This question was raised prior to the current Gaza war, specifically during the rule of Hamas, and before and during every war that occurred at that time.
Benjamin Netanyahu constantly repeated it, whether on specific occasions or randomly.
Suppose that the current war finally ends. This will happen sooner or later. Will this question constitute a Gazan, Palestinian, Arab, or even international dilemma? The recognized Palestinian Authority announced more than once that it will not return to Gaza on board Israeli tanks, and it is right about that.
As for Egypt, which has the only passage for the people of the Gaza Strip to the outside world, it declares that it provides support and assistance and has no intention of returning to the Strip as a ruler, as was the case before the June 1967 war.
The country has sponsored most of the conferences and talks that aimed at ending the Palestinian division, in order to have one unified authority that would assume its responsibilities in the Gaza Strip as it does in the West Bank.
If the division had ended, there would have been no dilemma, and the saying of returning to Gaza on board Israeli tanks would have no justification.
If elections had been held in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, which Hamas and all the factions announced their willingness to run, the entire Palestinian situation would have been different. For the better, of course.
All of the above can be said about the period that preceded the recent war. Here, the question arises again: Who will rule Gaza after the war?
There is no logical justification for proposing a detailed scenario to answer this question, as long as the war is raging, and as long as its coming chapters herald the expansion of the area of destruction in Gaza and the West Bank, not to mention the possibilities of the outbreak of a regional war that no one can definitively assert whether it will occur or not.
In this situation, the conclusions of which are still ambiguous, the Palestinians and their Arab allies, led by Egypt, which has a historical, geographical and strategic connection to Gaza, should have a conclusive and unequivocal answer.
This answer, which must be based on a Palestinian and national will, begins with ending the division as an inevitable condition. There is nothing that prevents the continuation of efforts in this direction, even during the war. When this goal is achieved, those who have reservations about the PLO will go back on their doubts, while everyone will join its frameworks and institutions. Its National Council will be inclusive of all sects, including those who object to its programs and policies.
The organization, which was abandoned by its people, and turned into a faltering authority, is still, in the eyes of the world, the highest and most widely recognized Palestinian legitimacy. This is an advantage that cannot be sacrificed under any reason or under any circumstances.
Whoever invokes the impossibility of doing so is responsible for the uncertain destinies of the Palestinian people, cause and rights. The most dangerous point about the matter is the continued dispersion of the national authority and the scattering of its legitimacy, which brings back the question, albeit in a broader and more dangerous form: who rules the Palestinian situation as a whole?
Before the Al-Aqsa Flood War and the Iron Swords, each had his own considerations and justifications for the stagnation and failure. After this war, an important constant will emerge... There is no room for liquidating the Palestinian cause.
The world has also become closer to certainty that the ongoing Israeli battles in the region are futile. The American and Western pampering of Israel only produces several wars in Gaza and the West Bank, and also generates fears over the outbreak of a regional war, the consequences of which will be devastating.
The post-war phase must see the reorganization of the Palestinian house, by achieving national unity, a comprehensive political framework, and a political system based on elections, not only at the level of the presidency, parliament, and local councils, but at all sectors...
What I see is not impossible to achieve. Working on it is the inevitable path to keeping the people, the cause, and the rights at the heart of regional and international equations. If the time has come to regret neglecting the Palestinian house, its frameworks, and its institutions, it is not too late to rectify the sins of the past.
Our story will not end with the end of the war on Gaza and the West Bank in its current circumstances, but rather with the desired solution that satisfies the Palestinian people. This solution will not be in the interest of the Palestinians in light of the current status quo. They certainly bear alone responsibility for their internal structure, and will not spare friends and allies to help them rebuild it on the basis of one Palestine.
In a short sentence, I conclude... Let Israel stop its destructive war, leave Gaza, and then the Palestinians will manage their affairs.
