There is probably no figure quite like Edmund Burke in the Arab world today. The 18th-century Irish-British who, to a large extent, laid the foundations of conservative political thought through his critique of the French Revolution, developed a philosophy that advocates gradual change rather than radical revolution. Burke stressed the need to safeguard tradition and the institutions already in place, calling for a practical approach to development and reform that respects the unique cultural and historical contexts of different countries and societies.
Echoes of Burke’s philosophy, however, can be found in contemporary Arab politics, especially during and in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”. Indeed, some of the conservative leaders in the Arab world have demonstrated pragmatic leadership and strategic acumen in their struggle against the triple threat of Muslim Brotherhood’s political Islam (in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan), Iran’s revolutionary political Islam (in Yemen and Iraq), and “Jihadist” terrorism.
The same is true for their struggle with the loud liberal left, which often ends up providing a platform for Islamic movements that swiftly build on the ruins of the political institutions that had been built by the left, as happened following the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime.
This school of Arab politics, which is embodied by the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has been leading one of the most sensitive social and economic shifts in the history of the region. They are pursuing gradual change through reform that does not clash with the heritage of their countries, whereby political and social stability is prioritized. Thus, despite lacking theoretical and philosophical underpinnings, their approach reflects Burke’s philosophy.
One of Burke’s fundamental arguments is that: “The true statesman is he who combines in himself the propensity to preserve what exists with the capacity to improve and develop it” without fearing the contradiction this entails. In practice, it advocates reform founded on gradual change, the development of governance, and cautious modernization that is mindful of the need to preserve particular elements of tradition. This approach can clearly be seen in the progress currently underway in the region in terms of women’s rights, the adoption of technology, economic diversification, the development of laws that promote gender equality, and the promotion of tolerance and social stability.
Meanwhile, after the 2011 Arab uprisings and prior to their outbreak (i.e., since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 that sought a “hostile democratization” of the Middle East through the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad), the complex mosaic that is the social fabric of the region was blown up in stages. Indeed, its social history, collective memory, and traditional institutions were desecrated, and these elements were wantonly unaccounted for in strategies for engendering the development so badly needed in these countries.
In contrast to other global leaders who called for immediate democratization during and before the Arab Spring, the conservative political leaders of the region emphasized cautious pragmatism. Weary of the expansion of the Iranian revolutionary project or Islamists ascending to power, their approach was built on staving off the dangerous repercussions for the region that could be brought about by sudden shifts. Their experiences during this period laid the political foundations for a strategy that combines stability and flexibility in a region fraught with turbulent change and revolutionary dynamics, which are inherently unpredictable and always raise the specter of chaos.
While the political foundations of this approach were laid through practical experience, it has an acute need for theoretical and philosophical foundations laid by a “progressive conservative,” “liberal conservative,” or “progressive right-wing” intellectual.
I accept that all these concepts are reductionist for various reasons. First and foremost, the right-wing/ left-wing dichotomy emerged through the Western experience of partisan competition and on the basis of the dynamics that arose as a result of the push and pull between social and cultural transformations, on the one hand, and monarchical regimes, on the other. Meanwhile, political thought in the Arab world was built on the dynamics that arose amid the interplay between the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the dynamics of colonialism. Thus, it primarily revolved around governance and sources of legitimacy.
Between the mid-19th century and the mid-20th century, one could point to Arab intellectuals and political bodies that could be loosely associated with “progressive conservatism,” “liberal conservatism,” or “progressive right-wing thought.” The region was home to both civic-minded figures who meet this description, like Taha Hussein, Lotfi al-Sayed, the upper brass of the Wafd Party, and before them all, Rifat Al-Tahtaw (1801- 1873), and religious figures like Sheikh Mohammed Abduh, around whom secular intellectuals like Taha Hussein and Qasim Amin gravitated.
Lebanon also had its fair share of progressive right-wing figures. Though he was something of a secular extremist, Shibli Shumayyel was one. More reasonable Lebanese figures include Farah Antoun, Butrus al-Bustani, and Fares Chidiac.
Once the 1950s and its nationalist revolutions arrived with Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was followed by precursors to the rise of the “Baath” and its various evils, the fragile foundations of progressive conservative Arab political thought were destroyed. This process was coupled with the systematic elimination of rationality and moderation to the benefit of radical revolutionary ambition.
While the Arab right endured politically through the conservative regimes that chose to come to an understanding with the United States amid the Cold War, it continues to lack philosophical, political and moral theorization to this day. Meanwhile, left-wing and Islamic political cultures dominate political thought and debates on contemporary issues.
More dangerously perhaps, the diplomatic and political elites of these conservative political regimes are educated in Western universities, which are also dominated by the left. As a result, we have either elites who are left struggling to reconcile the knowledge they had accumulated prior to entering university, the things they learned in left-wing academic environments, and the character of their governments and political systems. Or we have elites who oppose the status quo and play the over-simplistic game of “democracy versus tyranny,” or elites who believe in their country’s political project but lack the progressive right-wing intellectual underpinnings needed to present a comprehensive and coherent narrative that defends the political choices of their countries, governments, and societies.
The Arab world desperately needs to generate a right-wing intellectual and a progressive right-wing culture that defends various paths towards stability and progress that go beyond preconceived notions regarding a struggle between democracy and tyranny. This would allow for putting forward and defending the viability of the conservative-progressive approach for overcoming the Arab world’s current plight and leading the Arabs toward stability, prosperity, and cohesion over the next few years.
