Zarif is heard saying that it was not in Russia’s interest for Tehran to normalize relations with the West. He also spoke of insulting his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. While the nuclear deal was being negotiated, Lavrov asked for updates, and Zarif responded: “It’s none of your business.”
The question now is, why are Iranians criticizing Moscow in the open? An informed source familiar with the political scene in both Iran and Russia explained that both the hardliners and reformists in the Iranian government have complex views on Russia.
The hardliners, as well as the Iranian schools’ history curriculum, see the Russians as occupiers who bombarded Iran. On the other hand, the reformists see the Russians as the main ally of the regime, especially its radical core (the Office of the Supreme Leader and those affiliated with him in the government).
Explaining this complexity, my source told me that “the Iranian Supreme Leader is personally taken by the geopolitical idea of Greater Khorasan, which extends to reach Russia.”
“While the Supreme Leader reads Russian literature,” he added, Ali Khamenei also “fears the emergence of an Iranian Gorbachev.”
Thus, the Supreme Leader has a Khorasani perspective on the Russians, and he is influenced by their literature. When he looks at the Russian experience, he fears the emergence of an Iranian “reformer” who does to his regime what Gorbachev did to the Soviet Union.
My source said the reformists’ criticism of Russia is a veiled criticism of the Supreme Leader and his entourage. He also explained that, despite the claims to the contrary, some Iranian reformists are closer to Washington than Moscow, and Zarif is the most prominent among them.
As for the Russians and their view of Iran and its nuclear program, my source stressed that regardless of what Russia says about the nuclear question in public, one thing is certain: Moscow is wary of Iran’s long-range missiles and the prospect of an Iranian atomic bomb, which “would be the nuclear threat closest to Moscow.”
A seasoned diplomat who is deeply familiar with Russian politics affirmed: “Yes, it is true. You should keep in mind that ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states genuinely serve the economic interests of China and Russia, while their relationship with Iran is useful for political propaganda and confronting the United States.”
These are some of the secrets we need to know to understand the criticisms of Russia we are seeing today. There are surely many more, both in the past and the present.
