The strong Russia is in a crisis. It is like a strong boxer who has chosen to fight a smaller one and yet, cannot deal the knockout blow. The West is also in a crisis. Russia’s victory would be too much for it to bear, while Russia’s defeat will be too much for the world to bear.
A defeated Russia in Ukraine is more dangerous than a victorious one. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s defeat may force him to expand the war or bring it closer to nuclear war. Sometimes you need to save your rival after depriving them of victory.
I recall statements from a man who knows the international game and its players. He said the United States is a massive empire, and yet, it can be ruled by an ordinary, weak or moody man.
It can also lose a war. It can launch a probe and conclude that changes are needed: a new president, administration and perhaps even a new majority at Congress. It boasts institutions that can absorb shocks and blows.
The institution in the US is more powerful than the man. It grants him wide authority, but it can rein him in if he takes risks or violates the basic rules. Russia is another story. It can only feel reassured when a strong man is in power. The weak man makes it feel that it is being surrounded and under threat.
It is standing at an important crossroads where all choices are costly. The strong man relieves it of its concerns, fears of others and of the forces within its maps.
The Soviet experience is rife with lessons. Russia is a continent that boasts ethnic, religious and cultural wealth. Its stability is necessary for the security or Europe and Asian and international balances. That is why Russia must be helped in getting out of the Ukraine crisis.
It won’t bode well if we witness advanced western jets fighting Russian jets over Ukraine. No one can guarantee that the war will remain contained within its current boundaries. And yet, the world cannot withstand the consequences of the war becoming open-ended and stretching on for years.
The crisis of the current war runs deep. The West cannot agree on giving Russia what it wants because Russia will only view this as a victory. On the other hand, Putin’s Russia cannot leave Ukraine defeated. The defeat of the master of the Kremlin may threaten the Russian federation itself.
Delivering the knockout blow in Ukraine is not on the cards. Ukraine has no other choice than to resist the invading Russians even if it seems like a suicide mission that has cost it massive human and economic losses. Even if its counteroffensive fails, Ukraine will not surrender. It will seek more support from the West and pledge before its people to carry out another counteroffensive.
Russia is unable to deal the knockout blow, but it can afford the cost of a lengthy war. This does not deny the truth that Russia has upended international equations by waging the war and weakened its position in the club of major powers.
Ukraine and Russia have no choice but to keep going in the war. However, the prolongation of the conflict will pose many dangers to countries near and far. For nearby countries, they fear the war may expand to them, while distant ones are suffering the consequences of rising energy and grain prices. The world cannot withstand more years of war.
A real will to stop the war must be formed. China must play the role of some sort of savior, especially if Europe begins searching for a solution and the US starts to believe that Russia has not received a reward for its “aggression”.
It is not impossible to put conflicts on the right path towards a solution. The feeling that the knockout blow is out of reach must not mean that war should go on indefinitely. Rather, it should pave the way for an equation of semi-victory and semi-defeat, where small gains are distributed, and major disappointments are shared.
Has Putin’s long stay in power affected his convictions? Those who knew him have said that in his early years in office, he had sent positive messages to the West. He was prepared for Russia to join the rules and institutions that ran the world. He was ready to establish balanced or semi-balanced relations with the US and normal and strong relations with Europe.
He then realized that the West had never forgiven Russia for its Soviet journey. It still approached it as a danger that should be contained. The speed at which former Soviet republics threw themselves in the European Union or NATO laps reawakened old Russian fears in him. That is why he began to believe that his country would make its own security, borders and roles by bringing its neighbors to heel.
He even came to believe that he must stage a major revolt against the world that was born out of the Soviet rubble. This explains his annexation of Crimea, his military intervention in Syria, need to avenge NATO’s intervention in Serbia and Kosovo, and confront the colored revolutions that erupted near Russia’s borders.
The US can live under the rule of a weak man, but Russia cannot. The world will pay the price of Putin’s victory and will pay a higher one for his defeat. Will the potential failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive make the decision-makers in the West realize that it is time to search for a solution where both sides are semi-defeated and semi-victorious?
Is it time to save Russia and the world? Does the Kremlin feel like it needs someone to help it end the costly conflict in Ukraine? It is evident that Putin made an error in launching the war. The master of reports was fooled by reports.
